Macroeconomic Trade-Offs and Monetary Policy in the Euro Area by Manuel Mota Freitas Martins
  
MACROECONOMIC TRADE-OFFS AND MONETARY POLICY IN 
THE EURO AREA 
 
 
Manuel António da Mota Freitas Martins 
 
 
 
 
 
Tese de Doutoramento em Economia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orientada por: 
  Álvaro Pinto Coelho de Aguiar 
 
 
 
Faculdade de Economia 
Universidade do Porto 
2002 
  UNIÃO EUROPEIA
Fundo Social Europeu
Biographic Note 
 
Manuel António da Mota Freitas Martins was born on the 29th of November of 
1964, in Porto, Portugal. 
 
He holds a Licenciatura em Economia since 1987, and a degree of Mestre em 
Economia since 1996, both from Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto 
(FEP). His Masters' dissertation, entitled Moeda e Preços em Portugal 1932-1990: uma 
investigação com métodos de séries temporais, has been supervised by Professor 
Fernando Teixeira dos Santos. 
 
He has taught at FEP since his graduation, firstly Introductory Economics 
(1987-1993) and then Economic Policy (1994-1998), before the beginning of his 
doctoral studies. 
He has also taught Macroeconomics at Instituto de Estudos Superiores 
Financeiros e Fiscais, (1991-1994), and several short courses on macroeconomics and 
Portuguese economics, throughout 1987-2000. 
Between 1987 and 1998 he has worked as economist at the research department 
of Associação Industrial Portuense. 
He his a graduate researcher at CEMPRE - Centro de Estudos Macroeconómicos 
e de Previsão. 
 
His main scientific areas of research interest are Macroeconomics, Business 
Cycles, Monetary Theory and Policy, and Time Series Methods. 
 i
Acknowledgements 
 
In the full process of setting up this thesis I have benefited from contributions of 
many people, in many ways. I gratefully acknowledge all that assistance. Even though 
risking incompleteness, there are some contributors that I must single out. 
 
First, I am exceedingly indebted to my supervisor, Álvaro Aguiar, for his 
omnipresence and precious guidance throughout this work. Álvaro shared his time, his 
expertise, and his intelligence with extraordinary generosity, and has been crucial for 
many of the achievements in this thesis. In addition to the good fortune of working with 
him, I now have the even larger fortune of being his friend. 
I also owe a very special acknowledgement to Fabio Canova, for kindly 
evaluating ex-ante the research projects of the thesis, and for generously contributing 
priceless comments and suggestions on previous draft versions of chapters 2 and 3. 
I am also highly indebted to Miguel StAubyn, for helping me in my first steps of 
GAUSS programming and of the Kalman filter, for several invaluable discussions and 
suggestions, and for sharing his wisdom in co-authored work written back in 2001. 
I am thankful to the European Central Bank's Research Department, for sharing, 
ahead of publication, the time-series of the Area Wide Model Database that were 
relevant for this research. 
I thank Mikael Apel and Per Jansson for sharing their RATS code for Kalman 
filter estimation, used in an earlier stage of the research reported in chapter 2. I thank 
James D. Hamilton for some help with the Monte Carlo procedure for computing the 
confidence bands in chapter 2. I am very grateful to Richard Dennis, for sharing his 
GAUSS code for estimation of policymakers' preferences that was the basis for the code 
written for section 4 of chapter 3. 
I am thankful to Kevin Ross for a thorough discussion of a draft version of 
chapter 2, and to Álvaro Almeida for incisive comments and suggestions also on that 
draft and on some topics of monetary policy analysis, relevant for chapter 3. 
I acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions on preliminary material from 
this thesis, by several participants at the following conferences: EcoMod Annual 
Conference on Policy Modelling (July 2001, July 2002, Université Libre de Bruxelles); 
 ii
Conference on Growth and Business Cycles in Theory and Practice (June 2002, 
University of Manchester, Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research); Money, 
Macro and Finance Research Group Annual Conference (September 2002, University of 
Warwick); 7ª Conferência Anual da Sociedade Portuguesa de Investigação em 
Economia (Junho 2002, Universidade de Aveiro). I also thank participants at a seminar 
in Faculdade de Economia do Porto. 
As regards institutions, I am grateful to Faculdade de Economia da 
Universidade do Porto, for material and logistic assistance, throughout the years that I 
have been exempted from teaching and fully devoted to research. Most specially, I have 
benefited from invaluable support from CEMPRE* and from the PRODEP program of 
the Portuguese Government, which I gratefully acknowledge. 
I am also thankful to several colleagues of FEP, for their words and actions of 
encouragement throughout the whole process of development of the thesis. From them, 
I must emphasize Ana Paula Africano, Francisco Castro, Inês Drumond, Luís Marques, 
Celsa Machado, and Óscar Afonso. I also thank Pilar Gonzalez and Luis Delfim Santos 
for their kind help in translating the thesis abstract to French. 
Last, but certainly not the least, I owe a lot to my family, whose patience, 
encouragement, and assistance throughout the years of preparation of this thesis - week 
after week and, at some stages, weekend after weekend - has been crucial for its 
completion. Very special thanks are owed to my parents, wife, daughters, sister, 
brother-in-law, and godmother. 
 
In spite of all these contributions, I remain the sole responsible for this thesis, so 
that its limitations, imperfections, and possible errors, are my exclusive liability. 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
* CEMPRE - Centro de Estudos Macroeconómicos e Previsão - is supported by the Fundação para a 
Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal, through the Programa Operacional Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação 
(POCTI) of the Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III, which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. 
 iii
Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the trade-offs between the levels (Phillips trade-off) and the 
variances (Taylor trade-off) of the unemployment gap and inflation in the aggregate 
Euro Area, throughout the last three decades of the XXth Century, and their implications 
for the Area's monetary policy regime. 
The Phillips trade-off is modelled within an unobserved components model, 
estimated by maximum likelihood with the kalman filter, featuring the Phillips curve 
and the Okun Law as main measurement equations, in which the NAIRU has a 
stochastic drift, whilst trend real output is modelled with a constant drift. Asymmetry 
tests do not reject the hypothesis that the Phillips curve has been linear, but clearly 
indicate a convex asymmetry in the Okun Law equation, during 1972-2000. It is shown 
that the forward-looking new keynesian Phillips curve works well for the Euro Area, 
once some deviation from rational expectations is allowed, and a model-consistent and 
time-varying NAIRU is used in computing the unemployment gap. 
As for the Taylor trade-off, a marked improvement at around 1986 is 
documented, and inverse control is used to show that the emergence of a well-defined 
aggregate monetary policy regime in the Area, targeting a low rate of inflation, is part of 
the explanation for the greater macroeconomic stability. Two methods - optimal control 
with GMM estimation, and dynamic programming with FIML estimation - are 
employed to estimate the loss function of the notional central bank of the Area, and find 
a regime of strict inflation targeting with a significant interest rate smoothing and the 
target slightly above 2.5 percent. Both methods generate some signals that milder 
supply shocks and an improved ability of policymakers to maintain interest rates closer 
to their optimal path are also part of the explanation for the Taylor trade-off 
improvement. Finally, it is suggested a method for testing asymmetry in a central bank 
loss function, which is used to interpret the monetary policy regime results for the Area 
in an alternative way. 
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Chapter 1 
Unemployment-Inflation Trade-Offs and Monetary Policy in 
the Euro Area: an Introductory Overview 
 
This chapter provides a brief theoretical and historical background for the 
studies in this thesis, and draws up the boundaries of the research. It is organised as 
follows. 
In section 1.1, we present the main theoretical foundations of our work, and very 
briefly link up those backgrounds to the central tasks of each chapter. Section 1.2 
discusses the meaning, motivations and objectives of studying the case of the Euro Area 
taken as a whole, for the specific period of the last three decades of the XXth Century. 
Section 1.3 summarises and delimits the scope of the thesis, briefly describing its 
central objectives, main methodological aspects, and some topics somehow related to 
the enquiry but not explicitly included in the study. Then, section 1.4 presents the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1. Unemployment-Inflation Trade-Offs: Levels and Variances 
This thesis studies the trade-offs between unemployment and inflation, and their 
implications for monetary policy, in the aggregate Euro Area throughout the three last 
decades of the XXth century. 
The key foundation of our analysis is the Phillips curve - the empirical 
regularities linking (wage) inflation to unemployment, detected by Phillips (1958, 
1959), developed by Lipsey (1960) as a relation between price inflation and 
unemployment, and formalised by Samuelson and Solow (1960). We study the Phillips 
relation in the context of expectations augmented equations, as outlined by Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1967). Therefore, our work is developed consistently with the 
natural rate theory - the hypothesis that there is a transitory trade-off between the levels 
of unemployment and inflation but no permanent trade-off. In this context, the relevant 
concept and measure is the deviation of unemployment from the natural rate (NR), the 
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unemployment gap, and not merely the level of unemployment - a most relevant issue 
because the NR is not necessarily constant. More specifically, we address the Phillips 
trade-off in the context of the Calvo-Taylor-Rotemberg new keynesian formulation of 
the Phillips curve - described, inter alia, by Roberts (1995). In this new keynesian 
Phillips curve - explicitly derived from microeconomic foundations - expectations of 
inflation are forward-looking, and supposedly rational in Muth's (1961) sense. 
The most notable recent contentious issues in the Phillips curve theory relate to 
the modelling of inflation expectations and to the curve's functional form, and both 
decisively shape the theoretical environment of this thesis. First, rational expectations 
are known to generate Phillips relations where inflation is a jump-variable, in contrast to 
its empirical persistence - Fuhrer and Moore (1995) -, and a serious ongoing research 
effort is trying to formalise sound alternatives to purely rational expectations. Second, 
an important tide of the Phillips curve literature of the 90s - see, for instance, Laxton et 
al. (1995) - has argued that the convex asymmetry present in the original Phillips' 
(1958, 1959) and Lipsey's (1960) curves, is actually significant in the recent data of the 
US and some developed countries. There are several empirical and theoretical motives 
for Phillips asymmetry, some additional reasons specific to the case of an aggregate of 
nations such as the Euro Area, and certainly important policy consequences, so the 
assessment of this matter is crucial in our research. 
Within this theoretical context - of expectations-augmented Phillips equations 
compatible with the NR hypothesis -, Taylor (1979, 1994, 1998a) has shown that there 
is a permanent trade-off between the variances of unemployment and inflation. The 
Taylor trade-off means that - in a given monetary policy regime, structure of shocks, 
and magnitude of the Phillips trade-off - if the economy is disturbed by a shock that 
moves the gap and inflation in opposite directions, monetary policy can not bring both 
simultaneously on target. Rather, the best achievable combinations of variability of the 
gap and inflation around their targets draw a convex negatively sloped curve, known as 
efficiency policy frontier, or Taylor curve. 
In summary, then, the current state of monetary theory, which frames our 
research, sees monetary policy as faced with two inter-linked trade-offs: the first-
moments and the second-moments trade-off - respectively, the Phillips and the Taylor 
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trade-off. Transitorily, policy can choose between negatively related levels of 
unemployment gaps and inflation, but in the medium-to-long-run unemployment is 
attracted by the NR and monetary policy merely determines, ultimately, the rate of 
inflation. The short-run Phillips curve may be asymmetric, meaning that the marginal 
rate of substitution between the gap and inflation would vary with the cyclical state of 
the economy. The long-run Phillips curve is assumed to be a vertical line. In the 
medium-to-long-run, the best achievable combinations of variability of the gap and 
inflation around their targets, that monetary policy can obtain, are negatively related. 
This Taylor curve is convex for intermediate levels of volatility, but turns quickly into a 
steep curve, according to most estimates - Taylor (1998a). 
 
Besides the functional form issue above referred, the analysis of the first-
moments' trade-off is complicated by the fact that the position of the Phillips curve is 
affected not only by unobserved expectations of inflation, but, also, by the unobserved 
NR - which, in Friedman's (1968) definition, was not a static concept. In view of the 
apparent trends in the unemployment rate in recent episodes, and the implied instability 
in the trade-off - documented, for instance, by King et al. (1995) - a literature has 
emerged treating the NR explicitly as a time-varying parameter – Staiger et al. (1997a, 
b), Gordon (1997). 
The analysis of the second-moments' trade-off is complicated by the fact that the 
position of the Taylor curve depends not only on somehow stable determinants - 
monetary policy regime and Phillips elasticity - but also upon the nature and variability 
of the shocks affecting the economy. Moreover, the actual position of the economy may 
be closer or further away from the efficiency frontier, as actual monetary policy is 
closer or afar from optimal policy - Fuhrer (1994, 1997a). However, the determinants of 
an estimated evolution of the volatility trade-off throughout a certain period can be 
traced out, assuming that the monetary authority behaves optimally for a given 
structural model and loss function. Specifically, inverse control theory can be used to 
back out the monetary policy regime’s structural coefficients, the central bank loss 
function coefficients - Salemi (1995). Joint estimation of the central bank's optimality 
condition and of the structural dynamic model of the economy, allows identification not 
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only of the policy regime, but also of the role played by the first-moments trade-off, 
supply shocks, and policy efficiency - Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001). 
The central bank loss function, itself, has received attention from a parallel 
literature that has been debating its functional form, specifically arguing that in some 
cases it may not be quadratic, but rather asymmetric around the implicit targets for 
inflation and/or the gap - Goodhart (1998), Cukierman (2000, 2001). 
 
The thesis connects to the outlined theoretical background as follows. 
Chapter 2 deals with the estimation of the Phillips trade-off and of the model-
consistent time-varying NR of the aggregate Euro Area with quarterly data from 1970:I 
to 2000:II., including tests of the hypothesis of asymmetry in the trade-off. This chapter 
also offers estimates of the Okun's (1970) Law, relating the unemployment and output 
gaps, tests of the possible asymmetry in that relation, and estimates of potential real 
output and the output gap in the Area. Results using standard adaptive expectations of 
inflation are compared to estimation of a new keynesian Phillips curve using Ball's 
(2000) concept of near-rational expectations - which is a promising alternative to purely 
rational expectations. 
Chapter 3 uses the NR's and unemployment gap's recursive estimates of the 
previous chapter, updated by four quarters to cover the period 1972:I-2001:II, assesses 
the implicit evolution of the Taylor trade-off throughout that period, and draws 
implications for the monetary regime of the Area as a whole. The study puts a special 
emphasis in the period after 1986:I, in view of the apparent improvement in the 
volatility trade-off at the mid-80s. Specifically, we evaluate the role possibly played by 
the emergence of a well-defined aggregate monetary policy regime targeting a low rate 
of inflation, in that improvement. The framework employed also generates some 
indications about the possible contribution of the other determinants of the Taylor trade-
off - Phillips trade-off, and supply shocks volatility - and of the position of the economy 
relative to it - policy optimality. Finally, this chapter brings together the literature on 
possible asymmetry of the central bank loss function with the inverse control literature 
that backs out the policymakers' loss function from the data. 
 
 4
1.2. The case of the Aggregate Euro Area 
This thesis studies the case of the Euro Area considered as a whole. Specifically, 
we use quarterly macroeconomic time series of the aggregate of the Euro Area, as 
offered in the Area Wide Model Database (AWMD) published with Fagan et al. (2001) 
for 1970-1998, and, thereafter, as published in issues of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) Monthly Bulletin. The aggregate Euro Area data are weighted averages of 
nation-level macroeconomic data, computed as described by Fagan et al. (2001), 
meaning that the member-states are treated as if they were regions of a nation, whose 
data must be added to obtain the data of the relevant aggregate economic area.1 
Hence, we study the Euro Area's macroeconomic trade-offs and their 
implications for monetary policy as if the Area was actually an economic and monetary 
entity throughout the last three decades of last century. However, the well-known facts 
are that the Single Market is a 1990s' process, and that the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) was launched only in January of 1999. 
Simulating the study of the macroeconomics and monetary policy of the Euro 
Area beforehand its actual existence seems, nevertheless, both justifiable and necessary. 
First, it seems justifiable to study the Area as a whole, having in mind its gradual 
process of economic and monetary integration since the late 70s. Monetary Integration 
began in 1979 with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and its 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and was deepened with the Basle-Nyborg 
agreement of 1987. Since the middle of the 80s controls to cross-the-border capital 
flows within the European Community were gradually relaxed, and exchange-rate 
realignments were infrequent - with the exception of the transitory 1992-1993 crisis. 
Economic integration was spurred by the European Single Act, in 1986, and further 
deepened with the Single Market in 1992, which has been completed during the 90s. By 
the mid 80s, a great part of the convergence of member-states' rates of inflation to 
German standards had already been achieved, and by the late 80s national short-term 
interest rates had also experienced a visible convergence. 
                                                          
1 It is beyond the scope of this work to assess, or even discuss, the methods used by the official sources to 
aggregate the nation-level data to sum-up to the Area data. 
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Second, it seems necessary to accumulate empirical evidence on the 
macroeconomics of the aggregate of the Euro Area, as the conduction of a single 
monetary policy by the ECB calls for the existence of as much knowledge as possible 
about the behaviour of the Area. In light of the well-known Lucas (1976) critique, 
knowledge about the Area's behaviour throughout our sample is not direct information 
regarding its behaviour after the possible structural break at 1999. We do not claim to 
be uncovering the trade-offs and the monetary policy regime of the EMU - there is 
simply not enough data yet for any researcher to aim at that task - but rather of the 
period covering roughly the last thirty years of the European Community's integration 
process. This is valuable information per se, for what it reveals about the integration 
process itself. Additionally, the estimates obtained are information prior to the EMU 
that may be important for a better understanding of the Area's reactions even within the 
EMU regime. Furthermore, historical data and estimates are required for having sound 
estimates of structural measures at the outset of the EMU, as for instance the level of the 
NR, and the position of the Area's trade-off between the volatility of the unemployment 
gap and inflation's volatility. 
The Area has evidently experienced fundamental changes along the studied 
period, so we deal with structural instability in a number of ways throughout this thesis. 
First, the estimation methods used in chapter 2 are recursive techniques - namely, 
maximum likelihood with the kalman filter. On one hand, this requires a large amount 
of initial data for its proper initialisation, but on the other hand, the time-varying 
parameters' estimates that it generates by the end of the sample are arguably not too 
dependent on the earlier data of the sample. Second, in chapter 3, we run adequate 
structural stability tests when we estimate, by full information maximum likelihood, a 
structural aggregate-supply / aggregate-demand model of the Area. Third, we end up, in 
that chapter, focusing on a period corresponding roughly to the second half of our 
sample, for which we identify a clear and new monetary structure in the Area. 
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1.3. Delimiting the Research: Objectives, Assumptions, Prior 
Research Options, and Methods 
This thesis considers the unemployment-inflation trade-off in the vein of 
Mankiw's (2000) definition of it - inexorable and mysterious. Inexorable, in the sense 
that it is taken for granted that there exists a Phillips trade-off (and, hence, a Taylor 
trade-off), and that the challenge faced by the researcher is merely to model it 
successfully. Mysterious, in the sense that the efforts to model and test alternative 
specifications for the trade-off, in this research, do not incorporate any profound 
attempts at understanding the causes explaining its existence. 
As implied by the brief review in section 1.1, there are plenty contentious issues 
in the present state of the analysis of the short-run (levels) trade-off - even within simple 
Phillips curve models, which merely describe, rather than explain, the trade-off and the 
course of the NR. They consist of, most notably, the implications of modelling inflation 
expectations as forward-looking, the choice of the functional form of the Phillips curve, 
and the method of modelling the path of the NR along time. As also suggested above, 
increased efforts have been devoted recently to the assessment of the long-run trade-off 
between the fluctuations of unemployment and inflation around their targets. Recent 
research has shown that this second-moments trade-off can furnish valuable information 
about the adopted monetary policy regime and about the optimality of actual monetary 
policy, given a certain dynamic structure of the aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand 
of the economy, and its shocks. In addition, once the analysis generates knowledge 
about the central bank loss function - the monetary policy regime - it is possible to 
enhance the enquiry with formal tests on the loss function functional form, namely in 
search of the kind of asymmetries that have been suggested recently by a parallel 
literature. 
The objective of this thesis is to offer empirical evidence on these topics, trying 
to contribute to their ongoing literature. They are simultaneously of important 
theoretical and policy relevance per se - equally the Phillips and the Taylor trade-off are 
at the heart of macroeconomic theory and are crucial for the study of monetary policy. 
Furthermore, we will add to the literature on these topics with some empirical 
refinements - summarised in section 1.4 and described in detail within each chapter. 
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Moreover, our choice of the case of the aggregate Euro Area (during the last three 
decades of the XXth Century) as the specific historical episode to be studied, enhances 
the relevance of the research, as suggested by the arguments in section 1.2 above. With 
this regard, it is noteworthy that the thesis offers the first pieces of evidence on 
asymmetry tests of the Phillips trade-off and the Okun Law relation in the Area. In 
addition, it offers the first assessment of the Area's Taylor trade-off, and of the 
aggregate Euro Area monetary regime prior to the EMU, including formal tests of 
asymmetry of the notional central bank's loss function. 
Before moving into the description of the structure of the thesis - section 1.4 
below - some preliminary theoretical discussions are in order, for a better definition of 
the boundaries of the thesis. They essentially relate to assumptions and empirical 
options, made at the outset of the enquiry, which evidently influence it. 
 
 1.3.1 Natural Rate (NR) versus Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment (NAIRU) 
The modern, Friedman-Phelps, Phillips curve theory relates inflation to 
expectations of inflation and to the gap between actual unemployment and the natural 
rate (NR). This has been defined by Friedman (1968, page 8) as follows: 
"At any moment of time, there is some level of unemployment which has 
the property that it is consistent with equilibrium in the structure of real 
wage rates. (…) The natural rate of unemployment (…) is the level that 
would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium 
equations, provided there is embedded in them the actual structural 
characteristics of the labour and commodity markets, including market 
imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of 
gathering information about job vacancies and labour availabilities, the 
costs of mobility, and so on."2 
The original NR concept corresponds, then, to the rate of unemployment that 
balances the economy's competitive dynamic general equilibrium system, and its level - 
which is typically positive - depends upon the specific microeconomic structural 
characteristics of the economy. Even though the NR depends upon such microeconomic 
features, it has also a particular macroeconomic attribute - it is the level of the 
                                                          
2 See Dixon (1995) for a genealogy of the NR concept, and Cross (1995) for a thorough discussion of the 
concept. 
 8
unemployment rate that balances the aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand and, 
therefore, stabilises the rate of inflation. In the context of expectations-augmented 
Phillips relations, it follows that the actual unemployment rate can only diverge from 
the NR temporarily, following some shock that drives inflation away from expected 
inflation. In Friedman's words (op cit, page 11), 
"(…) there is always a temporary tradeoff between inflation and 
unemployment; there is no permanent tradeoff. The temporary tradeoff 
comes not from inflation per se, but from unanticipated inflation, which 
generally means, from a rising rate of inflation." 
According to the natural rate hypothesis, then, monetary policy actions can only 
affect real economic activity transitorily, as can be read from the following more recent 
words of the co-author of the modern Phillips curve theory (Phelps, 1995, page15), 
"Monetary policy can make a permanent difference only to nominal 
variables: a policy to generate a finite increase or decrease in the inflation 
rate will generate only a transient dip of the actual unemployment rate 
relative to the path it would otherwise have taken. In particular, the actual 
unemployment rate, though occasionally hit by such shocks, is constantly 
homing in on the natural rate."3 
Modigliani and Papademos (1975) focused on the macroeconomic attribute of 
the NR and called it the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) - a 
designation that turned out to be vastly more popular, thereafter, than the NR original 
name. 
Some authors have argued that there are fundamental differences between the 
NR and the NAIRU concepts - for instance, Tobin (1995, 1997), Rogerson (1997), 
Galbraith (1997), Phelps and Zoega (1997) - and some have tried to estimate the NR 
differently from the NAIRU - for instance, Staiger et al. (2001), and Grant (2002). 
In contrast, Ball and Mankiw (2002) consider that the NAIRU is approximately 
a synonym for the NR. Solow (1998a, page 5) also considers them synonyms, even 
though rejecting both designations - the NR because the word natural suggests more 
than could be seriously argued for that particular state of the economy, and the NAIRU 
because it is terrible english. Solow choses, instead, the term neutral rate of 
unemployment. 
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We adopt this view that the NAIRU and the NR are two sides of the same coin. 
The NAIRU is simply the equilibrium unemployment rate that can be estimated out of 
macroeconomic models including the Phillips curve. In turn, the NR is the estimate of 
the equilibrium unemployment rate that would be obtained from a structural model 
featuring all the microeconomic variables and forces that explain the flexible price 
equilibrium unemployment rate, according to Friedman-Phelps' theory. 
The problem with the estimation of the NR is that it is virtually impossible to 
build a model that properly includes all its microeconomic determinants - demographic, 
institutional, informational, technological, etc… For instance, Dixon (1995, pages 57, 
64, 70) notes that the NR concept is so vague and broad that no empirical 
implementation combining all its microeconomic elements in a choerent model has been 
achieved so far, and probably never will. More recently, Taylor (1998a, pages 35-36) 
also mentions that there are still great uncertainties about the microeconomic 
determinants of the NR. 
Hence, the NAIRU seems to be the best measure of the NR that can be obtained, 
which explains that the recent literature has focused in estimation of the NAIRU - as an 
empirical estimate of the NR based on its macroeconomic attribute - from 
macroeconomic models including Phillips relations. But even researchers using 
macroeconomic models that include structural modelling of both the labour and goods 
markets, in the spirit of Layard et al. (1991), have been finding difficulties in finding 
plausible, significant and robust estimates of the NAIRU - see Cassino and Thornton 
(2002) for a recent example. 
The most recent research has focused, then, on estimation of the NAIRU from 
very small-scale macroeconomic models featuring only one Phillips equation - in some 
cases a wage-equation, but, more frequently, a price equation. The most popular 
approach has been to model the NAIRU as a time-varying parameter in unobserved-
components models with a Phillips equation in the measurement system, estimated by 
maximum-likelihood with the kalman filter - following Gordon (1997) and Staiger et al. 
(1997a, b). This approach amounts to give up explaining the NAIRU from its structural 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Even among the NR theory followers, there are divergences regarding the time that convergence to the 
NR takes. For instance, Phelps (1995, p. 21-22) says that he himself believes that the economy can take a 
non-equilibrium path for a long time, even indefinitely, because expectations can not be perfectly rational. 
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microeconomic determinants, but simply try to model its time-path subject to two 
constraints - that it varies smoothly, and that it fulfils its macroeconomic attribute of 
stabilising inflation.4 The second constraint is compatible with the natural rate theory, as 
reviewed above, and the first is also consistent with that theory, as can be read in Solow 
(1998a, pages 5-6): 
"The neutral rate of unemployment defined by a standard accelerationist 
model does not have to be constant in time. Other sources of inflationary 
pressure help to determine the current neutral rate. The usual suspects 
include the demographic composition of the labour force, exogenously 
caused increases in food and energy prices, similar impulses from import 
prices, imposition or removal of formal or informal price controls, and still 
others. (…) The neutral rate might also respond to occasional well-defined 
changes in the environment of the labour market - like the scope, duration, 
generosity of unemployment insurance benefits; the strength and 
aggressiveness of trade unions; the presence or absence of restrictions on 
layoffs by employers - or to characteristics of product markets, like the 
intensity of international and domestic competition (…). What the model 
can not tolerate is the need to postulate fairly frequent, spontaneous and 
unexplained changes in the neutral rate itself." 
In this thesis, we follow the Gordon approach in the estimation of the aggregate 
Euro Area NAIRU, and consider it the best estimate of the NR that could possibly be 
obtained.5 
The main features of this approach - that the NAIRU is a time-varying 
coefficient with a path modelled but not explained by the model, and that the best 
available estimate of the NR is the NAIRU - seem, moreover, particularly suited for the 
specific case under study. First, it seems unreasonable to try to model the Euro Area 
NAIRU as a constant, in view of the persistent rise in European unemployment during 
the 70s, 80s and part of the 90s, and its apparent decrease more recently. Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) argue that a combination of negative shocks with an unfavourable 
institutional framework in factors and goods markets explains the increase in structural 
unemployment in Europe from the 70s until the mid-90s, and that the shocks-
                                                          
4 Staiger et al. (2001) tried to explain their estimated time-varying NAIRU for the U.S. and its states with 
structural determinants such as demographic, educational, industry characteristics, and indicators of 
labour market policy, with no success neither at the aggregate nor at the state level. 
5 This approach is supported by recent evidence for the US in Staiger et al. (2001), who estimated the 
U.S. NR and NAIRU separately, using macroeconomic data. Specifically, they estimate the NR as the 
low frequency component of the unemployment rate, as suggested by Hall (1999), and the NAIRU as the 
time-varying equilibrium rate in a Phillips equation - and they obtain estimates of the NR and the NAIRU 
that are not significantly different. 
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institutions combination has improved ever-since. Second, any estimation of the NR 
from its structural microeconomic determinants would be arguably impossible because 
of the high diversity of structural determinants of the NR across the Area's countries, at 
least during most of the sample period.6 
Furthermore, the NAIRU estimates of the NR seem also suitable because the aim 
of this thesis is to shed light on the macroeconomics of the Area with an eye on 
monetary policy. In fact, the NAIRU is precisely estimated from the link between 
aggregate economic activity and inflation that is relevant for monetary policy. 
In this context, the correct specification of the Phillips curve is crucial for an 
adequate identification of the NAIRU as a consistent estimate of the NR. First, all the 
significant transitory price shocks must be added to the equation, as the movements they 
cause in inflation are exogenous, and therefore not related to deviations of 
unemployment from the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Second, the Phillips 
equation's functional form must be adequately identified, as in the case of a significant 
non-linearity there is a distinction between the stochastic NAIRU and the NAIRU that 
would prevail in the long-run, steady-state, deterministic equilibrium - which, in that 
case, would fit better the NR concept. Both these specification issues are considered in 
chapter 2, and we find no significant asymmetry in the Euro Area Phillips relation in 
our sample. 
Accordingly, throughout this thesis we use the designations NR, NAIRU, neutral 
rate of unemployment, equilibrium rate of unemployment, and flexible prices rate of 
unemployment, as synonyms capturing the microeconomic and macroeconomic 
attributes reviewed above. Moreover, we use the term trend unemployment with a 
similar meaning, as we compute the NAIRU from a trend-cycle decomposition model 
that is not a mechanical detrending filter, as it includes the Phillips equation in its 
measurement system - see the details in chapter 2. 
 
                                                          
6 Because of the difficulties in explaining the time-path of the NR from its structural determinants, even 
in the case of individual countries, a recent literature has developed models explaining the U.S. NAIRU 
decline since the mid-90s with macroeconomic phenomena. The most popular recent hypothesis explains 
the path of the NAIRU in the U.S. with a theory of wage aspirations lagging behind changes in the 
productivity growth rate - see Staiger et al. (2001), Ball and Moffit (2001), Mankiw (2001) and Ball and 
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1.3.2 Real Unit Labour Costs (Labour Share of Income) versus 
Unemployment Gaps as Marginal Costs proxy in New Keynesian Phillips Curves 
While the theoretical new keynesian Calvo-Rotemberg Phillips curve explains 
inflation with the current real marginal cost - besides expectations of inflation for next 
period -, empirical applications of the theory have typically used output or 
unemployment gaps as proxy for the real marginal cost. There is, however, a recent 
exception to this rule. 
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) have argued that real unit labour 
costs - or, equivalently, the labour share of income - are the most theoretically sound 
and empirically successful proxy variables for the real marginal cost in optimising 
forward-looking Phillips curves. Gali et al. (2001) showed that detrended output enters 
such optimising Phillips curve with the wrong sign, both in the US and in the aggregate 
Euro Area data of the AWMD, while the labour share of income has well-behaved 
estimated coefficients.7 These authors have popularised their approach to the new 
keynesian Phillips relation as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). 
The NKPC's replacement of the gap by the labour share has been, however, the 
object of criticism in some recent literature. 
First, it has been noted that the NKPC splits the Phillips link between real 
activity and inflation into two pieces, the link between labour costs and inflation, and 
the link between real activity and the labour costs, focusing only on the first and failing 
to explain the second - Roberts (2001). It follows that the NKPC assumes that in each 
period labour supply adjusts completely and instantaneously to labour demand, 
therefore disregarding the labour market institutions and its imperfections and frictions 
that are at the heart of the Phillips theory. As has been quite effectively summarised in 
Nelson and Nikolov (2002, page 16), 
"… the most these studies provide is a model of price-setting conditional 
on marginal cost - not a direct model relating inflation to a measure of 
excess demand." 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Mankiw (2002). For the U.K. case, Hatton (2002) also assessed the ability of productivity growth to 
explain the NAIRU over several historical episodes, finding that it could only be a partial explanation. 
7 This puzzle associated to the sign and significance of the Phillips elasticity in forward-looking new 
keynesian Phillips curves is documented as well by McCallum and Nelson (1999a), and Nelson and 
Nikolov (2002) 
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Second, Roberts (2001) has noted that the use of the labour share, or unit labour 
costs, as proxy for the marginal cost, means that the average labour productivity is used 
as measure of the marginal product of labour. Roberts has shown, for the US case, that 
it is the cyclical part of average labour productivity that correlates with inflation, and 
that that variable is dominated by a standard gap measure of economic activity, when 
both are included as explanatory variables in an optimising Phillips curve. Then, he 
concludes that, in the NKPC, the labour's share may simply be playing the role of a 
traditional economic activity variable. 
Third, Rudd and Whelan (2002) have found evidence that the labour share of 
income does not appear to drive inflation, as the discounted sum of current and future 
labour shares explains very little of the observed variation in inflation. Thus, they argue 
that there is no compelling reason for replacing conventional output gap measures with 
the labour share in monetary policy analysis models, as the latter does not outperform 
the former as proxy for real marginal cost. 
 
In view of these criticisms, we argue that the gains of swapping from the 
traditional gap-based Phillips equation to a labour share equation are still not 
satisfactorily clarified. Hence, in this thesis we do not follow the NKPC approach. 
Our approach, instead, is to try to refine the specification and estimation of the 
standard gap-based new keynesian Phillips curve, addressing two of its features that are 
problematic and, as such, may be the cause of its empirical failure: rationality of 
expectations of inflation, and theoretical consistency of the gap. 
As regards expectations, it is well known that the attempts to empirically 
validate the rational expectations hypothesis, with formal econometric tests, have 
systematically failed. Hence, the empirical problems with the new keynesian Phillips 
curve may be caused by the use of purely rational expectations of inflation, and not by 
the use of a gap as proxy for the real marginal cost. 
With respect to the gap measure, the empirical problems with new keynesian 
Phillips curves could derive from the typical use of a mechanically detrended real 
activity indicator, instead of the theoretically relevant gap measuring deviations of real 
activity from the flexible price equilibrium. 
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 Regarding expectations of inflation, since Fuhrer and Moore (1995) showed that 
some aggregate-level deviation from purely rational expectations is needed for new 
keynesian Phillips equations to fit some basic macroeconomic evidence, a vast literature 
has been seeking to build a theory of such deviations from rationality. In chapter 2, we 
develop one suggestion from this literature - Ball's (2000) hypothesis of near-rational, 
limited information, expectations of inflation - and show how it solves the inconsistency 
between forward-looking behaviour by optimising agents, and evidence of inflation 
inertia, preserving a reasonable and significant estimate of the Phillips trade-off. 
The necessity of estimating real activity gaps that measure deviations of real 
activity from its flexible-price equilibrium - the ones that, in theory, can proxy for real 
marginal costs - has been receiving an increased interest in the literature - Woodford 
(2001a). Some recent studies have tried to design methods for estimating theory-
consistent gaps, showing that they differ from mechanical detrending methods, and also 
that labour costs do not outperform such gaps in optimising new keynesian Phillips 
equations - see, for instance, Neiss and Nelson (2001, 2002) and Nelson and Nikolov 
(2002). In chapter 2, we estimate unemployment and output gaps using a structural time 
series method, which is considered a hybrid detrending technique combining statistical 
and theoretical criteria. Specifically, we estimate the NAIRU and potential output from 
an unobserved components model, that features in its measurement system the Okun 
Law and a new keynesian Phillips equation. The latter, guarantees that the estimated 
gaps are actually associated to demand and inflationary pressures, and, hence, that the 
estimated NAIRU and potential output have a flexible-price equilibrium meaning. All in 
all, our gap measure should prove superior to mechanically detrended unemployment or 
output, and compare well to the estimates of Gali et al. (2001) for the Euro Area 
business cycles. 
Overall, the empirical success of chapter 2 seems to confirm that the standard 
gap-based new keynesian optimising (forward-looking) Phillips relation works well, 
once purely rational expectations are replaced by a more realistic hypothesis, and once a 
theoretically-driven and consistent gap measure is employed. 
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1.3.3 Taylor Rule versus Structural Approaches to Policymakers' 
Preferences 
Since Taylor's (1993) seminal paper, the majority of monetary policy analysis 
has been conducted within frameworks featuring simple reaction functions linking 
short-term interest rates (the instrument) to deviations of inflation and the activity gap 
from their desired values (the targets), known as Taylor rules. Ensuing refinements of 
Taylor's original set-up include the estimation - rather than calibration - of the 
coefficients of the rule, the reaction of the policy instrument to expected - rather than 
contemporary - inflation and real gaps, and the explicit inclusion of an element of 
partial adjustment of the instrument - interest rate smoothing.8 
This literature includes, inter alia, Clarida and Gertler (1997), Clarida et al. 
(1998, 2000), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Peersman and Smets (1998, 1999), Taylor 
(1999c), Batini and Nelson (2000), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), Nelson (2000), almost 
all the studies in the volume Taylor (1999b), Huang et al. (2001), Doménech et al. 
(2001a, 2001b), and Muscatelli et al. (2000). 
As regards the specific case of the Euro Area, the monetary policy of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) since the beginning of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) in 1999 has also been studied in the context of Taylor rules. Mihov (2001) 
showed that the Euro Area interest rates during 1999-2000 have been closer to those 
predicted by a Taylor rule estimated with weighted average data of Germany, France 
and Italy, than to those predicted by a rule estimated with Germany data. Faust et al. 
(2001) used estimates of the Bundesbank rule and applied it to EMU-wide aggregates to 
simulate interest rates in the Area. Alesina et al. (2001) calibrated several alternative 
rule formulations and assessed which matched better actual ECB policy in 1999-2000 - 
an exercise updated by Galí (2002b). More recently, Begg et al. (2002) checked the 
coherence of the ECB actions throughout 2001 with the rule in Alesina et al. (2001), 
suggested a new rule, and compared the ECB policy with that of a Fed-in-Frankfurt, on 
the basis of a policy rule estimated with recent US data. 
                                                          
8 See Mankinw (2001) for an exception - an analysis of recent US monetary policy with a rule without 
instrument inertia and with interest rates reacting to contemporaneous unemployment and core inflation. 
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Taylor rules have also been used in research trying to detect structural changes 
in monetary policy. Most particularly, in view of the apparent break in macroeconomic 
volatility observed at the beginning of the 80s in the U.S., studies using Taylor rules 
have detected a structural change in U.S. policy reaction function from the pre-Volcker 
period (until 1979) to the Volcker-Greenspan era.9 The typical strategy has been to 
estimate such rules over the different periods and then assess whether its coefficients are 
different - see, for instance, Clarida et al. (2000). This identification of a change in U.S. 
monetary policy in the 80s seems to be robust, as it has also been detected by alternative 
literatures - for instance, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve literature, see Galí et al. 
(2002).10 
However, the use of Taylor rules in monetary policy analysis has recently been 
the object of a number of criticisms. 
First, Svensson (2001a, b, c) has argued that contemporary monetary policy - 
goal-directed, forward-looking, and conducted by rational policymakers - can only be 
described as a commitment to a targeting rule, not to a mechanical instrument rule. 
Minford et al. (2001, 2002) have demonstrated analytically the lack of identification of 
the Taylor rule, showing that different policy rules such as money growth targeting and 
exchange-rate targeting have a Taylor rule representation that resembles that implied by 
a true Taylor rule. An empirical illustration of this argument has been offered in Razzak 
(2001) with US data, who showed that the money base-nominal GDP targeting rule of 
McCallum (1988) can be expressed as a Taylor rule, under rather trivial conditions. 
Second, the estimation of Taylor rules has been shown to be somewhat fragile - 
Florens et al. (2001) showed that the typical generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimates of Taylor rules may exhibit large small-sample bias, high imprecision, and 
high variation across the specific type of GMM estimator.11 They suggested the use of 
full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation, using additional equations 
                                                          
9 In many studies of the US monetary policy, the quarters 1979:III-1982:II are not used, as these 
correspond to the monetarist experiment, a period of unusual operating procedures - non-borrowed 
reserves targeting - which is significantly different from previous and subsequent regimes. 
10 These authors identify technology shocks with the method suggested in Galí (1999). See the 
foundations of the NKPC in Galí and Gertler (1999), and recent developments in the survey by Galí 
(2002a). 
11 See Favero and Marcellino (2001) for a recent discussion and empirical simulations concerning the 
information set used as instrument set in GMM estimation of Taylor rules. 
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describing the structure of the economy, arguing that it performs better in terms of 
precision and centricity in small samples. Recent empirical research along these lines, 
which appears to confirm the capability of the FIML approach, includes Jondeau and 
LeBihan (2000), and, for a sub-set of countries of the Euro Area, Clausen and Hayo 
(2002a, b). More decisively, Lindé (2001a), and Boivin and Giannoni (2002), have 
documented the U.S. monetary policy shift in the 80s showing that the coefficients of 
the policy rule function change, while those of aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand 
functions do not, within a FIML estimation of such three-equation macroeconomic 
models with US data. 
Third, and most importantly, Favero (2001a), Favero and Rovelli (1999, 2001), 
and Dennis (2001) pointed out that policy reaction functions are reduced-form 
equations, whose coefficients are complex convolutions of two types of deep 
parameters - those describing the structure of the economy, and those defining the 
preferences of policymakers. Hence, Taylor rule coefficients do not directly identify a 
monetary policy regime - the central bank loss function -, and therefore its estimates do 
not allow direct study of changes in policymakers' preferences and efficiency. However, 
estimates of the policymakers' preferences - policy regime - can be backed out from 
estimated policy reaction functions - policy rule -, under certain identification 
conditions described by Dennis (2000). 
 
In view of the criticisms above portrayed, we do not pursue a Taylor rule 
approach in chapter 3.12 As our central aim is to assess the contribution of a monetary 
policy regime change in the aggregate Euro Area to the improvement in its 
macroeconomic volatility around the mid 80s, we choose a framework that allows direct 
estimation of the structural coefficients describing the policymakers' preferences. 
Specifically, we use two alternative set-ups combining inverse control and a suitable 
estimation technique, to back out from the data the central bank loss function - optimal 
control and GMM, and dynamic programming and FIML. 
 
                                                          
12 An Appendix to that chapter shows results of estimation of simple forward-looking policy reaction 
functions with our aggregate Euro Area data, for our sample and the relevant sub-samples, illustrating its 
inability to offer estimates of the monetary policy regime. 
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1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. 
Chapters 2 and 3 describe our empirical analysis of the macroeconomic trade-
offs and monetary policy of the Euro Area throughout the last three decades of the XXth 
Century. Then, chapter 4 summarises the results of the research, and presents 
suggestions for future work. 
Chapters 2 and 3 can be read independently, as they report self-sufficient 
research entities, with specific literature reviews, hypothesis, empirical work and 
conclusions. However, they are intimately related, so that their successive reading 
recounts a whole research story that is inter-linked and consistent. First, their broad 
object is the same, as they both focus on the macroeconomics of the Euro Area during 
the last three decades of the XXth Century. Second, the variability trade-off that 
motivates chapter 3 has its theoretical foundations in the levels trade-off, studied in 
chapter 2. Hence, the third connection: the empirical work of chapter 3 uses the 
unemployment gap estimates obtained with the kalman filter in chapter 2. 
In chapter 2 we test the linearity of the Phillips trade-off, as well as of the Okun 
Law, allowing for four alternative possible functional forms that nest the linear case and 
do not impose convexity nor concavity. We compare the results obtained with standard 
adaptive expectations in a backward-looking Phillips curve, with those obtained with 
near-rational expectations in a optimising, forward-looking, new keynesian curve. This 
chapter offers consistent estimates of the time-varying NAIRU and potential output, as 
the testing and estimation is performed in a small unobserved components model 
featuring the Phillips and Okun relation as main measurement equations - estimated by 
maximum likelihood with the kalman filter. The system successfully estimates all the 
hyper-parameters in the model, so that the trend-cycle decompositions of 
unemployment and output are obtained with no calibration of the signal-to-noise ratio. 
We report the smoothed estimates of the unobserved components, as well as adequate 
confidence bands, computed by Monte Carlo integration to comprise all the sources of 
uncertainty involved in kalman filter estimation. We also compare the cyclical turning 
points estimated by our model with some alternative estimates in the literature. 
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In chapter 3 we use the estimates of the unemployment gap obtained in chapter 
2, to document an apparent improvement in the Taylor trade-off of the Area around the 
mid-80s. Based on the macroeconomic and policy record of the Area member-states, we 
argue that an important part of the explanation for the volatility trade-off improvement 
lies in the emergence of a well-defined monetary policy regime of low and stable 
inflation in the aggregate Area at 1986. Modelling the structure of the Area 
macroeconomy with a version of the Rudebusch-Svensson model, we use inverse 
control theory to back out from the data the policymakers' deep preference parameters - 
the coefficients of the loss function of the aggregate Area notional central bank. We 
employ two alternative methods recently used in research for the U.S. case by separate 
researchers, in conditions that render comparisons of results possible, therefore 
enhancing the robustness of our results. In addition to comparability, our strategy 
improves on the U.S. case literature in that we do not use an official measure of the 
NAIRU available at the final of the sample, but use a quasi-real-time estimate. We end 
the chapter suggesting a method of testing for asymmetry in policymakers' preferences 
across recessions and expansions, and applying it to the Euro Area regime post-86, thus 
presenting an alternative interpretation for the policy regime estimate. 
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 Chapter 2 
NAIRU, Unemployment Gap and Phillips Trade-off in the 
Euro Area, 1970:I-2000:II 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents estimates of the trade-off between the unemployment gap and 
inflation changes in the Euro Area as a whole. The trade-off is modelled in a simple 
macroeconomic model based on Phillips and Okun relations, and requires the estimation 
of the unobserved gaps in output and unemployment. 
The unobserved components (UC) model has been first used by Watson (1986), in 
the context of the trend and cycle decomposition of the US real output. This statistical 
framework essentially postulates that the trend follows a random walk process and the 
cycle a stationary autoregressive process, with these two components mutually 
uncorrelated. In econometric terms, the unobserved cycle and trend are treated as time 
varying parameters, thus being estimated (by maximum likelihood) recursively through 
a Kalman (1960) filter. Clark (1989) augmented the model with a drift in the random 
walk driving the trend. 
Kuttner (1994) extended the UC model in order to include a measurement equation 
derived from economic theory – the Phillips equation – showing that this additional 
information improves its performance in decomposing output. The resulting UC model 
successfully combines economic theory with econometrics and has been often 
considered to have important advantages over both pure statistical (mechanical) 
techniques and structural trend-cycle decompositions.1 
Gordon (1997) pioneered the use of this framework to decompose the 
unemployment rate into trend and cycle (unobserved) components. Specifically, he 
                                                          
1 For recent reviews of trend-cycle decompositions in macroeconomic time series, see, inter alia, St 
Amant and Van Norden (1997), Canova (1998, 1999a), Burnside (1998), de Brouwer (1998), Cerra and 
Saxena (2000) and McMorrow and Roeger (2001). For an assessment of the performance of various 
trend-cycle decomposition methods (including UC models) for the Euro Area aggregate data, for certain 
specific criteria, see Ross and Ubide (2001). 
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 adapted the UC set-up to the context of his triangle model of inflation – a Phillips 
equation in which inflation is explained by inertia, demand and supply shocks – in order 
to estimate a time varying NAIRU ("Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment") for the US.2 Gordon's motivation to admit that the equilibrium US 
unemployment rate might have been falling was the observation of a systematic fall in 
the US unemployment rate since 1994 without any upsurge in inflation. The most recent 
studies on this subject seem to confirm that the US macroeconomic performance during 
the 90s is well explained by the evolution of the trends of unemployment and 
productivity, that is, by a significant fall in the NAIRU - Staiger, Stock and Watson 
(2001). The empirical hypothesis of a time-varying NAIRU has satisfactory theoretical 
foundations, as Friedman’s concept of ‘natural rate’ was not one of a constant parameter 
(Friedman, 1968). 
Following Gordon's seminal paper, many recent studies have estimated time-varying 
NAIRUs and the associated unemployment gaps from UC systems based on a Phillips 
equation. For example: Gerlach and Smets (1997) and Laubach (2001) with G7 
countries data; Kichian (1999) with Canadian data; McAdam and McMorrow (1999) 
with US, Japan and EUR-15 data; the OECD area has been extensively treated in 
Richardson et al (2000), with time-varying NAIRUs for 21 OECD countries; Peersman 
and Smets (1998) and Gerlach and Smets (1999) with EMU data; Orlandi and 
Pichelman (2000) with annual Euro Area data; and Irac (2000), Estrada et al (2000) and 
Meyler (1999), focusing on individual member-States of the European Union, namely 
France, Spain and Ireland. 
At a more institutional level, OECD research has recently adopted the Kalman filter 
estimates of quarterly time-varying NAIRUs, stating that the method should be used as 
a starting point for actual policy analysis and conception. Accordingly, the OECD 
NAIRU indicators will be based on this methodology - see Boone (2000), Richardson et 
al (2000) and OECD (2000).3 
                                                          
2 The NAIRU concept, first used by Modigliani and Papademos (1975), has been seen as an empirical 
'natural rate', i.e. one that may be estimated from Phillips equations. The theoretical literature has 
discussed the concepts of 'natural rate', 'potential output rate', 'flexible prices rate', 'equilibrium rate' and 
'NAIRU', but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to add to this discussion. Throughout this text, the 
terms NAIRU, equilibrium unemployment and trend unemployment rate will be used as synonymous. 
3 Differently, the researchers at the European Commission's D-G for Economic and Financial Affairs 
seem to prefer the production function approach (McMorrow and Roeger, 2001). This option may be 
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 Moreover, the Gordon-style method has been used by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) research in the computation of the quarterly Euro-area "trend unemployment 
rate" included in the Area Wide Model Database (AWMD, hereafter) published with 
Fagan et al (2001).4 The ECB itself has recently summed up its interest in the concept 
and estimation of potential output - which applies as well to the equilibrium 
unemployment rate -, for the purpose of assessing the trade-off (European Central Bank, 
2000a, page 37): 
 "The main interest of the ECB in the concept and estimation of potential output 
arises in the context of its stability-oriented monetary policy strategy (…) this 
strategy has two pillars. (…) Measuring potential output and its growth rate is an 
important issue under both pillars. Under the first pillar, (…), a measure of trend 
growth helps derive the reference value for growth in the broad monetary 
aggregate M3. Under the second pillar, (…), potential output growth and the 
output gap may be useful indicators for assessing the potential for inflationary 
pressures in the short to the medium term."5 
 
In addition to the arguments and results from these studies and to the 
institutional appraisal, the consideration of a time-varying NAIRU seems almost 
unavoidable in the Euro Area case, because of the persistent rise in European 
unemployment in the 1970s, 1980s and part of the 1990s. It does not seem realistic to 
try to explain such systematic increase in unemployment unless we admit an increase in 
the equilibrium unemployment rate itself, as has been extensively argued by Olivier 
Blanchard. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that this process is now under 
inversion, i.e. the NAIRU may be now decreasing – see Blanchard (1999, 2000a, 2000b, 
2000c, 2000d), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
connected to results previously obtained with a hybrid time-varying NAIRU/NAWRU model - combining 
Gordon's Phillips equation with structural equations of demand and supply of labour, compatible with a 
bargaining model of wage and price determination (McMorrow and Roeger, 2000). This model, which 
includes structural determinants of the NAWRU's path such as real interest rates, taxation and structural 
features of the labour markets, turned out to generate NAIRUs with low significance statistics and very 
wide confidence intervals. 
4 See also the tests and discussions in Fabiani and Mestre (2000). Note that these papers do not supply 
much information about the specific model from which the Euro area trend unemployment rate is 
computed, except that it is a Gordon (1997) model - see Fagan et al (2001, page 18). Note also that this 
trend unemployment rate, which is estimated outside the Area Wide Model, is then fed into the model's 
wage equation, which itself is a Phillips relation. 
5 Within their extensive study of the problem, Stock and Watson (1999) also conclude that the real gaps 
are important in predicting inflation. 
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 Having thus concluded that a time-varying NAIRU mechanism should be 
included in the estimation of the trade-off, we set out to address some of the 
shortcomings of the Gordon (1997) method as used in the research reported by Fabiani 
and Mestre (2000) and Fagan et al (2001). These shortcomings seem to affect the 
AWMD's trend unemployment series and may have important (technically as well as for 
policy making) consequences. 
The problems include difficulties in the estimation of the signal-to-noise ratio in 
the decomposition of the unemployment rate, options concerning the specification of 
inflation expectations in the Phillips equation and the functional forms of the 
measurement equations, and also some statistical issues in computing confidence bands 
for the estimated NAIRU. 
Based on recent literature about these problems, this chapter offers new tests and 
estimates of the Euro Area equilibrium unemployment rate, trend output and the 
associated real gaps. This is pursued by estimation of a small unobserved components 
macro model, that complements Gordon's measurement system with an Okun equation. 
This equation provides additional information necessary for the estimation of the 
standard deviation of the innovation to trend unemployment, thus achieving a proper 
estimation of the signal-to-noise ratio of unemployment.6 The estimation itself uses a 
conventional state-space framework and Kalman filter techniques. But some novelty is 
added furthermore by the consideration of a near-rational forward-looking model and, 
especially, of a battery of encompassing tests for asymmetries in the Phillips and Okun 
equations.7 Adequate confidence bands are also computed, for statistical evaluation 
purposes. 
 
The rest of the chapter is planned as follows. In section 2.2, we explain in detail the 
problems implicit in current estimates for the Euro area, as well as my attempts to 
                                                          
6 Some recent research projects at the ECB have also been estimating unobserved components systems of 
inflation, unemployment and real output of the aggregate Euro area, in work parallel to this chapter's - see 
the ECB's working papers by Camba-Mendez and Palenzuela (2001) and Fabiani and Mestre (2001). 
Some discussion of essential differences between these studies and this chapter's is offered below. 
7 Fabiani and Mestre (2000, page 20) report having performed some non-nested tests of a linear Phillips 
equation against the alternative in which unemployment enters in logs rather than in levels; however, they 
do not show these results. They point that they are aware of the limitation of considering only the 
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 overcome each of them. Section 2.3 presents the resulting model and its state-space 
format that allows the estimation with the Kalman filter. In section 2.4, the sources and 
main statistical characteristics of the data are described. Section 2.5 summarises the 
results of the research, while on section 2.6 we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
2.2. Addressing Current Problems in the Estimation of the Euro 
Area NAIRU 
In this section the problematic issues in the estimation of the Euro Area NAIRU are 
described in detail. Furthermore, the solutions used below in this chapter to overcome 
those problems are explained thoroughly. 
 
2.2.1. Estimation of the NAIRU's Innovation Standard Deviation 
When estimating his model, Gordon (1997) initially feared that the time-varying 
NAIRU would pick-up all the variation in the Phillips' equation residual. In practice, 
however, the problem that many researchers faced was precisely the opposite - the 'pile-
up' problem. In short, the maximum likelihood estimator of the variance of the 
innovation to an unobserved component that has low variation (low true standard 
deviation) is biased to zero because a large amount of probability in its distribution 
piles-up at zero. This difficulty in estimating the signal-to-noise ratio may exist even 
when the cyclical unemployment gap is modelled and, therefore, the system uses the 
unemployment rate information besides the inflation rate information - see, inter alia, 
Laubach (2001). 
Stock and Watson (1998) defined median unbiased estimators for the coefficient 
variance in a time-varying parameter model, thus offering a statistical solution for the 
problem - which was used in Gordon (1998a) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (2001). 
Apel and Jansson (1999a) (1999b) suggested a solution more derived from 
economic theory and used it successfully for some developed countries. Specifically, 
they included an Okun equation in the system, relating the unemployment and the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
logarithmic functional form, and they also seem to be aware of the limitation of not specifying nested 
tests. 
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 output gap, thus adding more information to it and achieving a reasonable estimation of 
the variance of the innovation to the NAIRU.8 
This solution is very interesting not only because it is driven by economic theory 
and stylised facts, but also because it provides an estimate of the Okun relation, which 
has important policy applications. Moreover, it allows for the discussion of many of the 
relevant specification issues associated to this relation, such as the possible lags in the 
association between the gaps and the specific functional form of the equation. The latter 
topic has been receiving a large interest recently, with some researchers testing for 
asymmetry in the cyclical relation between unemployment and output - see Mayes and 
Viren (2000), Lee (2000), Cuaresma (2000), Virén (2001) and Harris and Silverstone 
(2001). 
We follow Apel-Jansson's suggestion, extending the basic Gordon measurement 
system by including the Okun equation. This will provide estimates of the (quarterly) 
Euro Area Okun relation and allow testing for asymmetry in this relation, with a model-
consistent method that attempts to improve on the ones recently used in the literature.9 
Camba-Mendez and Palenzuela (2001) and Fabiani and Mestre (2001) also 
estimated unobservable systems for the Euro area including the Okun relation, in 
research parallel to this chapter's. However, they use different methods for identifying 
the model that best fits the data, as discussed below. Ross and Ubide (2001) assessed 
the results from multiple trend-cycle decomposition methods, for aggregate Euro Area 
                                                          
8 Okun (1970) suggested that the Law could be either estimated as a relation between the first-differences 
of unemployment and output or, alternatively, as a relation between the deviations of unemployment and 
output from their trends (i.e., their gaps). 
9 Mayes and Viren (2000) and Viren (2001) tested asymmetry using U gaps and Y gaps estimated by 
linear and purely mechanical techniques, while in this chapter the technique is mixed statistical-
theoretical and the gaps are estimated simultaneously with the asymmetry testing. Also, they used 
threshold models (piecewise linear regressions) while in this chapter more complex non-linearities will be 
investigated. Harris and Silverstone (2001) modelled and tested asymmetry in the (short-run) error-
correction mechanism implied by the (long-run) co-integration relation that they identified between the 
levels of unemployment and output. Specifically, they tested a unique error-correction mechanism 
(representing the adjustment of unemployment and output - i.e. ∆u and ∆y - to their long-run equilibrium) 
versus the hypothesis of an asymmetric ECM, using the threshold auto-regressive model. Lee (2000) 
tested asymmetry in the relation between the first differences of unemployment and output and also in the 
relation between the unemployment and output gaps, using gaps pre-computed from three alternative 
methods (Hodrick-Prescott filter, Beveridge-Nelson decomposition and a Gordon-style Unobserved-
components decomposition), within a threshold regression framework. Cuaresma (2000) also used a 
piecewise-linear approach, to test for asymmetry in the contemporaneous relation between output and 
unemployment gaps, comparing the outcomes of two alternative methods for trend-cycle decomposition - 
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 data, including four UC models, among which is the one we identify in this chapter, 
although always in a linear framework. 
 
2.2.2. Inflation Expectations in the Phillips Equation 
The Phillips equation in Gordon's (1997, 1998a) triangle model of inflation - which 
is, as discussed above, the ECB's Research framework - is of the kind 
phi
ttStu
n
tutLAt εωγππ ++−+= )()(  
where the lag polynomial A(L) is arbitrarily chosen and is meant to proxy for inflation 
expectations and inertia.10 The underlying expectations formation hypothesis is clearly 
the backward-looking Cagan-Friedman's adaptive expectations rule. 
The New Keynesian Phillips curve, derived from explicit optimization 
behaviour and microeconomic foundations explaining the existence of nominal 
stickiness, reached a quite different equation, sometimes known as the Calvo-
Rotemberg Philips equation: 
phi
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This is forward-looking, because it derives from a model in which agents know 
that they can not change prices every periods and, so, condition their decision on the 
price they're setting for current period (t) on some expectation of the future prices 
(period t+1) prevailing in the Economy. Expectations are assumed to be model-
consistent and rational – that is, agents are supposed to use efficiently all the 
information available by the time they form expectations, and they formulate the 
forecast out of the true model of the economy, which supposedly they know. As 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Hodrick-Prescott filtering and a structural time series decomposition - endogenously estimating the 
threshold parameter. 
10 As is well known, since Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967), the Phillips (1958) equation includes 
inflation expectations as the variable explaining the position of the curve in the [π,U] space. Therefore, 
the curve complies with the Natural rate theory: in the long-run (when expectations can not be wrong) 
there is no relation between nominal and real macro-economic variables. In the equations in the text, S 
stands for some proxy for supply-shocks, which is crucial for a correct empirical specification of the 
equation - see the discussion below in section 2.3. 
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 opposed to the Friedman-Phelps', this equation has reasonable microeconomic 
foundations.11 
In spite of its theoretical virtues, however, the New Keynesian Phillips equation 
is at odds with the data. As Ball (1994a, 1994b, 1997) stressed, it fails to explain why 
disinflations are costly in the real world. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Estrella and 
Fuhrer (1998) showed that the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model can not 
generate the high degree of persistence that is observed in actual inflation data, because 
the model has price level inertia and this precludes price changes (inflation) inertia. 
Roberts (1997, 1998) showed that a model of sticky inflation and rational 
expectations - the desirable theoretical framework - is observationally equivalent to a 
model of sticky prices with less than rational expectations. This led Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995), Fuhrer (1997b), Svensson (1999c), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Gali and 
Gertler (1999), Gali et al (2001), Rudebusch (2002b), Roberts (1998, 2001) and Lindé 
(2001a) to specify hybrid models with some part of expectations rational (forward-
looking) and other part adaptive (backward-looking).  
These models, while empirically successful, seem to lack any deep theoretical 
foundations for the assumed expectations' rule.12 Moreover, the estimated weight of the 
backward-looking part of expectations varies considerably across studies. For instance, 
Roberts (2001) estimates this weight to be around 50 percent. Fuhrer (1997b) found a 
point estimate of 0.8 for the US and could not statistically rule out complete non-
rationality. Rudebusch (2002b), using survey data to proxy for expectations, estimated a 
coefficient of 0.71 for US quarterly data, but found the forward-looking component to 
be statistically different from zero. Similar estimates and inference have been obtained 
by Lindé (2001a), from a FIML estimation of a system composed of the new keynesian 
                                                          
11 For a simple deduction of the Calvo-Rotemberg Phillips equation see, inter alia, Roberts (1995). 
12 These are not identical models, as the reasons considered for the existence of backward-looking 
behaviour and the specific combination of backward and forward-looking expectations vary considerably. 
This does not preclude considering these studies as part of a family of models designed to deal with one 
problem: that, in order to fit the data, the New Keynesian rational expectations' sticky-price model needs 
to be augmented by additional lags of inflation that are not predicted by the model. Other studies in which 
similar hybrid Phillips equations are used but where the weights on past and future inflation are not 
estimated, but rather set a-priori, include McCallum and Nelson (2000), Jensen (2001), Soderstrom 
(2001) and Walsh (2001a). The first two attach weights to lagged inflation of, respectively, 0.5 and 0.3. 
The third uses a baseline weight of 0.5 but also tests 0.75. The latter, also uses 0.3 as the benchmark 
value, but studies the performance of his model with weights ranging from 0 to 1. 
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 Phillips equation, an optimising IS equation and a policy rule.13 Jondeau and Le Bihan 
(2001) document that the estimates of the weight of backward-looking expectations are 
highly sensitive to the estimation method - single-equation GMM and FIML estimation 
of a system similar to Lindé's (2001a) - and to the extension of leads and lags of 
inflation. They obtain estimates between 0.34 and 0.73 for the US and between 0.26 and 
0.64 for the Euro Area. For the specific case of the Euro Area, Smets (2000) finds a 
weight of 0.48 in a GMM estimation with annual 1974-1998 data, while Doménech et 
al. (2001b) obtain a weight of 0.46 in a GMM estimation with aggregate EMU quarterly 
data for 1986:I-2000:IV. More recently, based on simulations, Soderlind et al. (2002) 
argue that one of the conditions for a New Keynesian model to mimic the behaviour of 
US main macro-economic time series is that the backward-looking behaviour in the 
Phillips equation has a weight of, at least, 0.9. 
In contrast to this literature, Gali and Gertler (1999) suggest that, for the US 
case, the backward-looking component, although improving the statistical fit, should 
have only a minor weight, when a measure of the real marginal cost is used in place of 
the output gap. Within this so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve set-up, Gali et al 
(2001) estimated a weight of about 0.3 for inflation lags in a Phillips equation of the 
Euro Area, and about 0.4 for the US. However, Rudd and Whelan (2001) have shown 
that Gali and Gertler's estimation procedure, based in GMM single-equation estimation, 
is likely to suggest that forward-looking behaviour is very important even if the true 
model contains no such behaviour.14 And Ma (2002) showed that the parameters in the 
hybrid backward-forward-looking Phillips curve are weakly identified, so that 
conventional GMM statistics are inappropriate and, thus, Gali and Gertler's conclusions 
are problematic. Lindé (2001a) has documented and explained the bias and the 
difficulties, in general, of single-equation estimation methods to generate reliable 
estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve - especially in the presence of (even 
mild) measurement errors. Jondeau and Le Bihan (2001) also find, in hybrid Phillips 
curves using the real marginal cost, that single-equation GMM estimation generates 
                                                          
13 He shows, with simulations, that this empirical approach pins down quite well the true parameters of a 
calibrated model - even with large measurement errors and some model mispecification. 
14 Rudd and Whelan proposed a test of the NKPC based on its closed-form solution, in which current 
inflation equals a discounted stream of expected future output gaps (or unit labour costs). For the US 
case, they found that expectations play a very small role in explaining why high and significant 
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 smaller estimates of the backward-looking part of inflation dynamics than does FIML 
estimation of a system enhanced with IS and policy rule equations - but that it is always 
significant. In their results, for the Euro Area, the difference is from 0.25 to 0.47, and 
the weight in the US can be as large as 0.48. 
Many recent empirical studies of the Phillips curve have adopted several 
alternative pragmatic approaches to proxy for inflation expectations. Basically, four 
main different types of pragmatic proxy measures have been used. First, some studies 
have used time series data of inflation expectations' surveys, as was the case in Clark et 
al. (1995, 1996, 2001), Roberts (1995, 1997), and Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1999). 
Second, others have estimated inflation expectations from some observed bond-market 
yelds, as did Clark et al. (1996), Debelle and Laxton (1997), Yates (1998) and Debelle 
and Vickery (1998). Third, Pyythia (1999) and Mayes and Virén (2000) used the 
OECD's Secretariat official forecasts of price inflation published with the Economic 
Perspectives bi-annual bulletin. Fourth, another branch of the literature has proxied 
inflation expectations with the one-step-ahead forecasts of inflation obtained from some 
univariate statistical model fitted to inflation observed data. For example, Meyler (1999) 
used the predictions from an ARIMA model and Ash et al (2000) considered 
predictions from the Hodrick-Prescot filter. Dupasquier and Ricketts (1997, 1998) 
proxied canadian inflation expectations with the predictions of a three-state Markov 
switching regime model that endogenously picked-up periods of low, medium and high 
inflation. 
The first two pragmatic approaches above are not feasible at this stage in the 
Euro area case. As to the first, many member-states do not have any inflation 
expectations' survey and, accordingly, there is no such survey for the Area. In what 
regards the second method, there is not enough homogeneity in the maturity and trading 
conditions of the indexed bonds of the Euro member-states. The third method could 
only be used in studies of annual or bi-annual data, whilst the focus in this chapter is on 
quarterly data. The fourth approach seems better suited for the problem at hand, but 
demands stronger theoretical foundations, so that its pragmatism can be, in any way, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
coefficients on inflation lags are typically found in empirical reduced-form Phillips equations, which is 
evidence against the New Keynesian theory. 
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 legitimated by the theoretical debate on backward versus forward-looking expectations 
described above. This legitimisation can be found in a recent work by Ball (2000). 
Addressing the forward-versus-backward-looking expectations debate, Mankiw 
(2000) stated that what the data are crying for is adaptive expectations.15 However, Ball 
(2000) noted that adaptive expectations are subject to the Lucas (1976) critique in that 
they are not necessarily adequate for all monetary regimes. 
To solve the dilemma (between rational expectations Phillips equations failing to 
fit the facts and backward-looking equations being subject to the Lucas (1976) critique) 
Ball (2000) suggested the concept of near-rational inflation expectations. Ball's 
hypothesis is that real-world agents form inflation expectations considering only the 
past information on inflation, but use it optimally, identifying and estimating the best 
linear univariate forecasting model: 
"The deviation from rationality is the fact that forecasts are univariate: agents 
ignore relevant variables such as output and interest rates. Aside from this 
limitation, agents' forecasts are optimal: they use inflation data as best they can. 
Metaphorically, one can imagine firms who use Box-Jenkins techniques to select 
an ARIMA model for inflation, but who do not go to the added trouble of using 
multivariate techniques."16 
This near-rational rule is then, in practice, a limited-information (or weak) 
rational expectations rule, which has some microeconomic foundations, in the spirit of 
Akerloff and Yellen (1985a, 1985b) model. It describes agents that, faced with the high 
costs of gathering and processing the whole information set needed for rational 
expectations, and knowing that these costs won't pay-off, limit their information set and 
form forward-looking expectations solely on the basis of past inflation.17 
                                                          
15 Even though he stressed that this pragmatic solution to the New Keynesian Phillips curve puzzle is not 
entirely satisfactory as adaptive expectations lack foundation in the microeconomic theories of price 
adjustment. In recent work, he suggested a model of slow dissemination of information (sticky 
information) instead of 'sticky prices' as a way of dealing with the New Keynesian Phillips Curve puzzle, 
- see Mankiw and Reis (2001a, 2001b). Although with different foundations, in practice, Mankiw and 
Reis' model is very similar to Fischer's (1977). Rudd and Whelan (2001) stress that their results against 
the New Keynesian Phillips equation do not necessarily imply that agents formulate expectations in a 
backward-looking manner, and that alternative avenues of research, like Mankiw and Reis', must be 
pursued. 
16 Ball (2000), page 9. The classification 'optimal' seems a bit exaggerated in this context, as the 
near-rational rule proposed is merely that of a best linear unbiased univariate forecasting model. 
17 Ball notes that it is assumed that (i) agents know the true time-series process that characterises inflation 
in each specific monetary regime, (ii) identify it ever-since its first period and (iii) estimate it with data 
from the whole sample period. Although not stronger than rational expectations', these hypotheses are 
strong and Ball admits that (ii) and (iii) could be alleviated with some learning modelling. 
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 In this research we use Ball's (2000) concept of near-rational expectations. 
Specifically, a series of inflation (changes) expectations is computed exogenously to the 
model, as predictions from the best ARIMA model identified and estimated with Box-
Jenkins methods for the adopted deflator series - and then it is used as data in the 
Phillips equation. Therefore, this equation is forward-looking - and, so, New Keynesian 
- but is also compatible with the inflation inertia observed in the present monetary 
regime.18 
 
2.2.3. The Phillips Equation Functional Form 
For the UC trend-cycle decomposition set-up to work well, it is crucial that the 
measurement equations are correctly specified. In this chapter's system this includes, 
notably, a correct choice of the Phillips and Okun's equations functional forms. 
Recently, a great interest has been devoted to the possibility that the Phillips 
equation is in fact asymmetric and not linear.19 As Clark and Laxton (1997) recalled us, 
the original Phillips (1958) and Lipsey (1960) formulations related some price change 
measure to the inverse of unemployment. 
There are several reasons why the Phillips relation may be asymmetric, both 
theoretical and empirical. 
Empirically, the asymmetry in the inflation-output trade-off provides good 
explanations for many stylised facts of the post-war industrial economies, most of 
which have been reviewed, for the US case, by De Long and Summers (1988). More 
recently, Macklem (1995) noted that Phillips asymmetry could explain the apparent 
inflationary bias seen in recent macroeconomic behaviour and the need for deep and 
long recessions during the 80s and 90s to reverse the inflation build-up of the 70s. 
                                                          
18 Throughout the chapter, the results for the baseline near-rational expectations model are compared to 
the ones of standard adaptive expectations regressions - in which the coefficients on some lags of 
inflation changes are estimated within the Phillips equation. Note, however, that our adaptive 
expectations' models do not include arbitrary lags of inflation, but have the lag polynomial truncated at 
the same extension of the optimal univariate ARIMA identified and estimated (3 quarters). 
19 The case for convex Okun equations has also been made - see Mayes and Viren (2000) and Viren 
(2001). But it has been made less out of theoretical foundations - which the Okun relation does not have 
at all - and more from stylised facts: specifically, the observation that in expansions the unemployment 
rate tends to decrease less than it tends to increase in recessions. 
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 The extensive literature of empirical testing for asymmetric effects of monetary 
policy has also been considered as evidence of asymmetry in the Phillips curve. This 
literature has addressed two distinct types of policy effects asymmetries: asymmetry in 
the effects of monetary stimulus versus contraction, on one hand, and asymmetry in the 
effects of policy actions in periods of positive output change versus periods of negative 
output growth. As Lo and Piger (2001) argue, convexity of the Phillips curve is 
theoretically associated to the second type of asymmetry, but because the state variables 
behind the two asymmetries are often correlated, it is difficult to determine which 
asymmetry is driving the empirical results. Notably, for our research, a convex 
aggregate supply could also show up empirically as a first type of asymmetry. Yet, most 
of the literature has been incapable to distinguish between both types of asymmetry, and 
to resolve some of their conflicting results, so we review both. 
Within the first type of asymmetry, Cover (1992) studied US quarterly post-War 
data and found evidence that negative monetary shocks have significant negative effects 
on output, whilst the output effects of positive monetary shocks are not statistically 
significant. Analysing annual data of a panel of 18 European countries (1953-1990), and 
using a similar method, Karras (1996a) confirmed Cover's (1992) results, which 
suggested the existence of Phillips asymmetry also in the European case. Relaxing some 
constraints implicit in Cover's (1992) method, Karras (1996b), and Karras and Stoke 
(1999a, 1999b) offered additional evidence supporting his results. Moreover, they 
extended them by showing that the observed asymmetry in the effects of monetary 
shocks seems to arise from both aggregate-supply (Phillips) convexity and a credit 
("pushing on a string") mechanism - both in quarterly seasonally adjusted US data for 
1960:IV-1993:IV - (1999a) - and in quarterly data from 1963-1993 of a panel of 12 
OECD countries - (1999b). Notably, Karras and Stokes (1999a), also offer evidence that 
asymmetries in the effects of monetary shocks on output are positively correlated with 
the level of inflation and that this asymmetry is due to an asymmetric response of 
investment and not of consumption.20 Karras and Stokes (1999b) showed that the 
asymmetry in the effects of positive versus negative shocks survives even when the 
cyclical situation of the economy is controlled for, thus suggesting that these may be 
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 two co-existing phenomena. Thoma (1994) presents similar results, based on the 
significance of rolling sample Granger causality tests of money over output. On the 
contrary, Weise (1999) finds no evidence of a statistically different impact of M1 
decreases versus that of M1 increases, within a trivariate VAR of output, prices and 
money. Also, Belongia (1996) finds that Cover's (1992) results are not robust to a 
change from the traditional monetary aggregate to a divisia index. Senda (2001) studies 
prewar and postwar data of OECD countries, and finds that the asymmetry between the 
effects of positive and negative monetary shocks depends upon the level of trend 
inflation, and suggests that a model with price-adjustment costs and positive trend 
inflation can explain the empirical results. 
Within the second type of asymmetry, Macklem (1995) noted that the effects of the 
monetary tightening of the late 80s were slow to emerge when the economy was, 
initially, above the trend, but seemed to increase more than proportionately when it 
began operating below the trend.21 Weise (1999) reports evidence in favour of a convex 
aggregate supply curve by finding that significant aggregate demand shocks in either 
direction have stronger output effects when economic activity is weak and stronger 
price effects when economic activity is strong. Using a switching-regime model of real 
output to distinguish expansions from recessions, Garcia and Schaller (2002) also find 
larger effects of monetary actions during recessions than during expansions. With 
quarterly Austrian data from 1976:I-1998:IV, Kaufmann (2001) estimated an univariate 
model of real GDP including the Austrian three-month interest rate as a measure of 
monetary policy, within a Bayesian framework using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
simulation methods, and found a significant negative effect of monetary policy during 
periods of below-average growth, and insignificant effects during periods of normal and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
20 Shen (2000) also finds an association of the asymmetry to the level of inflation, in Taiwan data, as he 
reports results suggesting that positive monetary shocks have a positive effect on output when inflation is 
low, no effect for medium-range rates of inflation, and negative effects for high inflation rates. 
21 Note that although asymmetric effects of monetary policy over the cycle - type II asymmetry - may be a 
symptom of a convex Phillips curve, they are not necessarily caused by such a convexity. In fact, there is 
at least one major alternative mechanism that could explain policy effects' asymmetries - the credit 
market effects discussed in Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995). These are associated to credit market 
imperfections, to the fact that firms are typically exposed to external financing but more heavily during 
recessions than during expansions, and to the fact that this external finance exposure influences firms' net 
value. These conditions create a 'financial accelerator' mechanism that acts more significantly during 
recessions than during expansions. In recessions, cash flow are lower, firms are more dependent from 
external finance and the values of the collateral of corporate debt are depressed, which makes firm's 
external finance premium more sensitive to interest rate changes. 
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 above-average growth. At a more global European level, Peersman and Smets (2001a) 
studied the (a)symmetry in the effects of Area-wide monetary policy impulses on 
industrial production growth of seven EMU economies - Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria - during 1978-1998.22 Specifically, they 
computed the Area monetary impulses as the historical contribution of the monetary 
policy shocks to the Euro area short-term interest rate, as estimated from a structural 
VAR of the whole Euro area (i.e. as the cumulated effects of current and past monetary 
policy shocks on the interest rate). Then, they estimated a two states (recession and 
expansion) Markov Switching Regime Model, finding that the monetary impulses have 
significantly larger effects on industrial production growth during recessions than in 
booms, especially in Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. 
Recently, Lo and Piger (2001) augment a standard univariate unobserved 
components trend-cycle decomposition of real US output with lagged monetary policy 
variables explaining the cyclical component, and allowing their coefficients to undergo 
Markov regime switching with no a-priori identification of the type of asymmetry 
involved. Their results show that when cyclical output is negative and falling, monetary 
policy is significantly more effective than otherwise, which is consistent with type-II 
asymmetry but not type-I asymmetry. In what regards the theoretical models of 
asymmetry, their results are only partially consistent with Phillips asymmetry - because 
monetary effects become different when the recession is deepening, but not when the 
economy is equally below trend but the transitory component is rising. They are, on the 
contrary, consistent with the Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995) credit-channel model. 
In another strand of the literature, asymmetry is also suggested by the finding that 
some estimates of the benefice ratio of inflationary episodes seem significantly inferior 
to the estimated sacrifice ratio of disinflations.23 And the non-normality in the errors of 
Phillips line regressions, noted by some researchers, could also mean that the effect of 
the output gap on inflation is asymmetric and the errors could be picking up that wrong 
specification of those equations.24 
                                                          
22 Portugal, Luxembourg, Ireland and Greece were excluded apriori of the analysis due to data 
limitations, while Finland was excluded because of statistical evidence that its macroeconomic cycle was 
not synchronised with the common cycle shared by the other States studied, at the outset of the EMU. 
23 Filardo (1998) pages 35-36. 
24 See, for instance, Fisher, Mahadeva and Whitley (1997), page 78. 
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 Theoretically, Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) argued that a model with New-
Keynesian characteristics implies a convex Phillips curve, and Ball and Mankiw (1994) 
provided possible explanations for why microeconomic rigidities generate asymmetries 
in the macroeconomic cycle and in the effects of shocks. These essays made asymmetry 
a part of the New Keynesian counter-revolution.25 
Recent surveys of theoretical New Keynesian models of pricing behaviour that 
imply asymmetry in the short-run adjustment of prices to aggregate demand shocks are 
given in Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998) and Macklem (1997). Most prescribe that the 
Phillips equation is convex - the capacity constraint model, the menu costs model, the 
contracts model, the downward nominal wage rigidity model and the efficiency wages 
model. 
The rationale for the convexity in the Phillips relation varies considerably across 
these theories. The capacity constraint theory highlights the increasing difficulties of 
firms to increase production as they get closer to full capacity, and so justifies the 
increased elasticity of prices to demand at high levels of capacity utilisation. The menu-
costs and the contracts theories stress that the frequency and size of price and wage 
revisions tend to increase with the inflation level. The downward nominal wage rigidity 
postulates that in contemporary economies the nominal wages have floors which imply 
that excess supply shocks have more real effects (and less nominal effects) than excess 
demand shocks have. The efficiency wages approach complements the downward 
nominal wages story by providing efficiency reasons for higher than equilibrium 
nominal wages, more prone to increase than to decrease. 
On the other hand, there is one theoretical alternative - the monopolistically 
competitive model - that implies a concave functional form. In this model, oligopolistic 
competition causes firms to be more reluctant to raise prices than to lower them, 
because of the fear of losing market share.26 
                                                          
25 This is not to say that these authors' arguments were undisputed - see the discussion in Akerlof, Rose 
and Yellen (1988). 
26 Eisner (1997) and Stiglitz (1997) report evidence of a concavity in the US Phillips curve. Dupasquier 
and Ricketts (1997) perform a simple test (see pages 139-141) using data from Canada and the US, and 
reject the hypothesis of a concavity in the Phillips relation. More recently, Filardo (1998) studied US data 
between 1959 and 1997, and found evidence that the Phillips relation is convex when the economy is 
overheated (operating well above the trend) but is concave when the economy is weak (well bellow the 
trend). This evidence is seen as a possible explanation for the apparently contradictory results on the 
shape of the US Phillips curve. 
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 Additionally to these global reasons, there are reasons specific to the EMU that 
strengthen the case in favour of a non-linear Phillips equation in this Area. Specifically, 
it has been argued that the aggregation of sectors of activity and regions with different 
cyclical positions and, possibly, different Phillips slopes, results in an asymmetric 
aggregate relation between inflation and the cyclical condition of the economy - see 
Mayes and Viren (2000) and Demertezis and Hallett (1995, 1998). This could be 
significant and tend to persist as the Euro Area still exhibits weak labour mobility 
across sectors and sub-regions. 
Asymmetry in the Phillips equation would have important policy implications. With 
(convex) asymmetry, excess demand has more inflationary effects than excess supply 
has deflationary effects, which means that on average the unemployment gap will have 
to be negative for the inflation rate to be stable. 
Figure 2.1 below illustrates this idea. In a deterministic world, the long-run Phillips 
curve would hold, as there are no surprises or shocks, and a null unemployment gap 
would be an equilibrium consistent with no inflation changes, even with Phillips curve 
asymmetry. This is the intersection of the Phillips curve to the [0,0] point in the plot. 
But if inflation and real activity vary stochastically - as they systematically do - and if 
the Phillips curve is convex, stationarity of the inflation rate implies that the 
unemployment gaps can not average to zero, but rather must be, on average, negative. 
This is termed GapE in the figure, which is simply the mean value of the unemployment 
gaps that occur if the inflation changes remain bounded symmetrically around zero, 
given an asymmetric Phillips curve. This is what might be called the stochastic 
equilibrium gap, which, as the figure clearly shows, is not identical to the deterministic 
equilibrium gap (zero), but rather is negative.27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Most of the functional forms tested in this chapter allow for the data to choose between a convex or a 
concave configuration of the function, when estimating each form's crucial parameters - see below. 
However, it can not be denied that the author's aprioris favoured a convex specification in detriment of 
the concave - which could be inferred from the written text at some stages. 
27 Laxton et al (1995), Clark et al (1995, 1996), Clark and Laxton (1997), Laxton et al (1999) and Isard et 
al (2001), inter alia, state these arguments not in terms of deterministic and stochastic equilibrium gaps, 
but in terms of deterministic and stochastic NAIRUs. Their terminology is associated to the fact that they 
model the asymmetry in relation to the level of unemployment and not to the unemployment gap. In this 
chapter, the concepts, as well as the asymmetry tests below, are always developed in terms of 
 37
 Figure 2.1 - Asymmetry in the Convex Time-varying NAIRU Phillips curve 
0
gapE
Inflation
changes
Unemployment
gap
 
Convex asymmetry would, therefore, call for a more activist stabilisation policy, 
taking pre-emptive action against any forecasted excess demand situation, because a 
subsequent policy to deliberately disinflate would be more costly than one to pre-
emptively resist a similar rise in inflation.28 Clark et al. (2001), in their model for 
evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules in the US - including a convex Phillips 
curve - document this argument: an inflation forecast based rule dominates a rule that is 
not forward-looking but in which interest rates react more to positive than to negative 
gaps. 
Moreover, a stabilisation policy that reduces the variability of real economic activity 
- and, as result, of inflation changes - gains particular importance in a convex economy, 
as it would place the (stochastic) equilibrium unemployment gap closer to zero. On this, 
see the arguments and the simulations in Laxton et al. (1995) (p.361-371), Clark et al. 
(1995, 1996), Clark and Laxton (1997) and Laxton et al (1999).29 
                                                                                                                                                                          
unemployment gaps, because that is the only meaningful concept and testable magnitude in a model of a 
time-varying NAIRU. 
28 On the contrary, a concave Phillips curve would imply that a policy to pre-emptively resist inflationary 
pressures of a given size is more costly than a policy to deliberately disinflate. 
29 These authors have also argued that policy errors arising from an incorrect assumption that the 
economy is linear would be more costly than the error of adopting a policy reaction function that assumes 
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 The question of the possible asymmetry in the Phillips relation is, however, far from 
settled. The tests results have been mixed, depending on the countries, the specific time-
series under study and the empirical methods and technical options adopted.30 
In the earlier stages of this literature, the NAIRU was assumed to be a constant or, at 
least, was estimated out of the model where asymmetry was to be tested - generally with 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. This branch of the literature includes the studies by Chada et 
al (1992), Turner (1995), Laxton et al (1995), Clark et al (1995, 1996, 2001), Fisher et 
al (1997), Dupasquier and Ricketts (1997, 1998), Yates (1998), Filardo (1998), Pyythia 
(1999) and Mayes and Viren (2000). The asymmetric models considered in this 
literature include threshold linear models, quadratic, cubic and hyperbole functions.31 
Subsequently, the asymmetry of the Phillips relation has been modelled in the time-
varying NAIRU framework described above, including the estimation of the NAIRU 
and gap in a model-consistent form. This literature includes Debelle and Laxton (1997), 
Clark and Laxton (1997), Debelle and Vickery (1998), Laxton et al (1999), Faruqee et 
al (1999), Isard et al (2001), Meyler (1999) and Irac (2000).  
However, these studies estimate asymmetric models without any formal pre-testing 
of the asymmetry. Furthermore, instead of relating the asymmetry to the unemployment 
gap, they specify it as related to the level of unemployment, which, in the modern 
framework of time-varying NAIRU, may not necessarily reflect the cyclical situation of 
the economy. A recent result that may corroborate this point, has been offered in 
Hamilton (2001): applying his parametric method of flexible nonlinear inference to US 
annual inflation and unemployment data from 1949 to 1997, he found no evidence of 
nonlinearity of the Phillips function on the unemployment level.32 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that the economy is symmetric when in fact it is asymmetric. This argument is central to Laxton et al 
(1999) plea for the US monetary policy authority to act on the presumption that the US Phillips curve has 
moderate convexity, in spite of not being able to provide a reliable answer on the US Phillips relation 
functional form. 
30 Note that, just like in this text, at least three basic technical problems must be solved in these studies, 
which may affect the results. They are (i) the choice of the specific asymmetric functional form, (ii) the 
choice of the econometric technique for estimating the output/unemployment gap and (iii) the modelling 
of inflation expectations. 
31 In a somehow different set-up, Eliasson (1999) modelled the non-linearity of constant-NAIRU Phillips 
curves as a logistic smooth transition autoregression. 
32 Nor he found any evidence of nonlinearity as function of the inflation level. In his estimates, the time 
trend was the only regressor with a significant nonlinear effect on the inflation rate. This could mean that 
the nonlinearity that he captures in his model may be the result of the time-variation of the supply-shocks 
variables - that he does not proxy for in the regression - and/or of the time-variation of the NAIRU. 
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 Recently, StAubyn (2000) suggested an empirical strategy that allows the formal 
testing of asymmetry encompassing the null hypothesis of linearity within the 
estimation of an unobserved components model designed to identify the NAIRU and the 
gap. He tested for asymmetry in the US Phillips curve specifying the Phillips' slope 
parameter as a possible function of the recent unemployment gap or inflation changes, a 
method that Martins and StAubyn (2001) also applied to Portuguese data. 
In this chapter, this strategy is used to test for asymmetry in the Euro Area Phillips 
and Okun equations, thus offering the first formal joint test of these non-linearities. 
First, some preliminary evidence is detected using a linear spline (piece-wise linear or 
threshold) approach. Then, results from two functional forms quite common in the 
literature are supplied - quadratic and hyperbole - and, in addition, evidence using the 
exponential function is also offered. On the whole, these tests should provide 
reasonably robust statistical evidence regarding the problem at hand. 
As mentioned, we consider and test for a non-linear Okun relation, jointly with the 
possibly non-linear Phillips curve. This is itself of interest - as stressed in recent 
literature by Mayes and Viren (2000), Lee (2000), Cuaresma (2000), Viren (2001), and 
Harris and Silverstone (2001) - and deepens the knowledge about the Euro Area cyclical 
behaviour. Moreover, it enables a more precise definition of the trade-off, by providing 
an indirect test of the hypothesis that its linearity/non-linearity depends upon the gap 
considered - unemployment or output. In our model, we have the opportunity to offer a 
first piece of evidence on this for the aggregate Euro Area, with the further advantage of 
using model-consistent output and unemployment gaps. 
 
2.2.4. Confidence Bands for the Estimated NAIRU and Gaps 
As is well known, the uncertainty associated to unobserved components' estimates 
surpasses the variance of the errors in their one-step ahead forecasts that is given by the 
Kalman filter. In fact, besides this uncertainty due to the estimation of the time-varying 
parameters, there is also the uncertainty due to the estimation of the hyper-parameters of 
the likelihood function. The Kalman filter does not generate a measure of this total 
uncertainty, and yet this is important for some assessment of the utility of the estimates 
for the practical conduct of monetary policy. 
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 Hamilton (1986, 1994) suggested the use of Monte Carlo integration to compute an 
approximation to the total uncertainty around time varying parameters' estimates.33 
Using a large number (N) of randomly generated sets of hyper-parameters - drawn 
from their estimated distribution under the assumption of multivariate normality - his 
method computes measures of the two testable sources of asymmetry. These are filter 
uncertainty - the one that would occur even if the hyper-parameters were perfectly 
known - and parameter uncertainty - the one associated to the uncertainty about the 
hyper-parameters' estimates. 
In this study, Hamilton's measure of uncertainty is computed, with N=10,000, for 
the estimated NAIRU and unemployment gap of the Euro area 1970:I-2000:II. 
 
2.3. The Model 
The model is a refined and extended version of the unobserved components 
framework recently popularised by Gordon (1997). 
The basic extension consists of the inclusion of an Okun equation and a transition 
equation for trend real output, and was suggested by Apel and Jansson (1999a, 1999b) 
as a way of solving the 'pile-up' problem. 
The most important refinements lie in the treatment of inflation expectations and in 
the testing for asymmetries in the measurement equations, which will allow a better 
specification of the system. 
It consists of the following three measurement (2.1 to 2.3) and four state/transition 
(2.4 to 2.7) equations:34 
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33 See Hamilton (1994), chapter 13, section 13.7. 'Statistical inference with the Kalman filter'. 
34 Equation (1) and (3) are presented here in their baseline linear specification. The asymmetric functional 
forms considered in this study and the specific asymmetry are described below. 
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Equation (2.1) is a New Keynesian Phillips equation of the Calvo-Rotemberg 
type - specified in inflation changes -, which as is well known, explains inflation with 
inflation expectations and the demand pressure in the economy.35 We denote by Et, as 
usual, expectations formed in period t, but, for the sake of realism, we consider that the 
information then available reports up to period t-1 - which is a somehow standard 
assumption for quarterly data, see Rudebusch (2002a), but which we discuss further 
below in section 2.3.1.. The demand pressure is proxied by the difference between the 
NAIRU, u  (which is allowed to vary along time), and observed unemployment, u . Its 
action over wages and prices is the heart of the Phillips / Natural rate theory. In this 
empirical application, the function includes also some variable proxying for transitory 
supply-shocks (S
n
t t
t), which influence inflation through a different channel than 
expectations and demand, having temporary effects that must be modelled in order to 
achieve the estimation of a NAIRU and not merely of a short-term NAIRU.36 
The second measurement equation is the Okun equation, relating the output gap 
to the current unemployment gap, which is a well-known empirical regularity with a 
long tradition in macroeconomics. In this model, it has the specific econometric role 
described above - of supplying more identifying information to the system and, thus, 
allowing for the estimation of all the hyper-parameters in the model, including the 
standard deviation of the NAIRU's innovation, that otherwise would be affected by the 
'pile-up problem'. 
                                                          
35 For a simple derivation of this New Keynesian Phillips relation see Roberts (1995). 
36 The short-run NAIRU is the level of unemployment consistent with maintaining the current level of 
inflation in next period, while the NAIRU is the level that stabilises the inflation rate after all the 
temporary shocks that affect inflation have eroded their effects. For details on the distinction between the 
short-run NAIRU, the NAIRU and the long-term NAIRU (or Natural rate), see, inter alia, Estrella and 
Mishkin (1998) and Richardson et al (2000). 
 42
 The third measurement equation, (2.3), stems from the seminal unobserved 
components model in Watson (1986) and decomposes the unemployment rate into the 
trend component, the NAIRU, and the cyclical unemployment gap. Technically, it 
assures that the NAIRU and the gap sum-up to the observed unemployment rate. 
The state-system models the dynamics of trend and cycle unemployment and 
output - equations (2.4) to (2.7). 
In equation (2.4), the NAIRU is assumed to follow a random walk, which is the 
standard assumption in the literature that, as in this chapter, aims at modelling the time-
path of the natural rate without explaining it. The random walk process driving the 
NAIRU includes a drift which itself follows a random walk, rather than being a constant 
- which is modelled by equation (2.5). This drift specification is used to capture low 
frequency innovations to the stochastic trend such as long run structural breaks in trend 
growth rate - see Lo and Piger (2001). In other words, it is a standard procedure for 
modelling time series that exhibit for some period a specific systematic trend but may 
invert that trend and drift systematically in the opposite way - used, inter alia, by 
Gerlach and Smets (1997), Laubach (2001), and Kichian (1999). As discussed above, 
this is empirically and theoretically suited for the Euro Area case, in which equilibrium 
unemployment has been drifting up for some decades, seems to be decreasing currently 
and has the potential to decrease in the next years ahead. 
Equation (2.6) models the unemployment gap as a stationary auto-regressive 
process of order 2. This is the assumption made in Watson (1986) and Kuttner (1994) 
about the US output gap, and has been adopted thereafter in several works that deal with 
unemployment gaps such as Apel and Jansson (1999a, 1999b), Rasi and Vilkari (1998) 
and Laubach (2001). Specifying the cyclical unemployment as a process that reverts to 
a zero mean captures the essence of Friedman's (1968) natural rate theory - that the 
unemployment rate can not drift away from the natural rate indefinitely. 
Finally, equation (2.7) postulates that trend output follows a random walk with 
drift process. Here, however, the drift is a constant g - as real output trends 
systematically up - and its estimated (positive) value represents the quarterly average 
growth rate of trend real output. 
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 It should be noted that trend unemployment and trend output are specified as 
time-series processes with different dynamics - equations (2.4) and (2.7) - in accordance 
to the behaviour of the observed series. This is not the case in recent research parallel to 
this chapter's. For instance, the one reported in Camba-Mendez and Palenzuela (2001), 
where both trends are always modelled identically although allowing for three 
alternative processes: random walks with constant drift, local linear trends (random 
walk with stochastic drift) or smooth trends. Likewise, in a parallel piece of research on 
similar unobserved components systems estimated with aggregate Euro area data, 
Fabiani and Mestre (2001) also impose an identical process on trend unemployment and 
output - specifically, the local linear model. Ross and Ubide (2001), in turn, compared 
the performance of a number of alternative UC model formulations - including a linear 
version of our own - in terms of inflation forecasting and cyclical turning points 
identification, but did not actually performed any classic econometric identification of 
the model best fitting the data. We, instead, follow the behaviour of the observed series, 
and, as discussed below, the a-priori in this model's equation (2.7) was confirmed 
within our identification work, as the hypothesis of a stochastic drift versus that of a 
constant drift in trend real output was clearly rejected. 
 
2.3.1. Inflation Expectations 
A crucial issue in empirical studies of the Phillips equation is modelling 
expectations of inflation. As mentioned above in section 2.1, we follow the recent 
suggestion of Ball (2000), which reconciles the theoretical forward-looking New 
Keynesian Phillips equation with the inertia properties exhibited by recent inflation 
data. Specifically, it is supposed that agents are near-rational when forming expectations 
about future inflation, in the sense that they only use available inflation information. 
Following Ball's metaphor, this concept is used here assuming that agents are 
able to identify and estimate the best ARIMA process for inflation. In the present 
monetary regime, inflation has significant persistence and therefore is generally not 
stationary in its levels but only in its first differences. This means that agents identify 
and estimate the best ARMA process for inflation changes 
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This estimated model yelds the rule that allows agents to compute expectations of 
inflation. To see how, note that the ARMA estimates can be written as 
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Then, at period t, agents form near-rational expectations of inflation for next period t+1 
as follows: 
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Equation (1) in our model is a Calvo-Rotemberg New Keynesian Phillips 
equation transformed so that it is estimated in inflation changes and not levels. 
Disregarding the other elements in the Phillips relation (gap and supply-shocks), and 
assuming near-rational expectations of inflation, the transformation is simply 
(.......)111 +−−+=−− tttEtt ππππ  
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This expression shows how Ball’s near-rational forward-looking Calvo-
Rotemberg Phillips curves could be estimated, using the estimated coefficients from the 
best linear unbiased univarate time-series process for inflation (changes) and data until 
current period t. 
Besides forwardness, one other characteristic of standard formulations of New 
Keynesian theory is that they describe agents that set prices for period (t) after knowing 
the state of the Economy at that period (t). We depart from standard theory at this 
respect. In fact, we consider unrealistic for a model to assume that agents know the state 
of the Economy at (t) when making price decisions for that same period (t), because 
prices are one of the variables defining the state of the Economy at (t). In other words, if 
agents are deciding prices for period (t), that decision must surely be made at the very 
beginning of that period, when it is not realistic to assume that they could know 
anything about the state of the economy in a period that has not yet began. This 
argument would only be reinforced if one considers the lags involved in the publication 
of statistics describing the state of the Economy, and that we are using quarterly data. 
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 Accordingly, we assume that agents decide prices for period (t), at the beginning 
of that period, taking into account expectations of inflation for next period (t+1), which 
they build using the available information on the state of the Economy, as of period (t-
1) and the ARIMA coefficients estimates. Hence, in spite of being taken at period (t) for 
(t+1), expectations are in fact two-step-ahead forecasts, as only magnitudes relating to 
period (t-1) are assumed to be known when expectations at (t) are formed. ( )1231211 ˆ.....ˆˆˆ +−−−+ ∆++∆+∆+∆+= ptpttttttt EE πφπφπφπφππ  
 After some algebra, this can be expressed only in terms of known information at 
the beginning of period (t) - which relates to period (t-1) or previous - and of the ARMA 
coefficients. Assuming, for instance, p=3, we have: ( ) ( ) ( ) 3313232121221111 ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ −−−−+ ∆++∆+++∆+++= ttttttE πφφφπφφφφπφφφππ  
Finally, as we estimate Phillips equations specified in inflation changes, the rule 
generating our series of near-rational forward-looking expectations of inflation changes 
is given by the following equation: 
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where ( ) ( ) ( )313*33212*22211*1 ˆˆˆˆ,ˆˆˆˆˆ,ˆˆˆˆ φφφφφφφφφφφφφ +=++=++= .  
Equation (2.8) closes our model, in the sense that the time series generated by 
(2.8) is taken as data in the Phillips equation (2.1), for each period (t).37 
 
We assume that this time-series of inflation expectations is orthogonal to the 
other regressors in the Phillips equation, namely the current unemployment gap and the 
lagged deviation of domestic inflation from imported inflation. In the latter, this means 
that it is assumed that the transmission of foreign inflation to domestic inflation changes 
takes longer than a quarter - which seems to be confirmed empirically with our data (see 
                                                          
37 In our empirical analysis we have checked if results would differ significantly with standard Calvo and 
Taylor versions of New Keynesian Phillips equations – formulations assuming that agents use 
information contemporaneous to the formation of expectations. The difference is that the Taylor version 
includes explicitly a simple average of E 1tt +π  and t1tE π− , while Calvo’s version only explicits 1ttE +π  
and considers t1tE π−  implicitly in the residual – see Ball (2000, page 18, equations (4) and (4’)). These 
formulations lead to smaller and not significant Phillips elasticity, even though retaining its correct sign. 
Also, the Phillips equation residuals behave worse than with our formulation. As for the rest, results are 
practically equivalent: the identification of the measurement equations is unchanged and the unobserved 
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 below, section 5). Hence, the econometric framework used here does not suffer from the 
generated regressor problems, as discussed in Pagan (1984) and Pagan and Ullah 
(1988).38 
In the empirical work below, the results from this 'near-rational expectations' 
model' are always compared to those from an adaptive expectations model'. The latter is 
the standard backward-looking Phillips model in which inflation (changes) expectations 
are proxied by lags of inflation (changes), with coefficients estimated within the Phillips 
equation simultaneously with the whole model. Note, however, that the extension of 
distributed lag of inflation is fixed at p, which is the extension identified with the Box-
Jenkins method and adopted in the 'near-rational model'. Hence, the Gordon-style 
practice of including long and arbitrarily chosen lags of inflation in the Phillips equation 
will not be followed here, so that the results from both approaches remain comparable. 
In the baseline model - the 'near-rational model' - expectations of inflation 
changes have an associated coefficient α, to be estimated with the model. Given that the 
expectations' process is exogenously estimated with data for the entire period, the 
inclusion of this coefficient α is intended to allow for a correction, in each quarter, of 
the weight given to expectations in the Phillips relation.39 
It could be argued that the near-rational model may suffer from a problem of 
inconsistency of expectations. In fact, the Phillips equation (2.1) can be solved in order 
to the expectations term, generating a series of ex-post inflation expectations that is not 
restricted to be identical to the one that is plugged into that equation from the 
(exogenous) estimation of equation (2.8). This issue is addressed below, with a brief 
discussion and an alternatively estimation, with simultaneous estimation of the whole 
set of equations (2.1)-(2.8). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
components estimates are hardly distinguishable – most especially in the case of the Taylor version - and 
the estimates of cyclical turning points do not change at all. 
38 This model is a 'weak' or 'partly rational' expectations model of the class identified as model 2 in Pagan 
(1984) - pages 227-229. See below in section 5 the description of the model identification, where it is 
shown how the theoretical reasons for admitting the referred orthogonality have been confirmed 
empirically. 
39 The alternative option here could be having the ARIMA model for expectations estimated with 
coefficients up-dated with every new observation. However, because the number of observations 
available for this study is not that large, this would mean that, in practice, any robust estimation of the 
ARIMA process would leave only a small number of periods, at the end of the sample, in which 
coefficients updating could be done satisfactorily. Not restricting the α coefficient to be 1 across the 
whole sample is a simpler way of doing this with no practical disadvantages. 
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2.3.2. State-space Format 
Estimation by the Kalman filter requires that the system is written in state-space 
form. This form is as follows: 
O
ttt tUO εα +=  (2.9) 
U
ttt gtTUU ε++= −1  (2.10) 
where O stands for 'observables' and U for 'unobservables', and: 
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with all innovations independent, serially uncorrelated and with normal distribution 
with zero expected values and constant variances. 
In this model, tα  is a vector composed of observed variables (expected inflation 
changes and the supply-shock proxy - the deviation of domestic inflation from imported 
 48
 inflation), zeros, ones and two parameters that are to be estimated - the Phillips relation 
slope parameter, γ, and the Okun law parameter, θ. 
tU  is a vector of unobserved variables, composed of the coefficients associated 
to the expectations of inflation and the supply-shock proxy, c  and , and of the 
unobservable variables that are to be estimated – trend output, equilibrium 
unemployment, unemployment gap and drift in the innovation to the equilibrium rate. It 
has transition equations defined by the matrix Τ.  In the transition system,  is a 
vector of innovations, assumed to be normally distributed with a variance-covariance 
matrix Q: 
t1 t2c
U
tε
)(0,Ν ∼ QUtε  (2.11) 
This matrix Q has, by assumption, all elements equal to zero except the diagonal 
ones associated with trend output, the NAIRU, the unemployment gap and the 
NAIRU’s drift  - , ,  and pεσ nεσ gapεσ µεσ - so that these are the only parameters that 
really vary with time. 
Estimation by the Kalman recursive equations requires the setting of initial 
values for the state vector. The starting values of trend output and the NAIRU were set 
to the corresponding observed values of output and unemployment, and those of the gap 
and drift were set accordingly to that assumption. Following the suggestion in the 
literature, relatively diffuse priors were adopted here by assuming large starting values 
for the unobserved' variance matrix. Specifically, the standard deviation of the one-step 
ahead predictions of the system's unobserved components were initialised at 5 percent 
for trend real output, 2 percentage points for the NAIRU and unemployment gap and at 
0.75 percentage points for the NAIRU's drift. 
With these starting values for the state system and with initial conditions for the 
likelihood’s hyper-parameters, the Kalman iterations can proceed and maximisation of 
the maximum-likelihood function can be pursued. The log-likelihood function, L, is 
written on the system's one-step ahead prediction errors and their variance, as described 
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 in Harvey (1989, pages 125-128).40 In the specific case of the baseline linear model of 
this study, L is a function of eleven unknown parameters, sometimes called hyper-
parameters: 
),,,,,,,2,1,,( µσσσσσσρρθγ gappnphiokgLL =  (2.12) 
which are, respectively, the slope parameters in the Phillips and Okun equations, the 
two auto-regressive parameters in the unemployment gap process, the average rate of 
growth of trend output, the standard deviations for the disturbances in the Okun and 
Phillips equations, and the standard deviations for the innovations in the NAIRU, the 
unemployment gap, trend output and the NAIRU drift. 
Estimation was conducted with a GAUSS code, which uses the procedure Optmum 
to maximize the likelihood function.41 Standard deviations of the hyper-parameters' 
estimates were computed using the inverse of the Hessian (computed out of the 
maximisation process), while variances of the time-varying parameters were obtained 
from the Kalman filter recursive equations. 
 
2.4. The Data: Sources and Basic Time Series Properties 
Data are quarterly time series of GDP deflator, Imports deflator, Real GDP and the 
Unemployment rate, for the aggregate of the Euro area, 1970:I-2000:II. Observations 
from 1970:I to 1998:III were supplied by Fagan et al (2001), while observations for 
1998:IV-2000:II were taken from recent issues of the ECB’s monthly bulletin.42 
The basic time-series properties of the data are reported in tables 2.1.A and 2.1.B.43 
The inflation rate (πt), the Unemployment rate (Ut) and the log of real output (Yt) seem 
                                                          
40 For details on the mechanics of the Kalman filter and estimation of UC systems by maximum 
likelihood, the reader should see Harvey (1989), Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor (1992) or Hamilton’s 
(1994) chapter 13. 
41 Estimation very often required some management of the maximization algorithm, the step-method and 
the algorithm for computing the gradient. The typical option was to initiate iterations with the ‘BFGS’ 
algorithm and the ‘stepbt’ step-method, and then switch to the ‘Newton’ algorithm and the ‘half’ step-
method when the function had come closer to the maximum. Generally, the Richardson extrapolation of 
the forward difference method was used as the numerical gradient method, which can be very close to the 
analytical derivatives. 
42 This data is a part of the AWMD - the Area Wide Model Database. 
43 Results for augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are presented, as practice 
has revealed that PP tests very often help in clarifying the results of the (most common) ADF tests - 
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 to be integrated of order 1. On the contrary, the series of inflation changes (∆πt), the 
imports deflator's inflation rate (Impπt), the deviations of Euro Area inflation from 
imports inflation (Imp πt- πt), the changes of the unemployment rate (∆ut) and the 
growth rates of real output (∆Yt) seem to be I(0). 
 
Table 2.1.A. Unit Root Tests - Augmented Dickey-Fuller  (l=6) 
Statistics πt + ∆πt ++ Imp πt Impπt-πt Ut ∆Ut Yt +++ ∆Yt 
T(ρτ−1) τρτ 
-25.24b 
-3.97 b 
-163.23 a 
-4.64 a 
-55.16  a 
-4.30  a 
-69.16 a 
-4.52  a 
-1.43 
-1.00 
-32.72 a 
-2.73 
-10.80 
-3.09 
-90.02 a 
-4.30 a 
Φ3 
Φ2 
8.68 b 
5.83 b 
10.83 a 
7.22 a 
9.26  a 
6.17  b 
10.23  a 
6.83  a 
2.13 
1.81 
4.00 
2.74 
5.20 
8.97  a 
9.32 a 
6.22 b 
T(ρµ−1) 
 τρµ 
-3.98 
-1.06 
-155.30 a 
-4.56 a 
-33.65 a 
-3.18  b 
-63.67  a 
-4.31  a 
-0.99 
-2.04 
-26.26 a 
-2.30 
-0.42 
-1.18 
-84.17 a 
-4.20  a 
Φ1 0.62 10.40 a 5.06  b 9.31  a 2.66 2.76 8.36  a 8.82 a 
T(ρ−1) 
 τρ 
-0.95 
-0.76 
-358.02a 
-4.36a 
-15.04  a 
-2.35  b 
-155.65 a 
-4.07  a 
0.15 
0.18 
-13.44 a 
-2.13 b 
0.05 
3.70  
-7.54  c 
-1.86  c 
+ First differences of the log of GDP deflator;++ First differences of Inflation; +++ Logarithm of real GDP 
∆ First difference operator 
Estimates obtained with routine unitroot.mlc in MALCOLM (1998), except for the model without trend 
and drift, obtained with RATS routine unitroot.src 
a - significant at 1 percent confidence; b - significant at 5  percent; c - significant at 10 percent. 
 
Table 2.1.B. Unit Root Tests - Phillips-Perron  (l=6) 
Statistic πt + ∆πt ++ Imp πt Impπt - πt Ut ∆Ut Yt +++ ∆Yt 
Z( ρ~ ) 
Z(t ρ~ ) 
-17.11  
-3.51  c 
-149.55a  
-14.65 a 
-34.41a 
-4.53  a 
-40.76  a 
-5.05  a 
-1.16 
-0.38 
-46.70 a  
-5.27  a 
-13.07 
-3.24 
-99.37 a 
-8.79 a 
Z(Φ3) 
Z(Φ2) 
6.58 c 
4.41 c 
107.34a 
71.56 a 
11.06 a 
8.19  a 
13.95  a 
10.02  a 
1.60 
2.62 
14.02  a 
9.36 a 
5.35 
29.57 a 
7.52 b 
27.01  a 
Z(ρ*) 
Z(tρ*) 
-4.73  
-1.46 
-151.01a 
-14.46 a 
-30.79a 
-4.22 a 
-41.15  a 
-5.07  a 
-2.00 
-1.73 
-41.89 a  
-4.85  a 
-0.80 
-1.77 
-97.32 a 
-8.67  a 
Z(Φ1) 1.10  104.61 a 10.71 a 14.93  a 3.62 11.76 a 37.52  a 39.68  a 
Z(ρ) 
Z(tρ) 
-1.30 
-0.87 
-151.36a 
-14.38a 
-22.47 a 
-3.54 a 
-39.13  a 
-4.92  a 
0.53 
1.03 
-35.69 a 
-4.45 a 
0.06 
7.75 
-48.79 a 
-5.58  a 
Notes: see table 2.1.A. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
which is sometimes important, having in mind the lack of power of the unit root tests. We show results 
for all the alternative models, sequentially from the most complex to the simplest. The auto-regressive 
correction was truncated at the 6th lag, which, albeit arbitrary, is close to the Said and Dickey (1984) rule 
of thumb - L = T (1/3) - that generally gives good results. 
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The properties are in line with general aprioristic analysis, and legitimate some of 
the specification options adopted here. They imply that the Phillips equation should be 
specified in inflation changes rather than in levels, as near-rational agents' expectations 
result from fitting a Box-Jenkins model to a stationary inflation series. In addition, they 
also suggest that the proxy for supply-shocks - imported inflation - can enter the Phillips 
equation alternatively in its levels or as the deviation from domestic inflation. 
Table 2.2 reports the ARIMA model identified and estimated for the GDP deflator 
series. Specifically, Box-Jenkins methods suggested that a simple AR(3) process is the 
best univariate ARIMA model for output’s inflation in the Euro area 1970-2000. As 
discussed above, each period’s one-step-ahead prediction of inflation changes given by 
this estimated model will be our series of expected inflation changes fed into the 
‘near-rational expectations’ models. 
 
Table 2.2 - Arima Model: GDP Deflator, Euro Area [1970:I-2000:II] 
Series = (1-B)2 Log GDPdeft Estimate T-Statistic  Significance 
φ1     -0.4093 [-4.632]   (0.000) 
φ2     -0.1425 [-1.511]   (0.134) 
φ3     -0.2137 [-2.428]    (0.017) 
φ(1):     -0.766 
R2    0.9999 
SSRs    0.0011 
Q     (29-3): 20.698     (0.757) 
[ ]: t-statistics; 
( ): Significance; 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Baseline Linear Model Results 
The model was estimated with all reasonable specifications combining 
contemporary and lagged values of the explanatory variables in the Phillips and Okun 
equations. Individual significance statistics and global statistical quality indicators - 
especially normality and auto-correlation statistics of the measurement system's 
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 residuals - were used to identify the most significant model. This was found to be the 
one in which the unemployment gap enters the Phillips and the Okun equations (only) 
contemporaneously to, respectively, the inflation changes and the real output gap.44  
The fact that additional lags of the unemployment gap are not statistically 
significant, in the Phillips equation, means that there is no evidence of the 'speed-limit 
effects' discussed since Turner (1995) - which would be a symptom of persistence, and 
possible hysteresis, in the Euro Area unemployment rate. This result is in line with 
Richardson et al's (2000) findings that only in the UK and Spain, out of 21 OECD 
countries' quarterly data, were these effects significant, but not with the ones of 
McAdam and McMorrow (1999) obtained with annual aggregate data of the EU15. 
The standard deviation of the residual of the Okun equation converged 
systematically to zero throughout the identification work, so it was restricted to that 
value during estimation.45 
We have alternatively estimated the model with a random-walk drift in the (random 
walk) process driving trend output, instead of the constant drift above defined. 
However, the variance of this random walk drift was not statistically significant and its 
estimated value showed no notable change along time, which confirmed the baseline 
apriori of a constant (positive) drift in Euro Area trend real GDP 1970-2000. 
Similar identification work led to choosing the (one quarter) lagged deviation of the 
Euro area inflation from the imports' deflator inflation as the sole proxy for the supply 
shocks, in the Phillips equation. Economically, this variable is generally considered a 
good proxy for the inflationary pressures that originate in recent periods at the 
international level and will supposedly feed into domestic inflation with some lag. 
Historically, most supply shocks have indeed emerged outside the Euro Area and have 
                                                          
44 Differently, the experiments in Camba-Mendez and Palenzuela (2001) and Fabiani and Mestre (2001) 
rely on some specific aprioris and do not offer any identification work comparable to the one done here. 
Moreover, Fabiani and Mestre (2001) rely on OLS regressions (performed with proxies for the 
unobserved components obtained from Hodrick-Prescott filtering) to achieve some identification of the 
system. The fragility of this procedure might explain why they chose to report results from a number of 
slight variations of their baseline model, without being able to choose one preferred model. It may also 
explain why they included in the Phillips equation some supply-shocks proxy variables that were not 
statistically significant within this chapter's identification work - see comments below. 
45 This means that, with this data, the model will generate unemployment and output gaps that are 
perfectly proportional. This is in sharp contrast to Astley and Yates' (1999) findings for the UK: using a 
structural VAR approach, they found that the unemployment and output gaps (as well as the capacity 
utilisation gap) exhibited very different dynamics. 
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 subsequently affected the Area inflation - namely oil price shocks and commodities 
prices' shocks. In large and relatively closed economic areas like the US and the Euro 
one, this variable is generally seen as enough to model supply-side factors. It is assumed 
that the transmission of these shocks into domestic Euro area inflation takes longer than 
a quarter. This assumption was confirmed empirically, as the contemporary deviation of 
domestic Euro inflation from imported inflation was not statistically significant, 
contrary to what happens with the lagged deviation. This result also confirms that this 
supply-shocks proxy is orthogonal to the variables forming expectations, providing 
more content to the theoretical assumption that had previously discarded the possibility 
of a generated regressor problem. 
One problem with this proxy in the specific case of the Euro Area is that the Euro 
Wide Area imports deflator may be an imperfect measure of actual imported inflation of 
the Euro Area. This is because this series was built by simple aggregation of the 
national imports deflators and includes changes in prices of trade between member-
states - see Fagan et al (2001). As an alternative, two series of the International 
Monetary Fund's Financial Statistics were tried - 'world oil price' (average of the main 3 
spot price indexes - Dubai, Brent and Texas) and 'non-fuel commodities', both in their 
levels, changes and as deviations from Euro Area inflation. Results were not 
significantly different and the model's statistical fit was actually worse. 
In the attempt of modelling also domestic supply-shocks, experiments were 
conducted including several alternative measures of productivity in the Phillips 
equation. The variables considered here were, specifically, the changes of (i) the Solow 
residual from the Euro Area production function, (ii) the log of the ratio of real GDP to 
total employment, and (iii) the deviation of the series (ii) from its trend as given by, 
alternatively, the HP filter and a simple moving average. However these variables' 
estimated coefficients had the wrong sign or were not significant, and, in some cases, 
the model's residuals deteriorated significantly. It was also tried adding the deviation of 
(log) Unit Labour Costs from their trend - computed with the HP filter - but results were 
similarly not good. 
Within the identification work, a model with hysteresis was also estimated. 
Specifically, hysteresis was modelled as in Jaeger and Parkinson (1994), specifying the 
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 time process of the NAIRU as a random walk augmented with a feed-back effect from 
past estimated cycles. However, the coefficient associated to the lagged unemployment 
gap turned out to be not statistically significant. 
 
Results are summed up in Table 2.3. 
A first conclusion is that the results from the two alternative specifications of 
inflation (changes) expectations are very close. This means that Ball's (2000) concept of 
near-rational expectations, although technically different and more theoretically 
founded, leads to identical results - which are highly desirable - generated by adaptive 
expectations models, at least with this data-sample.46 The estimate of coefficient α, 
which is associated to inflation expectations in the Phillips equation, is quite close to its 
theoretical value of 1, and not statistically different from unity, which adds likelihood to 
the hypothesis of near-rational expectations of inflation.47 
All the coefficients have the expected signs and reasonable estimated values. 
Notably, the estimate of the Phillips elasticity is only slightly different across the 
expectations' hypothesis - 0.032 in the near-rational model, versus 0.0355 in the 
adaptive-expectations model - and is always correctly signed - a result that is at odds 
with the incorrect sign of the estimate obtained by Gali et al. (2001). All the coefficients 
are statistically significant, with one very important exception: the Phillips elasticity - 
one of the central coefficients of the model - is not statistically significant, having one-
sided significance probability of about 17 percent. This result could be evidence of the 
hysteresis hypothesis first raised by Blanchard and Summers (1986), who argued that 
the natural rate model might be unable to describe the joint evolution of inflation and 
unemployment in European countries during the 70s and 80s. 
                                                          
46 Recall that in the adaptive expectations models in this chapter, the adopted extension for the lag 
polynomial (3 quarters) has been identified with the Box-Jenkins method, when specifying the optimal 
univariate model for inflation changes to be used in the near-rational models. While in our adaptive-
expectations models the coefficients associated to lags of inflation changes are estimated within the 
Phillips equation - coefficients φ in table 2.3 - in our near-rational expectations' models we use the roots 
estimated in the univariate Box-Jenkins model for inflation changes. These are then used to compute two-
steps-ahead forecasts of inflation changes - Et-1∆πt+1 -, which are finally imputed in the Phillips equation 
as a series of expectations of changes of inflation. 
47 We have also estimated the baseline model restricting the α coefficient to 1. Although the Phillips 
elasticity estimate decreases slightly, its significance is virtually unchanged, like the rest of the results, 
especially the unobserved components' estimates. 
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 Table 2.3 UC Model with Linear Phillips and Okun equations 
 GDP Deflator, Unemployment Rate, Real GDP a [1970:I - 2000:II] 
Specification of ∆πt e  Near-rational   Adaptive 
Phillips: 
γ    0.0320 [0.976] (0.329)  0.0355 [0.949] (0.342) 
α    0.990 [-0.051] (0.960) b  - 
φ1        -0.389 (0.000) 
φ2    -    -0.178 (0.050) 
φ3    -    -0.277 (0.000) 
φ(1)    -    -0.843 [-0.952] (0.340) b 
ω    0.049 (0.000)   0.049 (0.000) 
σ εphi    0.290 [14.931] (0.000)  0.283 [14.787] (0.000) 
Okun: 
θ    0.0235 [4.883] (0.000)  0.0236 [4.872] (0.000) 
Unobserved components: 
g    0.0060 [10.972] (0.000)  0.0060 [11.039] (0.000) 
σ εp    0.0051 [13.226] (0.000)  0.0051 [13.198] (0.000) 
σ εN    0.0872 [7.163] (0.000)  0.0872 [7.143] (0.000) 
σ εµ    0.0167 [1.953] (0.051)  0.0168 [1.952] (0.050) 
ρ1    1.811 [23.279] (0.000)  1.811 [23.079] (0.000) 
ρ2    -0.833 [-10.774] (0.000)  -0.832 [-10.705] (0.000) 
σ εc    0.0629 [4.639] (0.000)  0.0629 [4.626] (0.000) 
Log L    -781.536   -780.880 
Residuals: c 
Phillips equation: 
Jarque-Bera   1.26 (0.53)   1.28 (0.53) 
Q(4)     6.140 (0.189)   1.987 (0.738) 
Okun equation: 
Jarque-Bera   14.99 (0.00)   15.15 (0.00) 
Q(4)     4.529 (0.339)   4.593 (0.332) 
Unemployment equation: 
Jarque-Bera   4.93 (0.09)   4.47 (0.11) 
Q(4)     8.743 (0.068)   8.890 (0.064) 
a:    Series transformed into:    ∆πt = (1-B)2 Log GDPDeft;   Ut = Ut;   Yt = Log real GDP 
The coefficient ω is associated to  πtIMP(i-1)-πt (i-1). The coefficient α is associated to  Etπt+1. 
b:   T-statistics and Significance for the test H0: α = 1; idem for H0: φ(1) = 1; 
c:   Standardised residuals computed as defined in Harvey (1989), p. 256, 442. 
[ ]: T-statistics; ( ): Significance; Significance probabilities relate to two-sided tests, except in 'Residuals'. 
The standard deviation of the innovation of the first measurement equation (Okun equation) was 
restricted to zero as it systematically converged to that value. 
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 However, this interpretation seems to be at odds with the lack of statistical significance 
of 'feed-backs' from cycle to trend and of 'speed-limit effects', related above. 
The estimated Okun coefficient is statistically significant and says that each 
additional percentage point of gap in unemployment is associated with 2.35 additional 
percentage points of output away from its trend. This estimate is very close to 2, which 
is the current textbook benchmark for the US Okun's Law coefficient - Gordon (1998b) 
- and is also quite close to the mean of the estimates obtained by Lee (2000) with annual 
post-war data of 16 OECD countries.48 
Average trend real output growth is estimated at 0.6 percent per quarter, i.e. about 
2.4 percentage points per year, which is in line with conventional wisdom on the 
subject. The fact that the hypothesis of a constant drift in trend real output could not be 
rejected means that there is no evidence of increases in the average growth rate of trend 
real output in the aggregate data for the Euro area up to 2000:II. Hence, at least with this 
method and until 2000:II, there is no statistical evidence of the 'New Economy' 
phenomena that has been under discussion in recent years, especially in the US case.49 
The standardised residuals of the two main measurement equations - Phillips and 
Okun - show no signs of significant auto-correlation, and the Phillips residuals seem 
normal. In contrast, the Okun equation residuals deviate significantly from normality. 
In spite of the problems with the Okun equation, the model works well in the sense 
that it successfully decomposes the unemployment rate and the real output into 
reasonable trend and cycles that are in accordance with the conventional wisdom about 
the recent decades' macroeconomic cycles. Figure 2.2 shows the basic trend-cycle 
series, for the near-rational model (all the estimated unobserved components - NAIRU, 
unemployment gap, potential GDP and output gap - are identical in the 'adaptive 
expectations model'). The figure shows the typical negative skewness in the transitory 
                                                          
48 See especially the last row in Table 2, page 341. The unweighted mean of the estimates for the 6 Euro 
Area countries studied in that paper is 2.16, 1.86, 1.87 and 2.28 with, respectively, the first differences, 
Kalman filter, HP filter and BN filter gaps of unemployment and output. Note that Lee (2000) found 
considerable heterogeneity in Okun's coefficients across-countries and some evidence of structural 
change in the Law, with an overall reduction in its coefficients in recent decades. 
49 This result seems to contradict those in McMorrow and Roeger (2001) for the EU-15 Area, obtained 
from a production function approach. Based on a growth accounting exercise, they estimate that the "New 
Economy" sector - Information and Communication Technologies, ICT - may have contributed to an 
increase of between 0.25 and 0.33 of a percentage point to the EU-15 potential output's growth rate in the 
second half of the 1990s. 
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 component - negative deviations from trend are deeper than positive deviations - that 
has been documented, for instance, by Sichel (1993). This evidence is somewhat 
suggestive of the Friedman (1993) plucking model of economic fluctuations - see Lo 
and Piger (2001) -, even though our unobserved components model is symmetric, and, 
thus, is not designed to capture asymmetries as the ones in Kim and Nelson's (1999) 
unobserved components model with Markov switching regimes. 
Figure 2.2 - Main Results from Baseline Linear Model  
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 Results point that the Euro Area was in a cyclical trough during the beginning of 
1985. Then, a systematic expansion followed until a peak was reached in the beginning 
of 1991. Subsequently, the cyclical situation of the Euroland deteriorated continuously 
until a new trough was reached at the beginning of 1997 (with a slight recovery during 
1994:III-1995:II that proved transitory). Finally, estimates show the Euro Area in a 
steady cyclical recovery since the beginning of 1998, and point to a positive situation 
since 2000:II. 
All summed up, apart from the positive results, two main caveats remain. Firstly, the 
lack of statistical significance in the Phillips elasticity. Secondly, the possible poor 
quality of the estimation, shown by the non-normality in the Okun's equation residuals. 
Both these caveats seem to suggest that testing for asymmetries in the Phillips and - 
perhaps more importantly - in the Okun equation may be important for achieving an 
improvement in the specification of our empirical model. 
 
2.5.2. Inflation Expectations: Model-consistency and Time-varying 
Coefficient 
This section assesses to what extent the results obtained so far might be sensitive to 
the way inflation expectations are being treated. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of 
two extensions to the baseline model: first, forcing near-rational expectations to be 
model-consistent; and second, relaxing the restriction of a constant coefficient on 
inflation expectations in the Phillips equation. 
 
 Model-consistent Near-rational Expectations 
The Ball-type univariate expectations given by equation (2.8) are, by definition, 
not model-consistent. In fact, this attribute of near-rational expectations is an essential 
part of the theoretical argument that they convey: real-world agents do not form 
expectations in a perfectly rational, model-consistent, way. The near-rational hypothesis 
assumes that agents are rational in the sense that they form forward-looking 
expectations - they try to forecast next quarter inflation - but are not perfectly rational in 
the sense that they use only information from the past of inflation to compute their 
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 forecasts. A direct corollary to this argument is that agents do not know the true 
economic model, not even the trivariate unobserved components model that we use in 
this research - they only know the best linear unbiased univariate model for inflation. 
Hence, it is only natural that the Ball-type expectations given by our equation 
(2.8) are inconsistent with the ex-post expectations given by the model when equation 
(2.1) is solved for Et∆πt+1. To illustrate this, the system is now re-estimated with joint 
estimation of the whole set of equations (2.1) to (2.8). Specifically, the Phillips equation 
(2.1) is now specified as 
phi
ttt
n
ttttt Suu εωγπφπφπφπ ++−+∆+∆+∆=∆ −−− )(321 3*2*1*  
And the expectations' equation (2.8) is specified as  
AR
ttttt επφπφπφπ +∆+∆+∆=∆ −−−+ 3*2*1*1 321  (2.8’) 
 That is, this expectation's equation is estimated within the model with imposition 
of a cross-equation restriction of equality between the coefficients associated to the 
three lags of inflation (changes) included in this and in the Phillips' equation. Hence, 
this system corresponds to the adaptive expectations Phillips equations referred to 
before, extended with a fourth measurement equation - equation (2.8’) above - which 
has three coefficients that by imposition equal those associated to lagged inflation in the 
Phillips' measurement equation. Note, however, that in equation (2.8') the measurement 
(observed) variable is the change in inflation in next quarter, while in the Phillips 
equation it is the current quarter change in inflation. The system has now one additional 
hyper-parameter to be estimated, the standard deviation of the innovation to the residual 
of the inflation changes equation, σ ε ARt. 
 
Results are summed-up in table 2.4. 
The Phillips elasticity's estimate exhibits an important reduction, from 0.032 to 
0.019, and its t-statistic decreases from 0.98 to 0.50, so that the significance level for the 
two-sided test that the true elasticity is zero is, now, 70 percent. However, the estimate 
of the Phillips trade-off coefficient retains the correct sign. The estimate of the Okun's 
elasticity increases only marginally from 0.0235 to 0.0238. 
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 Table 2.4 - Model With Model-Consistent Near-Rational Expectations Of Inflation 
GDP deflator, Unemployment rate, real GDP a [Euro area, 1970:I - 2000:II] 
    Estimate  T-value  Probability 
Phillips: 
γ    0.0194   0.499   0.70 
φ1    -0.199   -2.959   0.00 
φ2    -0.144   -2.047   0.04 
φ3    -0.085   -1.279   0.20 
φ(1)    -0.428   12.109   0.00b 
ω    0.048   3.870   0.00 
σ εphi    0.281   14.786   0.00 
Okun: 
θ    0.0238   4.668   0.00 
Inflation changes: 
σ εAR    0.333   14.251   0.00 
Unobserved components: 
g    0.0059   10.673   0.00 
σ εp    0.0051   12.900   0.00 
σ εN    0.0885   7.085   0.00 
σ εµ    0.0169   1.836   0.06 
ρ1    1.797   22.451   0.00 
ρ2    -0.818   -10.231  0.00 
σ εc    0.0635   4.614   0.00 
Residuals: c   Statistic    Probability 
Phillips: 
Jarque-Bera   10.34      0.00 
Q(4)     9.46      0.05 
Okun: 
Jarque-Bera   17.67      0.00 
Q(4)     4.19      0.38 
Unemployment: 
Jarque-Bera   8.40      0.01 
Q(4)     8.34      0.08 
Inflation changes: 
Jarque-Bera   23.77      0.00 
Q(4)     14.13      0.01 
a:    Series transformations - see table 2.3; The coefficient ω is associated to  πtIMP(i-1)-πt (i-1). 
b:   T-statistics and significance for the test H0: φ(1) = -1; 
c:   Standardised residuals computed as defined in Harvey (1989), p. 256, 442. 
Significance probabilities relate to two-sided tests, except in 'Residuals'. 
 61
 All the other hyper--parameters' estimates show no visible change: notably, the average 
growth rate of trend real output is consistently estimated at 0.6 percent per quarter.  
The estimates of φ1*, φ2* and φ3* are quite different from their theoretical values 
that could be computed from the estimates of the AR (3) model for inflation changes 
shown in table 2.2. All the three coefficients are estimated at smaller values - especially 
the first two - and add up to -0.428, which is quite lower than the theoretical φ(1) that 
would be obtained from the univariate AR (3) estimates (-0.808). 
The NAIRU estimates obtained from the model considered in this section are 
somehow above their counterparts from the near-rational expectations' model reported 
in table 2.3. This generates a level difference between the unemployment gap estimates 
of the two models, but their broad behaviour along the sample period is quite similar, so 
that there is no marked difference between the cyclical turning points they estimate. 
The main indicators of quality of fit of the model in this section are evidently 
negative. In fact, the residuals of the measurement equations are much worse behaved 
than in the models reported in table 2.3: no residuals pass the Jarque-Bera test for the 
null of normality, at 5 percent of significance. The residuals of estimation of the 
equation modelling inflation changes, in turn, exhibit an high short-memory auto-
correlation, clearly the consequence of the unit root in our quarterly time series of 
inflation - as that equation models two-step-ahead forecasts. 
In the end, we choose to continue the empirical work within the framework 
defined in the previous section of this chapter, for two reasons. First, theoretically, 
Ball's concept of near-rational, limited-information expectations is not supposed to be 
model-consistent, as argued above. Second, empirically, the attempt in this section of 
forcing near-rational expectations of inflation - formulated two quarters ahead - to be 
model-consistent, has generated highly problematic empirical results. 
 
 Time-varying Coefficient of Inflation Expectations 
Over the last two decades most developed countries have disinflated their 
economies and many changed their monetary policy regimes into explicit or implicit 
targeting of a low and stable rate of inflation. This context increased the attention to the 
 62
 hypothesis that the weight that (at least partially) rational agents attribute to past 
inflation when forming expectations of inflation may vary as a function of the level of 
inflation, the monetary policy regime and its credibility. In Phillips equations, this 
would imply smaller coefficients associated to lags of inflation (as proxy for 
expectations) in times of low and stable inflation and policy institutions more strongly 
committed to low inflation. This had already been stated by Sargent (1971), when 
arguing that the practice of restricting the sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation to 
unity in Phillips regressions was not a necessary condition for the rational expectations' 
natural rate theory to be verified. Taylor (1998a, page 35), mentioned the hypothesis, 
and Poole (1998) speculated that errors in the quantification of the weight of 
expectations in Phillips equations might generate spurious shifts in the estimated 
NAIRU. 
Brainard and Perry (2000) estimated price and wage (Phillips) equations for the 
US, with quarterly data from 1948 to 1998, allowing the intercept and the coefficients 
of all regressors - lagged inflation, the inverse of the unemployment rate and 
productivity - to be time-varying. They found that the only coefficient that showed 
significant time-variation was the one of lagged inflation - which means that the implicit 
estimated NAIRU showed no significant variation. More specifically, that coefficient's 
estimate was around 0.6 in 1960, increased systematically until it peaked at 0.8 by 1980 
and then decreased systematically to an estimate of 0.4 in 1998, in line with the path of 
the inflation rate. Akerlof et al (2000) suggested some theoretical explanations for this 
phenomenon, within a simple model of wage and price setting. They estimated Phillips 
equations of the Brainard-Perry type, with US data, and found the estimates of the 
coefficients associated with the inflation expectations' proxies to be significantly larger 
in high inflation samples than in low inflation samples (lagged inflation and data from 
expectations surveys were used as alternative proxies). Kichian (2001) found similar 
evidence for Canada, when estimating Phillips equations relating inflation to lagged 
inflation, a supply-shock proxy and three alternative measures of the output gap 
estimated from three alternative time-series methods. More recently, Cogley and 
Sargent (2001) report results from bayesian estimation methods suggesting that the 
persistence of US inflation decreased in recent years, in line with Brainard-Perry-
Akerlof. In contrast, Stock (2001), with frequency domain methods, and Pivetta and 
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 Reis (2001), with bayesian time-varying parameter estimation and classical median 
unbiased estimation, find that the persistence of US inflation has been remarkably 
stable. 
In order to test if there is any comparable phenomenon in the aggregate Euro 
area data, we estimated the baseline near-rational-expectations model specifying the c1t 
parameter (associated to the time-series of inflation changes expectations) as a random 
walk. Technically, this is achieved by relaxing the assumption that the innovation to this 
parameter, εc1t, has null variance, hence allowing the [1,1] element of the matrix Q to be 
estimated together with the other hyper-parameters of the model by maximisation of the 
likelihood function. 
The estimates of the other hyper-parameters and the unobserved components of 
the model do not change significantly, and so are not reported. The estimate of 
parameter c1t at the end of the sample is unchanged at 0.99. The standard deviation of 
the innovation εc1t is estimated at 0.0000105, and is not statistically significant (one-
sided significance probability 0.38). Accordingly, the first chart in figure 2.3 shows that 
while the coefficient's estimate changes significantly during the first half of the sample, 
then it stabilises, and its smoothed estimates are constant. Specifically, the smoothed 
estimate changes from 0.99006644 to 0.99006643, at period 8, and then stays 
unchanged throughout the rest of the sample. 
It could be argued, however, that this experiment should be conducted within the 
adaptive expectations' model. In fact, performing this test within the 'near-rational 
expectations model' amounts to admit that what changes along time is how agents use 
the (exogenously computed) near-rational expectations. Akerlof's et al (2000) 
terminology seems to suggest, indeed, this type of interpretation, as they write that the 
Brainard-Perry hypothesis is one of 'near-rationality in the use of inflation expectations'. 
However, the New Keynesian Phillips theory states that agents attach always a weight 
of 1 to inflation expectations. What seems to be the issue in Brainard and Perry (2000) 
is, differently from Akerlof's et al (2000) suggestion, a change along time in the way 
near-rational agents compute their expectations based on inflation's past. Hence, in the 
'near-rational expectations' model the experiment could be biased as it uses expectations 
generated as forecasts of an ARIMA model featuring constant parameters. If the 
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 Brainard-Perry argument is true, these forecasts may be meaningless, at least in the final 
part of the sample, and what should be tested here is if lagged inflation has been 
receiving less weight, in recent times, when agents use it to proxy for expectations. 
One interesting test would be modelling expectations as a weighted average of 
past inflation and the policy target, to assess if the relative weights of these regressors 
change as inflation decreases and the target gains credibility. Unfortunately, this 
specification can not be tested in this case, as there was no unique policy regime in the 
Euro area until 1999:I., with the EMU policy regime having too few data points for any 
robust empirical research. Moreover, the ECB's regime is not yet entirely clear, at the 
time we write this text, due to the inconsistency between the first and second pillars of 
its monetary strategy.50 
In accordance with these arguments, we proceeded with a test closer to Brainard 
and Perry's (2000) procedures and quite in the spirit of our study. Specifically, we re-
estimated the baseline adaptive expectations model admitting that the three coefficients 
associated to inflation changes at t-1, t-2 and t-3 in the Phillips equation may follow 
random walks processes. The estimates of the model's hyper-parameters and main 
unobserved components did not change significantly, and so are not reported. Most 
importantly, the main features of the estimates of trends and cycles of unemployment 
and output remained unchanged. The sum of the estimates of the parameters associated 
to inflation lags at the end of the sample is -0.8725, which compares to -0.844 in the 
original formulation of the model. The standard deviations of the innovations to the 
three time-varying parameters are estimated at 0.0000000051, 0.00065 and 
0.000000083, respectively for lags 1, 2 and 3, all not statistically significant (one-sided 
significance probabilities of 0.49, 0.35 and 0.17, respectively). Accordingly, the second 
chart in figure 2.3 shows that the sum of the coefficient's estimates changes significantly 
during the first half of the sample and then stabilises. Its smoothed estimate decreases 
from -0.828 at the beginning of the sample to -0.8725 at the end, which is a larger 
movement than the one in the near-rational model but can not be considered significant. 
Clearly, the order of magnitude of the change is not comparable to the ones found 
by Brainard-Perry, Akerlof et al. and Cogley-Sargent, and is in line with the results 
                                                          
50 See the chapter 3 in this thesis, for new results on this subject. 
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 obtained by Stock, and Pivetta and Reis. Hence, there seems to be no statistical 
evidence of the 'Brainard-Perry-Akerlof' phenomenon in aggregate Euro area data for 
1970-2000, and so, at this stage, there seems to be no significant specification error in 
modelling inflation expectations using constant parameters associated to past inflation. 
 
Figure 2.3 - Coefficient of Inflation Expectations as Time-Varying Parameter 
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 2.5.3. Asymmetry Tests 
Following StAubyn (2000) and Martins and StAubyn (2001), asymmetry is tested 
within estimation of the model. Specifically, the relevant elasticity – θ in the Okun 
relation and γ in the Phillips' equation - is decomposed into a constant and a function of 
the cyclical state of the economy (measured by the last quarter estimated unemployment 
gap).51 
The rationale of the test is to have the data choosing which one of those components 
is statistically significant. The asymmetry hypothesis is tested encompassing the null of 
linearity, as linearity is only rejected – and asymmetry not rejected – if and only if the 
component of the elasticity associated to the cyclical state of the economy is statistically 
different from zero. In the opposite case, the equation collapses to the baseline linear 
specification. 
It is worth noting that this test strategy is model-consistent, in the sense that 
asymmetry is tested simultaneously with the estimation of the real gap. It must also be 
stressed that asymmetry is specified as a relation between the relevant elasticity and the 
unemployment gap - not the level of the unemployment rate - because of the time-
varying NAIRU framework adopted. In fact, any specific value of the unemployment 
rate could have different meanings concerning the cyclical situation of the economy, 
depending on the position of the NAIRU. 
Our empirical strategy implies the previous definition of the asymmetric functional 
forms that are to be tested for, which obviously could affect the test results. One 
alternative interesting approach would be Hamilton's (2001) parametric method of 
flexible nonlinear inference, which has the advantage of not imposing ex-ante the 
functional form but rather let the data choose the best function (and the explanatory 
variables that drive the nonlinearity). However, it is not clear how this method could be 
used in the context of an unobservable components model, where the arguments of the 
possible nonlinearity may be unobserved variables that are to be estimated as time-
                                                          
51 Except in the linear spline function, where it is measured by current inflation changes net of 
expectations and supply shocks effects. This measure is used here simply to illustrate that it is 
theoretically and empirically equivalent to using the unemployment gap, as positive (negative) inflation 
changes (net of expectations and supply effects) are associated with positive (negative) gaps. Also, this 
formulation is simpler to estimate because inflation, expectations and supply-variables are observable and 
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 varying parameters of the model, jointly with the asymmetry testing. Therefore, another 
route is followed here in trying to minimise the risk that decisions on the functional 
form may affect the test-results. Specifically, a reasonably large number of different 
functional forms are tested in this study. Preliminary evidence is offered with the piece-
wise linear regression (spline equation), and then three possible functions are used - the 
quadratic curve, the modified hyperbole used by Laxton et al (1995) and the 
exponential functional form (re-scaled so that it passes through the origin). 
The spline function gives a good first approximation to the problem, but has three 
main problems that, in practice, preclude its use as the final form adopted. First, its 
derivative is discontinuous at the null unemployment gap. Second, it imposes the strong 
assumption of allowing for only two different elasticities across the whole spectrum of 
unemployment gaps. Third, it lacks any upper bound on the real gap. 
These objections to the piece-wise linear regression would analogously apply to the 
Markov regime-switching models, often used in literature testing for asymmetries, and 
also, partly, to the (logistic) smooth transition auto-regression models also frequently 
used elsewhere. In addition, models that allow for smooth and continuous change in the 
relevant elasticity (letting it assume an infinity of values) seem to be more in line with 
what may be the asymmetric behaviour of the real-world economy. The switching 
regime models have a limited number of regimes and imply step changes of the 
elasticity across regimes. The (logistic) smooth transition auto-regression is smooth in 
the transition between regimes, but has also a limited number of regimes.52 In contrast, 
the three functional forms described below imply smooth changes across a continuum 
of possible parameters' values. 
The quadratic form does not impose any upper bound on the gap, and, furthermore, 
may include a phase of negative relation between the two variables of interest, that is 
not economically of interest. But it is very simple to estimate, its derivative is 
continuous - implying smooth and continuous asymmetry - and if the estimated gaps do 
not fall into the undesired phase of the function, may be a good approximation to the 
true non-linear function. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
their coefficients are components of the unobserved components vector with true variances equal to zero 
by imposition. 
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 The exponential function (re-scaled) is very interesting in that, besides smooth and 
continuous, is always increasing and convex - although it does not impose any upper 
bound on the gap. 
The Laxton's et al (1995) hyperbole seems also very convenient. It is always 
increasing and convex to the left of a 'wall' parameter - w in the expressions below - 
which has an important economic meaning. In fact, this parameter represents the value 
for the unemployment gap at which inflation changes (in the Phillips equation) and the 
output gap (in the Okun equation) increase without bound. 
The analytic expressions of these functions (except for the spline) are as follows: 
 
Quadratic:  (2.13) phittStu
n
tuktu
n
tuktLAt εωππ ++−+−+∆=∆ 2)(2)(1)(
Hyperbole:  (2.14) phittStu
n
tuwtu
n
tuwktLAt εωππ ++−−−+∆=∆ ))](/()([2)(
Exponential:  (2.15) phittStu
n
tuktLAt εωππ ++−−+∆=∆ ]1)[exp(2)(
 
These functional forms behave, for reasonable coefficients, as shown in figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
52 Recent papers using the LSTAR models to test for asymmetry in the Phillips (or Aggregate-Supply) 
equation are Weise (1999) and Eliasson (1999). 
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 Figure 2.4 - Non-Linear Functional Forms 
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 HYPERBOLE (w=3)
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Their analytic expressions and specific tests when applied to the Phillips equation 
are summed up in table 2.5. It explains the transformation that is imposed on the 
elasticity of interest (γ) so that when it is multiplied by the gap, an analytical expression 
is generated which includes both a linear and a non-linear component. 
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 In the table, the example is the γ in the Phillips equation, but the same applies to the 
Okun's equation θ. 
 
Table 2.5 - Non-Linear Functional Forms and Asymmetry Tests 
Functional 
Form Phillips equation: ∆  
phi
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n
tutLAt εωγππ ++−+∆= )()(
 Test specification: estimation and hypothesis tested for γ in the baseline 
Phillips equation 
Linear 
spline 
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The hypothesis to test is if the coefficient k2 in the models above is statistically 
different from zero, with the null being H0: k2 = 0. If that hypothesis can be rejected 
and the estimated coefficient is positive (negative), data tells that the equation of 
interest should be estimated with an asymmetric functional form - k1 should be 
eliminated in the exponential and hyperbole forms - and will be convex (concave). If k2 
is not significantly different from zero, then the component associated to that parameter 
in the models above should be eliminated and the models collapse to the baseline linear 
model, ie γ (or θ) equals k1. 
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 Table 2.6 - Asymmetry Tests - GDP deflator, Unemployment rate, real GDP a  
[Euro area, 1970:I - 2000:II] 
Specification of ∆πt e   Near-rational   Adaptive 
 
Linear spline 
Null hypothesis     Statistical Inference   
Okun equation is linear        
Given Linear Phillips  Not rejected (0.13)  Rejected (0.06) 
Given Asymmetric Philips  Not rejected (0.11)  Rejected (0.04) 
Phillips equation is linear 
Given Linear Okun   Not rejected (0.88)  Not rejected (0.56) 
Given Asymmetric Okun  Not rejected (0.84)  Not rejected (0.58) 
 
Quadratic 
Null hypothesis     Statistical Inference   
Okun equation is linear        
Given Linear Phillips  Rejected (0.01)   Rejected (0.00) 
Given Asymmetric Philips  Rejected (0.00)   Rejected (0.00) 
Phillips equation is linear 
Given Linear Okun   Not rejected (0.71)  Not rejected (0.58) 
Given Asymmetric Okun  Not rejected (0.14)  Not rejected (0.08)b 
 
Hyperbole 
Null hypothesis     Statistical Inference   
Okun equation is linear        
Given Linear Phillips  Rejected (0.00)   Rejected (0.00) 
Given Asymmetric Philips  Rejected (0.00)   Rejected (0.00) 
Phillips equation is linear 
Given Linear Okun   Not rejected (0.86)  Not rejected (0.80) 
Given Asymmetric Okun  Not rejected (0.62)  Not rejected (0.26) 
 
Exponential 
Null hypothesis     Statistical Inference   
Okun equation is linear        
Given Linear Phillips  Rejected (0.00)   Rejected (0.00) 
Given Asymmetric Philips  Rejected (0.00)   Rejected (0.00) 
Phillips equation is linear 
Given Linear Okun   Not rejected (0.58)  Not rejected (0.88) 
Given Asymmetric Okun  Not rejected (0.50)  Not rejected (0.25) 
a:    Series transformed into:    ∆πt = (1-B)2 Log GDP Deft;   Ut = Ut;   Yt = Log real GDP 
The standard deviation of the innovation of the first measurement equation (Okun equation) was 
restricted to zero as it systematically converged to that value. 
 ( ): Two-sided Significance probability of the test statistic for   H0: k2=0,   where k2 is the coefficient of 
the non-linear component of the function. 
b: The null hypothesis of no asymmetry is not rejected, in spite of a significance probability that would 
point to rejection at 10 percent of confidence (although not at 5 percent), because the Phillips equation 
residuals are highly non-normal (Jarque-Bera statistics = 10.5, significance of 0.005 on the null of 
normality) and the estimated UCs have implausible values. 
In the hyperbolic models above, the specific values used as 'wall parameters' (given unemployment gaps 
expressed in percentage points) were (i) in the near-rational models, wOK=2.4 and wPHI=1.2 and (ii) in the 
adaptive expectations models, wOK= 2.1 and wPHI= 1.1. For robustness analysis, it was also tried wPHI=2.0 
and wPHI=3.0 in both models, leading to unchanged inference results. 
 73
 Results are summarised in table 2.6.53 
Except for the linear spline function, the tests consistently reject the null hypothesis 
of linearity of the Okun relation. Due to the strong limitations of the spline form, 
mentioned above, we conclude that there is enough evidence to reject linearity of the 
Euro Area Okun relation, throughout 1970-2000. More specifically, since k2 is 
consistently estimated with positive values, the evidence indicates that the Okun 
relation should be modelled with a convex functional form..  
In what regards the Phillips relation, the evidence is even more clear: there is no 
evidence to reject the hypothesis that the Euro Area Phillips curve has been linear, 
between 1970 and 2000, at standard confidence levels. 
 
2.5.4. Detailed Results for the Preferred Model 
Given the evidence collected in last section, there is a decision to be made 
concerning which specific asymmetric functional form should be used in the estimation 
of the Okun equation in the model’s final version. 
Table 2.6 summarises information from several statistical criteria considered 
determinant for that choice, for both near-rational and adaptive expectations models 
(Tables 2.7.A and 2.7.B, respectively).54 They include the significance of the Phillips 
and the Okun elasticities, the filter variance of the NAIRU and trend output, the mean 
square error of the model's one set-ahead forecast of inflation changes, the average and 
symmetry of the estimated unemployment gap and the normality of the measurement 
equations' residuals. 
The scenario is fairly identical across both expectations' models, and, on the basis of 
that information, the quadratic functional form is chosen.  
                                                          
53 Note that in the models of (modified) hyperbole, the GAUSS procedure optmum experienced problems 
in converging, when estimating the full model. Therefore, the following sequential testing method was 
used. Firstly, the 'wall' coefficients (w in the table) were estimated in models that did not include any 
linear component in the Okun and/or Phillips coefficients (ie, k1=0). Secondly, these estimates were 
calibrated into models including both the linear and the hyperbolic components of the coefficient of 
interest (ie k1 and k2 are free parameters), to perform the asymmetry test. 
54 Results for the spline model are shown just for completeness, as that particular functional form is 
considered just a first approximation for testing asymmetry, not suitable for a final estimation of an 
asymmetric model. 
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 Table 2.7.A -  Criteria for Choice of Asymmetric Functional Form of Okun 
Equation  Near-Rational Expectations Models 
(GDP deflator, unemployment rate, real GDP) [Euro area, 1970:I - 2000:II] 
Functional 
Form 
Criteria 
 
Spline 
 
Quadratic 
 
Hyperbole 
 
Exponential
Significance κ2 a 0.12726076 0.00984334 0.000000 0.000000 
Significance γ a 0.43992148 0.037555 0.2142438 0.04253668 
Variance NAIRU 0.45987524 0.34295078 0.57303305 0.31447141 
Variance  
potential Y 
0.0002721804 0.000191495 0.0003339774 0.00023053 
Mean squared  
∆πmodel–∆π actual 
0.078535338 0.077329 0.07776792 0.077181 
U gap: 
Mean 
 
0.31834714 
 
-0.10856166 
 
-1.0796429 
 
-0.86141046 
Min -0.82107159 -1.2939133 -2.8863389 -2.3863680 
Max 1.5308638 1.7867107 0.97220049 0.96661386 
Normality of 
residuals Okun b 
0.00026782 0.042624258 0.0049417310 0.02412770 
Normality of 
residuals U. b 
0.080302432 0.22057882 0.035479903 0.00387680 
Normality of 
Residuals Phillips 
b
0.46719619 0.78864932 0.28051516 0.27776090 
a:   Two-sided significance probability of the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to 
zero. 
b:   One-sided significance probability of the Jarque-Bera statistics for testing the null hypothesis of 
normality 
 
Considering first the near-rational expectations' model, the quadratic form exhibits 
the best performance in 6 out of the 9 proposed criteria, including the most crucial: 
significance of Phillips' elasticity, variance of estimation of potential output, symmetry 
of the gaps, and normality of all measurement equations' residuals. Furthermore, it 
scores second in two more criteria – NAIRU’s variance and mean square error of 
inflation changes prediction - and, finally, shows a perfectly acceptable result in what 
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 regards the significance of the asymmetric component of Okun Law's elasticity. In the 
adaptive expectations models, the quadratic form performs best in six criteria - 
significance of Phillips elasticity, filter variance of potential output, mean-square error 
of forecast of inflation changes, centricity of the gaps, and normality of the residuals of 
the Okun and unemployment equations. 
 
Table 2.7.B -  Criteria for Choice of Asymmetric Functional Form of Okun 
equation   Adaptive Expectations Models 
(GDP deflator, unemployment rate, real GDP) a [Euro area, 1970:I - 2000:II] 
Functional 
Form 
Criteria 
 
Spline 
 
Quadratic 
 
Hyperbole 
 
Exponential 
Significance κ2 a 0.058539 0.007137 0.000000 0.000000 
Significance γ a 0.640296 0.054549 0.176881 0.171452 
Variance 
NAIRU 
0.68888263 0.34570911 0.5105046 0.2800522 
Variance  
potential Y 
0.00036059 0.0001924 0.0003073 0.000217738 
Mean squared  
∆πmodel–∆π actual 
0.078177 0.076693 0.0772941 0.07680959 
U gap: 
Mean 
 
0.77028895 
 
-0.10864352 
 
-0.990894 
 
-0.6945057 
Min -0.19677750 -1.2818523 -2.836103 -2.2426601 
Max 2.1529710 1.8407730 0.9525220 1.0462479 
Normality 
residuals Okunb 
0.00096677 0.03103709 0.0095715 0.010515 
Normality 
residuals U. b 
0.10983604 0.21371748 0.04356165 0.0489565 
Normality 
Residuals 
Phillips b
0.66355932 0.70811918 0.80429955 0.818295 
a:   Two-sided significance probability of the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to 
zero. 
b:   One-sided significance probability of the Jarque-Bera statistics for testing the null hypothesis of 
normality 
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With respect to two more criteria - significance of the convex component of the 
Okun equation and filter variance of the NAIRU - it scores second best performances, 
and finally, its results in terms of normality of the Phillips equation are unquestionably 
good. 
The detailed estimation results of the model with linear Phillips equation and 
quadratic Okun equation are presented in Table 2.8. 
Most coefficients' estimates do not change significantly, in comparison to the results 
shown in table 2.3, relative to the model with linear Phillips and Okun equations. 
However, two main improvements occur. First, the Okun equation residuals clearly 
improved, and are now very near to passing the Jarque-Bera test of the null of normality 
(significance of about 4 percent). Second, the Phillips elasticity is now significant at 5 
percent. 
These are not, obviously, minor changes - the Phillips relation is the theoretical 
basis of the model, and the empirical technique adopted presupposes normality of the 
stochastic processes modelled. The conclusion is that specifying the Okun relation as 
asymmetric is crucial for a correct specification of the proposed model. 
The estimated Phillips coefficient tells us, in the near-rational expectations' model, 
that for each additional percentage point of unemployment gap, inflation changes by an 
additional 0.042 percentage points in the same quarter. The estimate of the Phillips 
trade-off elasticity is, as happened in the linear models, somehow smaller in the near-
rational expectations' model than in the adaptive expectations' model - where it equals 
0.053, instead of 0.042. However, the notable result here is that if rational expectations 
are replaced by forward-looking, but limited-information and near-rational expectations 
of inflation, then we obtain a correctly signed estimate of the Euro Area Phillips trade-
off elasticity, which is, moreover, statistically significant at 5 percent of significance. 
The Okun coefficients indicate that each additional percentage point of 
unemployment gap is associated with an additional deviation of output from its trend of 
2.3 percentage points plus 2×0.008 of the unemployment gap. 
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 Table 2.8 – UC Model With Quadratic Okun and Linear Phillips Equations 
GDP deflator, unemployment rate, real GDP a [Euro area, 1970:I - 2000:II] 
Specification of ∆πt e  Near-rational   Adaptive 
Phillips: 
γ    0.042 [1.91] (0.05)  0.053 [1.92] (0.05) 
α    1.022 [0.113] (0.91) b  - 
φ1        -0.402 (0.00) 
φ2    -    -0.194 (0.03) 
φ3    -    -0.287 (0.00) 
φ(1)    -    -0.884 [-0,46] (0.65) b 
ω    0.048 (0.00)   0.046 (0.00) 
σ εphi    0.288 [15.08] (0.00)  0.280 [14.88] (0.00) 
Okun: 
κ1    0.023 [4.66] (0.00)  0.023 [4.74] (0.00) 
κ2    0.008 [2.58] (0.01)  0.008 [2.69] (0.00) 
Unobserved components: 
g    0.0060 [12.82] (0.00)  0.0060 [12.35] (0.00) 
σ εp    0.0047 [13.33] (0.00)  0.0047 [13.26] (0.00) 
σ εN    0.093 [8.19] (0.00)  0.092 [8.19] (0.00) 
σ εµ    0.014 [1.87] (0.06)  0.015 [1.90] (0.05) 
ρ1    1.821 [25.30] (0.00)  1.826 [25.83] (0.00) 
ρ2    -0.843 [-12.02] (0.00)  -0.847 [-12.26] (0.00) 
σ εc    0.0581 [4.60] (0.00)  0.0586 [4.72] (0.00) 
Log L    -788.315   -787.965 
Residuals: c 
Phillips equation: 
Jarque-Bera   0.48 (0.79)   0.69 (0.71) 
Q(4)     6.09 (0.19)   1.96 (0.74) 
Okun equation: 
Jarque-Bera   6.31 (0.04)   6.95 (0.03) 
Q(4)     1.72 (0.79)   1.61 (0.81) 
Unemployment equation: 
Jarque-Bera   3.02 (0.22)   3.09 (0.21) 
Q(4)     6.64 (0.16)   7.74 (0.10) 
a:    Series transformations - see table 2.3; The ω coefficient is associated to  πtIMP(i-1)-πt (i-1). 
The coefficient α is associated to  Etπt+1. 
b:   T-statistics and Significance for the test H0: α = 1; idem for H0: φ(1) = 1; 
c:   Standardised residuals computed as defined in Harvey (1989), p. 256, 442. 
[ ]: T-statistics; ( ): Significance; Significance probabilities relate to two-sided tests, except in 'Residuals'. 
The standard deviation of the innovation of the first measurement equation (Okun equation) was 
restricted to zero as it systematically converged to that value. 
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 Figure 2.5 shows the main unobserved components estimated with this model.55 The 
central conclusion is that they do not change markedly in comparison to the ones of the 
baseline linear model and sketch the same story in what regards the dating of Euro area 
business cycles in the last decades.56 However, as the last chart in this figure shows, 
there are some differences in some specific estimates, such as the rate of decrease of the 
NAIRU's drift by the end of the sample. 
 
Figure 2.5 -  Main Unobserved Components From Model With Quadratic Okun 
Curve 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND SMOOTHED NAIRU
QUADRATIC OKUN AND LINEAR PHILLIPS
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55 Presented charts relate to the 'near-rational expectations' model'. As happened in the baseline linear 
model, the results with the 'adaptive expectations model' were identical and, as such, are not shown. 
56 Note that the centre of the smoothed estimated gaps - and their amplitude in the particular case of the 
output gap - changes slightly from the linear to the quadratic models. Specifically, the minimum of the 
unemployment gap is now -1.97 (-1.66 in the linear model) and its maximum is 0.81 (1.08 formerly). The 
minimum of the output gap is now -3.22 (-3.90 in the linear model) and the maximum is 2.29 (2.55 
formerly). This result is partly due to the change in the Okun equation functional form and partly caused 
by the fact that in the quadratic model the smoothed values are only approximations to the true smoothed 
values, because each period's output gap depends upon the last period's output gap. 
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The evolution of the NAIRU's estimated drift describes the path of the equilibrium 
unemployment in the Euro Area and is quite in line with the results of the literature of 
macro-labour that studied the subject.57 The path estimated with the quadratic model 
using near-rational expectations of inflation can be described as follows. At the 
beginning of the sample the NAIRU was drifting up at a rate of about 0.12 percentage 
points per quarter. During the 70s this positive drift persisted at values between 0.10 
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 and 0.12 percentage points per quarter, therefore pushing the Euro Area equilibrium 
unemployment upwards at a more or less constant rate. Only after 1981:II did the drift 
begin decreasing. Between that quarter and 1994:I the NAIRU was drifting up but at 
decreasing rates (with some minor exceptions in 1990:IV and 1992:IV-1993:I). After 
1994:II the estimated drift for the NAIRU is negative, which means that Euroland's 
equilibrium unemployment is decreasing, and at the end of the sample it was drifting 
down at a rate of about 0.075 percentage points per quarter. 
Figure 2.6 displays scatter plots of the estimated unemployment and output gaps, 
showing the asymmetry in the Okun curve estimated with this model - which is, as seen 
above, statistically significant and important for the model's results. The smoothed 
estimates tell us that at the peak of booms, typically, the Euro Area economy has its real 
output growing at about 2 percent above the trend and unemployment 0.5 to 1 
percentage point below the NAIRU. At the troughs real GDP grows between 2 and 3 
percent below trend and unemployment is between 1.5 and 2 percentage points above 
the NAIRU.58 
Business cycle asymmetry is quite apparent in these charts: expansions generate 
smaller decreases in unemployment (increases in output), compared to the trend, than 
contractions generate increases in unemployment (decreases in output). As expected, 
asymmetry is more important the further away from trend the economy is, while at the 
trend's vicinity the Okun relation is approximately linear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
57 See Blanchard (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) and Blanchard 
(2000a, b, c, d). 
58 As usual throughout this chapter, the reported results are from the 'near-rational expectations' model' 
and the charts from the adaptive expectations model' look similar.  
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 Figure 2.6 -  Estimated Quadratic Okun Curves 
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2.5.5. Trend and Cycle in the Euro Area 1970-2000 
In this section, results from the preferred model are further analysed, with the 
purpose of deepening their evaluation. First, confidence bands for the estimated NAIRU 
are computed. Then, the estimated NAIRU (and the corresponding gap) are compared to 
the trend unemployment rate (and the implied gaps) published in the AWMD. 
Moreover, the business cycle dating identified in this study are compared not only to the 
AWMD's but also to the ones implied by the recent analysis in Gali et al (2001). Then, 
the ex-post estimates of the unemployment gap resulting from the preferred model are 
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 compared with their quasi-real-time estimates as of 1998:II, which is the last data-point 
in the AWMD and in Gali et al (2001). Finally, some computations illustrate the 
model's forecasting performance. 
 
Confidence Bands for the Euro Area NAIRU 
As mentioned above, Hamilton's (1986, 1994) method is now used to compute 
confidence bands for the estimated unobserved components of the preferred model. This 
Monte Carlo procedure is needed because the Kalman filter does not generate estimates 
of the whole uncertainty associated to the unobserved components' estimates. It 
estimates filter uncertainty only, therefore assuming perfect knowledge of the hyper-
parameters of the likelihood function, which is clearly not the case. 
In short, 10,000 sets of hyper-parameters were randomly generated, drawn from 
a multivariate normal distribution with averages equal to the parameter's point-estimates 
and variance-covariance matrix given by the inverse of the Hessian. The Kalman filter 
was then ran 10,000 times, with each of these hyper-parameters combinations, and the 
corresponding smoothed unobserved components, from T to 1, were computed. 
Filter uncertainty is then given by the mean of the one-step smoothed forecast 
errors' variances for each observation t (from T to 1) across the N random samples. 
Parameter uncertainty is given by the mean square error of the smoothed UCs to the 
smoothed UCs of the estimated baseline model, for each observation t (from T to 1) 
across the N random sets of hyper-parameters. Total uncertainty, defined as a mean 
square error (MSE) for the UCs estimates around their true values, is given by the sum 
of these measures.59 
The Monte Carlo experiment was conducted in GAUSS, using a code written by 
the author, which runs the Kalman filter, the Kalman smoother and computes all 
Hamilton's sources of uncertainty from observation T to 1. The random sets of hyper-
parameters were generated with the instruction rgaussm, of the procedure mgauss.src of 
library distrib.lcg, written by Noack and Schlittgen (2000). For all Monte Carlo draws, 
the Kalman filter was initialised as follows. The Nairu and trend output's starting values 
                                                          
59 Filter uncertainty and parameter uncertainty are given by, respectively, equations 13.7.6. and 13.7.5. in 
Hamilton (1994). 
 83
 were set at the actual values of unemployment and real output at time 1 - and the 
implied values for the gaps - just as was done in estimating the model. The parameters 
associated to inflation expectations and supply-shocks were initialised at the estimates 
obtained in the baseline model. The variance-covariance matrix of the unobserved 
components vector was initialised also at the estimates obtained in the preferred model 
above. 
Results are summarised in table 2.9. The root of the mean square error (i.e. the 
standard error of estimate of the NAIRU and the gap around their true values) is 
estimated at 0.68 percentage points for the last available observation. Its average value 
across the sample is 0.59 percentage points and it ranges from a minimum of 0.42 to a 
maximum of 0.73 points. Hamilton's MSE is estimated at 0.46 percentage points, at 
observation T, from which about 0.29 are due to filter uncertainty and 0.17 to parameter 
uncertainty.60 As natural, filter uncertainty's maximum occurs at period T, as it increases 
systematically, from a minimum of 0.07 percentage points at period 1. Parameter 
uncertainty, on the other hand, evolves in a more complex and less systematic way. In 
our specific case, its maximum is observed at period 1 (0.42 percentage points) and its 
(0.05 percentage points) minimum occurs at 1980:I, while it averages to 0.22 points 
across the sample. At the end of the sample, there is no significant widening of the total 
uncertainty interval, because the increase in filter uncertainty is offset by a reduction of 
parameter uncertainty, which seems to be associated to the linearly decreasing path of 
unemployment since 1997. 
The estimated uncertainty around the NAIRU is in line with the estimates 
reported in the recent literature. For instance, within the G7 countries, Richardson et al 
(2000) find average (full sample) standard errors (root of mean square errors) ranging 
from 0.2 in Japan to 1.1 percent point in France and the UK. OECD (2000) reports 
average and end-of-sample standard errors for 21 developed countries, the first ranging 
from 0.2 points in Japan and Austria to 1.4 points for Finland, and the second ranging 
from 0.3 percent and 1.8 percentage points (for the same countries). Irac (2000) places 
this uncertainty measure for France's NAIRU between 0.7 and 1.2 percentage points. 
Laubach (2001) finds standard errors between 0.54 and 1.98 percent points for the 
                                                          
60 Charts below show results for the near-rational expectations' models. The standard error for the 
adaptive expectations model at moment T is only slightly larger, at 0.70 percentage points. 
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 NAIRUs of G7 countries, and for continental Europe countries his findings are 0.77 for 
Germany, 0.55 for Italy and 1.30 for France.61 
 
Table 2.9 - NAIRU Estimates And Uncertainty [Euro area 1970:II-2000:II] 
    2000:II Average Maximum Minimum 
NAIRU   9.15  7.40  10.15  1.72  
Unemployment Gap  0.05  -0.62  0.83  -1.95  
MSE    0.46  0.36  0.53  0.18  
 Filter   0.29  0.15  0.29  0.07  
 Parameter  0.17  0.22  0.42  0.05  
Standard Error (RMSE) 0.68  0.59  0.73  0.42  
95% Confidence Band 
(1.96*RMSE)   1.32  1.17  1.43  0.83  
95% Conf. Interval 
(± 1.96* RMSE)  2.64  2.34  2.86  1.66  
NAIRU and Unemployment Gap: smoothed estimates from model with linear Phillips equation and 
quadratic Okun equation, Euro area 1970:I-2000:II; 
MSE: Hamilton's (1986, 1994) measure of uncertainty for the smoothed estimate of unobserved 
components around their true value, computed with 10,000 Monte Carlo draws of the model's hyper-
parameters generated with the procedure mgauss.src of the library distrib.lcg, written by Noack and 
Schlittgen (2000). 
 
Figure 2.7 shows our preferred model estimates of the Euro area NAIRU and the 
unemployment gap with the corresponding 95 percent confidence bands (computed as 
1.96*sqrt(MSE)). These amount to 1.32 percentage points by the end of the sample and 
are no smaller than 0.83 percentage points and no larger than 1.43 points, averaging to 
1.17 points of percentage across the full sample. 
As can be seen from the charts in that figure, actual unemployment is out of the 
95 percent confidence bands only during the 4 to 5 years around the recessions' troughs. 
The Euro Area cyclical condition could be considered negative, with a 95 percent of 
confidence, since 1982:III, whereas the trough would be reached only two years and 
                                                          
61 Laubach (2001) page 228, table 4. Note that he stresses, across the paper, that Italy's results are hard to 
understand. 
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 two quarters later, in 1985:I.. In the most recent recession, the model would allow a 
confident classification of the Euro Area cyclical state as negative since 1993:IV, three 
years and one quarter before the 1997:I's trough. 
 
Figure 2.7. Estimated NAIRUs, Unemployment Gaps and Confidence Bands 
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 The model's performance is much worse at expansions, though, as one can never 
be 95 percent confident that the economy is booming, not even at the quarter of cyclical 
peak. In fact, in spite of a systematically increasing unemployment gap since the 1985 
trough, until the peak at 1991:I., the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval 
around the gap never reached a positive value. 
One could argue, tentatively, that the model does seem to generate worth 
information for the policymaker to react in an useful timing to the expansion62 (and its 
inflationary dangers), as the estimated gap is positive since 1989:III, which is almost 
two years before the peak.63 But the fact remains that unless we relax our confidence 
level64, the Euro Area economy could never be considered booming with this type of 
model. 
These results concerning the imprecision in the (unobserved components) 
estimation of the NAIRU and the gap are not new. In fact, they have been around since 
the earlier days of the literature on time-varying NAIRUs, when Staiger, Stock and 
Watson (1997a, 1997b) estimated confidence bands for the US NAIRU so wide that one 
could never be confident that the actual unemployment was significantly different from 
the estimated NAIRU. 
"The main finding is that the NAIRU is imprecisely estimated: a typical 95-
percent confidence interval for the NAIRU in 1990 is 5.1 to 7.7 percent. (…) 
The imprecision suggests caution in using the NAIRU to guide monetary 
policy." 65 
 
If anything, the confidence bands here compare slightly positively with the 
competing literature, as discussed above. But they do not solve the essential problem of 
NAIRU estimates lacking practical utility for the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
                                                          
62 The plotted estimates of the NAIRU and the gap are smoothed estimates and are not real-time 
estimates, so this conclusion should be read with careful - see the discussions below. 
63 Remember that the time lags between monetary policy actions and inflation reactions are typically 
placed around two years by many researchers, since the seminal dating in Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 
64 Which seems to be what OECD (2000), Richardson et al (2000) and Irac (2000) have done, by 
graphing confidence bands computed with one only standard error in each side of the estimates. 
65 Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997b), abstract. Note that they estimated uncertainty with a different 
method from this chapter's. In (1997a), they used the 'Delta method', while in (1997b) they used the 
'Fieller method' - which they found superior to the latter on Monte Carlo simulations (for brief 
presentations of both methods see Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997b) page 37). 
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 Euro Area NAIRU and Cycles: A Comparison to the AWMD 
This chapter's estimates of the NAIRU and the gap are significantly different 
from those reported by the ECB in the Area Wide Model Database (series URT), as 
figure 2.8 shows. 
First, the ECB's Research NAIRU is smoother than this chapter's and, 
accordingly, its unemployment gap is more volatile. Specifically, for the comparable 
period (1972.I-1998:II), the Area Wide Model Database (AWMD) NAIRU has a sample 
standard deviation of 1.98, while our series has a standard deviation of 2.62. The 
AWMD unemployment gap has a standard deviation of 1.3, while ours is around 0.86. 
Second, the AWMD NAIRU average (6.96) is further away from the actual 
unemployment series average (7.87) than ours (7.24 percentage points). This implies 
that the average of this chapter's estimates of the unemployment gap is closer to zero 
than the ECBs': -0.63 against -0.92. As can be seen from the chart with estimates of the 
unemployment gap, in the 1990-91 cyclical peak the AWMD unemployment gap was 
positive for only four quarters and reached a maximum of 0.22 percentage points. This 
study's gap was positive for thirteen quarters and peaked at 0.83 points. 
Third, between the beginning of the sample and 1984 the ECB's research 
NAIRU behaves almost as a deterministic time trend, while this chapter's series 
fluctuates considerably and drifts up much more markedly, in line with the path of 
actual unemployment. 
Finally, the point estimates suggest that the model behind the AWMD 
systematically underestimated the NAIRU since 1978:III, in comparison to this 
chapter's model. In the recent periods, the AWMD NAIRU is much more sensitive to 
the evolution of actual unemployment than this chapter's estimates, which suggests 
more economic foundation of the latter in comparison to the former. 
As the last chart in figure 2.8 shows, the deviation of this chapter's estimates 
from the ECB's research is not random and is very significant, peaking at around 1.5 
percentage points at the end of 1993, which suggests that the AWMD trend 
unemployment rate may not be correct. 
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 Figure 2.8. Estimated NAIRUs, Unemployment Gaps and Confidence Bands   
versus   ECB's Estimates in AWMD 
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ESTIMATED NAIRU AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
   VERSUS   AWMD'S NAIRU
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 ESTIMATED UNEMPLOYMENT GAP AND 95% CONFIDENCE BANDS 
VERSUS   AWMD'S [ECB]  U GAP
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DEVIATION OF ESTIMATED NAIRU   FROM   AWMD'S NAIRU
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
19
72
Q1
19
72
Q4
19
73
Q3
19
74
Q2
19
75
Q1
19
75
Q4
19
76
Q3
19
77
Q2
19
78
Q1
19
78
Q4
19
79
Q3
19
80
Q2
19
81
Q1
19
81
Q4
19
82
Q3
19
83
Q2
19
84
Q1
19
84
Q4
19
85
Q3
19
86
Q2
19
87
Q1
19
87
Q4
19
88
Q3
19
89
Q2
19
90
Q1
19
90
Q4
19
91
Q3
19
92
Q2
19
93
Q1
19
93
Q4
19
94
Q3
19
95
Q2
19
96
Q1
19
96
Q4
19
97
Q3
19
98
Q2
 
As table 2.10 shows, in three out of the six cyclical turning points, identified in 
the sample period, the AWMD unemployment gap changed its evolution simultaneously 
with our estimated unemployment gap. This happened whether strictu sensu - as in 
1980:I - or with no more than a quarter of delay, as in 1974:I and 1991:I.. The 
interesting regularity here is that the divergences occur always at troughs. Specifically, 
they occur at the recession of the mid-70s (7 quarters of delay), the 1985:I trough (4 
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 quarters of leading) and the recession of the second half of the 90s (11 quarters of 
leading). 
 
Table 2.10 – Cyclical Turning Points   [Euro area, 1970:I - 2000:II] 
Cyclical  Unemployment Inefficiency  Unemployment  
Turning   Gap   Wedge  Gap 
Point   [trivariate UC] [GGS (2001)]  [ECB's AWMD] 
 
Peak   1974:I   -----   1974:II 
Trough  1975:IV  -----   1977:III * 
Peak   1980:I   1980:IV  1980:I 
Trough  1985:I   1984:IV  1984:I 
Peak   1991:I   1991:I   1990:IV 
Trough  1997:I   1997:III  1994:II 
 
* Between the beginning of the ECB's AWMD trend unemployment rate estimates (1971:IV) and quarter 
1980:III, this is the only period in which the unemployment gap implicit in the ECB's AWMD is 
negative. Moreover, it is only slightly below zero (-0.0222). Furthermore, between 1977:II and 1978:IV 
the AWMD unemployment gap evolved very closely to 0, although at positive values (except 1977:III, 
obviously). All this implies that it is very hard to consider this period as a standard cyclical downturn 
using the AWMD series. 
 
The AWMD NAIRU is almost always inside the 95 percent confidence bands 
surrounding our estimates of the NAIRU. In the studied sample, only in the five 
quarters between 1972:I and 1973:I and in the five quarters from 1993:II to 1994:II can 
we be 95 percent confident that the AWMD estimates are different from ours. 
This 1993-94 episode could be used to illustrate the practical relevance of the 
divergence between this chapter's model and the AWMD trend unemployment rate. In 
fact, if the Monetary Union and the European Central Bank were already in force by 
then, the AWMD series would suggest that the European Central Bank should lower 
interest rates as soon as 1994:II. On the contrary, this chapter's model indicates that the 
cyclical trough has been reached only in 1997:I, so only about then would it strongly 
suggest lowering interest rates. Euro Area inflation did reach a local minimum by 
1994:II (quarterly rate of 0.45 percentage points) but it increased again until 1995:II 
(0.95 percentage points) and only from 1986:III on was it below 0.45 points. This 
means that an expansionary monetary action by 1994 would have been inappropriate. 
Obviously, it remains to be seen how different would these trend and cycle estimates be 
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 if the same data set ending by 1998:II was to be used with both models - a question that 
will be addressed below. 
 
Euro Area Business Cycles: A Comparison to Gali, Gertler and Salido (2001) 
Another interesting analysis of these results is to have them compared to Gali, 
Gertler and Salido's (2001) (hereafter, GGS) indicator of capacity utilisation in the Euro 
Area 1970:I-1998:II.66 
The GGS's theoretical and empirical framework is significantly different from 
ours: they estimate a New Keynesian Phillips curve using not a real gap but a proxy for 
the real marginal cost (specifically real unit labour costs) and their estimation technique 
is GMM.67 Most importantly, they argue that the real marginal cost can be decomposed 
into the wage mark-up - which indicates the level of frictions in the labour market and, 
therefore, accounts for inflation inertia - and the ratio of the household's marginal cost 
of labour supply to the marginal product of labour. 68 They refer to the latter as the 
inefficiency wedge, and argue that it is a proportionate measure of output relative to the 
efficient level of output, i.e. the output corresponding to the frictionless competitive 
equilibrium. They further argue that the standard formulation of the New Phillips 
relation based on the output (or unemployment) gap is correct only under the 
assumption of constant wage mark-ups. 
Figure 2.9 shows GGS's measure of the inefficiency wedge for the Euro area, 
1970:I-1998:II, together with this chapter's estimate of the unemployment gap and  an 
extension of GGS's measure for 1998:III-2000:II based on the statistics subsequently 
published by the ECB (values to the right of the vertical line).69 The most striking 
                                                          
66 Ross and Ubide (2001) offer a comparison of the Euro Area business cycles estimated from a number 
of alternative methods, also including Unobservable Components Models and GGS's inefficiency wedge. 
67 For a recent critique of GGS's use of the labour share (or unit labour costs) as proxy for the real 
marginal cost in their New Keynesian Phillips relation, see Roberts (2001). 
68 See Section 5 of Gali, Gertler and Salido (2001), p. 1260-1266. 
69 GGS's measure was replicated using the proxies and formulas they define for the practical 
decomposition of the log of real marginal cost into the sum of the logs of the wage mark-up and the log of 
the inefficiency wedge (see p. 1262-1263). Specifically, the (log of) inefficiency wedge is measured as 
the log of private real consumption, plus the log difference of total employment to the labour force, minus 
the log of real output deducted of the log difference of the employment to the labour force. For 1970:I-
1998:II the source was the AWMD, while for 1998:III-2000:II data was taken from recent issues of the 
ECB's Monthly Bulletin. The inefficiency wedge for 1970:I-1998:II in the graph mimics perfectly the 
dotted line in the upper part of GGS's figure 5, page 1264. 
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 conclusion is that between 1980 and 1998:II the cyclical turning points identified by 
both models are highly similar. This can be more clearly seen in Table 2.10. In fact, 
these models' estimated turning points match perfectly at the 1991:I's peak, they are just 
three quarters away from each other at the early 80s peak and at the mid 80s trough, and 
are separated by only two quarters at the 1997's trough.70 
 
Figure 2.9. Unemployment Gap versus Gali, Gertler and Salido's (2001) 
Inefficiency Wedge 
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These results are interesting at least on two grounds. First, at a general level, it is 
remarkable that two such different empirical frameworks, estimation methods and 
statistical information generate so similar business cycle turning points. 
Second, these results seem to defy GGS's theoretical arguments stating that the 
formulation of the New Phillips curve based on the output gap is correct only under the 
assumption of a constant wage mark-up.71 In fact, as the bottom half of GGS's figure 5 
                                                          
70 At the beginning of the sample period, on the contrary, the two models generate different results. GGS's 
cyclical measure indicates that the Euro area was producing at a high capacity utilisation rate. They 
further indicate that the capacity utilisation decreased slowly but steadily until the end of 1980 - therefore, 
suggesting that there was not a typical business cycle in the Euro Area during the 70s. My model's 
estimates, on the contrary, are closer to a standard business cycle, albeit shorter and less ample than usual. 
71 Gali, Gertler and Salido (2001), page 1262, equation (22). 
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 (p. 1264) shows, the wage mark-up seems to have changed markedly during this period. 
Yet, this chapter's model, based on a Phillips equation specified on the unemployment 
gap, generates a trend-cycle decomposition that is very close, in its turning points, to 
GGS's inefficiency wedge's turning points across almost 20 years. 
One advantage of the unobserved components framework here is that the 
uncertainty associated to the estimation of the NAIRU can be measured. The 
computations of the Inefficiency Wedge, in turn, depend upon a set of simplifying 
assumptions and of decisions about proxies for unavailable statistical information which 
uncertainty can not be formally assessed. 
 
Ex-Post and Quasi-Real-Time Estimates of the Unemployment Gap 
It could be argued that the AWMD URT series and GGS's inefficiency wedge 
should be compared to the NAIRU that would be estimated with this chapter's model 
using data only up to 1998:II (last period of the AWMD). 
The question here is that of the comparison of real-time or quasi-real-time 
estimates of the real gap to their ex-post estimates, on which there is a growing recent 
literature. In short, real-time estimates of the gaps may subsequently be subject to 
changes both due to data revisions and statistical revisions - the latter being changes in 
coefficient's estimates and, therefore, in estimates of the unobserved components, in 
recent periods, due to the availability of new data. Quasi-real-time estimates are not 
subject to data revisions, but are subject to statistical revisions. 
In an important essay, Orphanides and Van Norden (1999) found that real-time 
estimates of the output gap are typically subject to revisions of the same order of 
magnitude of the estimated gap itself. They further found that the main cause for those 
revisions is not data revision, but statistical revision instead, as the end-of-sample 
estimates of trend output tend to be highly unreliable with most available methods, 
especially around turning points. In a more detailed framework, Tchaidze (2001) 
confirmed that it is the inclusion of leads of data in the estimation of real gaps that 
contributes the most to its ex-post revision.72 However, the results in Camba-Mendez 
                                                          
72 The implication of real gap uncertainty for the design of monetary policy is potentially enormous and 
has received attention from a large recent literature. This analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this 
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 and Palenzuela (2001) seem to indicate that unobserved components models similar to 
the one in this text, when applied to aggregate Euro area data, may suffer less from 
statistical uncertainty than the time-series studied in Orphanides and Van Norden 
(1999). 
Figure 2.10 shows estimates of the unemployment gap of the Euro area, obtained 
with the model identified in this study when estimated with data up to only 1998:II. The 
first chart compares these quasi-real-time estimates at 1998:II to the ex-post estimates 
computed at 2000:II, showing that the additional 8 quarters of data generate substantial 
statistical revisions in the estimated unemployment gaps from 1995 onwards. These 
revisions increase steadily between 1995 and 1998, amounting from 0.18 percentage 
points at 1995:I to 0.87 percentage points at 1998:II, reaching 72 percent of the ex-post 
estimated gap at this quarter. 
As the second and third charts in figure 2.10 show, the AWMD's trend 
unemployment and unemployment gaps are significantly different from our quasi-real-
time estimates, at 95 percent of confidence, in three episodes. These are the periods 
from 1972:I to 1973:I, from 1993:I to 1994:IV and from 1997:I to 1998:II (the last six 
quarters of this sub-sample). Hence, even when quasi-real-time estimates as of 1998:II 
are used, there are still very large differences between this model's and the AWMD's 
gaps, which track back to a period of about 20 quarters before the end-of-sample. 
The charts also show that the quasi-real-time estimates as of 1998:II would 
wrongly suggest the existence of a trough at 1994:II, therefore failing - similarly to the 
AWMD - to detect the 1997:I trough. One qualification of this result, is that while the 
AWMD's estimated gap at 1994:II was -2.89 percentage points - minus 0.3 points than 
at the previous trough - this model's quasi-real-time estimated gap amounted to -1.41 
percentage points, about 0.5 points above its value at the previous trough. In spite of 
this qualification, the results suggest, essentially, that the policy use of real gaps 
estimated in real-time (from unobserved components systems) should be pursued with 
great caution. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
study. Recent references that the interested reader should see are, inter alia, Orphanides (2000), Drew and 
Hunt (2000), Orphanides et al (2000), Lansing (2000), Yetman (2000), Ehrmann and Smets (2001) and 
McCallum (2001a). 
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 Figure 2.10. Quasi-Real-Time versus Ex-Post Estimates of the Unemployment 
Gap 
UNEMPLOYMENT GAP 1970-1998:II
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 UNEMPLOYMENT GAP AND CONFIDENCE BANDS
QUASI-REAL-TIME ESTIMATE [1998:II]  VS  AWMD'S URT SERIES
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The last chart in figure 2.10 illustrates the fact that the estimates as of 1998:II 
mimic the turning points identified with GGS's inefficiency wedge from 1980 to 1991, 
but fail to identify the 1997 trough. Obviously, the GGS method has the advantage, 
here, of not involving any statistical procedure, therefore not being subject to statistical 
uncertainty and revisions. This is the positive corollary of the disadvantage of that 
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 method that we previously discussed, namely the impossibility of computing measures 
of uncertainty for this cyclical indicator. 
 
Inflation Forecasts 
Finally, figure 2.11 illustrates this chapter's model's performance in forecasting 
short-run inflation. 
The first chart shows actual quarterly inflation rate and in-sample one-step-
ahead forecasts of inflation for 1972:I-2000:II. Each period's quarterly inflation rate is 
predicted using the smoothed estimates of the Phillips equation's parameters, but only 
last quarter information on inflation expectations, domestic and imported inflation and 
the unemployment gap. As can be seen in the chart, the model tracks the short-run 
changes of inflation fairly well. The root of the mean square error (RMSE) is 0.28, 
which means that the model predicts next quarter's inflation, within the sample, with a 
95 percent confidence band with around 0.55 percentage points. 
The second chart in figure 2.11 looks with more detail into the model's predictive 
performance from 1996:I onwards. It shows that in spite of the somehow erratic 
movements of quarterly GDP inflation in 1999 and the first half of 2000, the model still 
performs well.73 Furthermore, the models' out of sample two-step-ahead predictions for 
2000:III and 2000:IV are shown, to the right of the dashed vertical line. These forecasts 
use the smoothed estimates of the Phillips equation and information on inflation 
expectations, domestic and imported inflation and the estimated gap as of 2000:II. As 
the chart shows, the model's performance happens to be quite good in these two 
quarters. The root of the mean square error is 0.09 and the corresponding 95 percent 
confidence band would be around 0.18 percentage points. 
 
 
 
                                                          
73 The inflation rates until 2000:II used in the charts and computations here are the initial ECB's 
estimates, which were used in this chapter's estimation - hence, they do not include subsequent revisions 
in this data. Figures for 2000:III, 2000:IV were drawn from the ECB's Monthly Bulletin of June 2001. 
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Figure 2.11. Actual Inflation versus Model Predictions of Inflation 
ACTUAL INFLATION  VS  ONE-STEP-AHEAD PREDICTIONS OF INFLATION 1972:I-
2000:II
INFLATION
1 STEP-AHEAD FORECASTS
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
19
72
Q1
19
72
Q4
19
73
Q3
19
74
Q2
19
75
Q1
19
75
Q4
19
76
Q3
19
77
Q2
19
78
Q1
19
78
Q4
19
79
Q3
19
80
Q2
19
81
Q1
19
81
Q4
19
82
Q3
19
83
Q2
19
84
Q1
19
84
Q4
19
85
Q3
19
86
Q2
19
87
Q1
19
87
Q4
19
88
Q3
19
89
Q2
19
90
Q1
19
90
Q4
19
91
Q3
19
92
Q2
19
93
Q1
19
93
Q4
19
94
Q3
19
95
Q2
19
96
Q1
19
96
Q4
19
97
Q3
19
98
Q2
19
99
Q1
19
99
Q4
 
ACTUAL INFLATION  VS MODEL INFLATION 1996:I-2000:IV
ACTUAL INFLATION
MODEL INFLATION
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
19
96
Q1
19
96
Q2
19
96
Q3
19
96
Q4
19
97
Q1
19
97
Q2
19
97
Q3
19
97
Q4
19
98
Q1
19
98
Q2
19
98
Q3
19
98
Q4
19
99
Q1
19
99
Q2
19
99
Q3
19
99
Q4
20
00
Q1
20
00
Q2
20
00
Q3
20
00
Q4
 
 
 
 99
 2.6. Concluding Remarks 
Using quarterly aggregate data for the Euro Area from 1970:I to 2000:II, this 
chapter estimates a simple macroeconomic unobserved components' model by 
maximum-likelihood, with the Kalman filter, whose main measurement equations are 
the Okun and Phillips relations. 
The estimation method and the tests here provided address some of the 
shortcomings existing in the literature and thus the new estimates of the Euroland's 
NAIRU and real gaps improve on the ECB's estimates published in the AWMD on 
some grounds. 
The system successfully estimates all the hyper-parameters in the model, including 
the standard deviation of the innovation in the NAIRU's random walk, thus 
circumventing the need to impose any arbitrary value for this or any other parameter. 
This model's Phillips equation is not a backward-looking ad-hoc equation with 
arbitrary lags of inflation, but rather a forward-looking New Keynesian relation. This 
New-Keynesian Phillips equation has good empirical properties, due to the use of a 
recently suggested concept of near-rational expectations of inflation. 
Tests of asymmetry in the Okun and the Phillips equation are provided, with a 
method that encompasses the linear null hypothesis and covering four possible non-
linear functional forms. On the whole, the evidence does not allow rejection of the 
hypothesis that the Euro Area Phillips relation has been linear in the last three decades, 
whilst clearly allows rejection of that hypothesis for the Okun relation, in favour of 
convexity. We draw two immediate consequences from these findings. First, the choice 
of unemployment vs output gap to characterise the trade-off may not be irrelevant in 
terms of its linearity/non-linearity. Second, neither non-linearity nor linearity should be 
taken for granted a priori across samples. Not rejection of linearity in the Euro Area 
Phillips relation (at least until 2000:II) has important policy implications, which can be 
easily drawn from the discussion on asymmetries reviewed in this work. 
The system is estimated fitting a quadratic function to the Okun equation, which 
seems to be the most suitable assumption for the data at hand, within the functional 
forms here considered. The results show that when near-rational expectations of 
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 inflation are used in the forward-looking new keynesian Phillips equation, in place of 
purely rational expectations, the Phillips trade-off is estimated with the correct sign and 
is statistically significant, provided that the Okun equation is adequately modelled as a 
convex relation. Hence, although the point estimate of the Phillips elasticity turns out to 
be somehow smaller than that obtained from similar models with adaptive expectations, 
Ball's (2000) limited-information forward-looking expectations seems to work well in 
fitting both the data and the theoretical properties of the new keynesian Phillips curve. 
The estimated model seems to capture reasonably well features of the 
macroeconomic data of the Euro Area during the 1970-2000 period. The peaks and 
troughs of the estimated unemployment gap seem in accordance with the conventional 
wisdom about recent European cycles and are very close to turning points identified by 
alternative sources with different frameworks, data and method. The model's 
performance in forecasting short-run movements of inflation is also satisfactory. 
However, comparison of ex-post estimates to quasi-real-time estimates of the main 
unobserved components shows that the model is subject to a significant amount of 
statistical uncertainty and revisions. 
Monte Carlo integration shows that this chapter's model estimates the Euro Area 
equilibrium unemployment rate with a degree of confidence that compares well with the 
competing literature. The 95 percent confidence bands are estimated at ± 1.32 
percentage points at the end of the sample and range from 0.83 to 1.43 points, averaging 
to 1.17 percentage points for the full sample. During the 4 to 5 years around the cyclical 
troughs the model estimates gaps that are different from zero at a 95 percent of 
confidence. The behaviour of the model's confidence interval estimates is, however, not 
that good during expansions. 
Hence, in the Euro Area, like in the other developed countries and Areas, the 
evidence so far calls (at the best) for a cautious use of the unemployment (output) gap in 
the practical conduct of monetary policy. 
There are at least two avenues for future research along the lines of this chapter's. 
First, the unobserved components model can be enhanced with additional equations, 
which may improve estimation of the unobserved variables by adding new information 
and restrictions from economic theory, as well as generate estimates of other 
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 unobserved variables relevant for monetary policy analysis. An interesting extension 
would be to include in our model an aggregate demand (IS) equation, modelling the 
unemployment (output) gap as function of the expected gap and the real short-term 
interest rate, as derived from optimising new keynesian models. One alternative 
formulation - although less theory-driven - would write the IS as function of the gap 
between actual interest rate and its natural level, and then explicitly relate this natural 
rate of interest to the natural unemployment and potential output, as in Laubach and 
Williams (2001). Another extension of the model could consider a production function 
in the measurement system, and use information from production factors and 
technology. A recent work along these lines is Proietti et al.'s (2002) combination of a 
Phillips equation with a production function, enabling them to estimate the contribution 
of the production factors and productivity to trends and cycles. 
A second path for future research relates to the modelling of inflation expectations - 
a crucial issue for the analysis of the Phillips trade-off, which, in spite of the good 
results in this chapter, remains open, and, as such, has been receiving enormous 
attention in the recent literature. On purely empirical grounds, data eventually available 
on aggregate Euro Area surveys of inflation expectations would be a natural candidate 
to proxy for inflation expectations, thus giving a pragmatic solution to the problem of 
expectations being unobservable. On theoretical - and not merely empirical - grounds, 
there is a growing recent literature of theories postulating deviations from full 
rationality, similarly to Ball's (2000) near-rationality hypothesis used in this chapter. 
Some of those theories seem to deserve a closer look, in the ongoing search for 
theoretical models of expectations simultaneously consistent with evidence from 
microeconomic and macroeconomic data. Examples of recent works along these lines 
are: Mankiw and Reis' (2001a, 2001b) hypothesis of slow dissemination of information; 
Ball and Croushore's (2001) hypothesis of agents forming expectations with data not 
completely up to date; Carroll's (2001) epidemiological model explaining deviations of 
household expectations from rational forecasts; Sims' (2001) model of agents with 
limited information-processing capacity and rational inattention - considered in 
Woodford's (2001b) model of monopolistically-competitive pricing with suppliers' 
perception of economic conditions contaminated by noise resulting from infinite-
processing capacity; Orphanides and Williams' (2002) model of agents that rely on an 
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 adaptive learning technology to form expectations - finite memory least squares 
learning -, resulting in perpetual learning because of the constant change of the 
economy structure - an approach building on the learning literature recently developed 
by Sargent (1999a) and Evans and Konkapohja (2001). 
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Chapter 3 
Macroeconomic Performance and Policymakers' Preferences 
in the Euro Area, 1972:I-2001:II 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Along the last thirty years, the macroeconomic performance of the Euro Area, in 
terms of the main policy objective variables, has changed markedly. Figure 3.1.A 
illustrates this idea, showing five years averages of (quarterly) inflation and 
unemployment gap variability around their desired targets (that is, square deviations 
from the desired levels), between 1972:I and 2001:II. 
The unemployment gap is an updated version of the one computed in chapter 2, 
from an unobserved components model of stochastic NAIRU and trend GDP, featuring 
the Phillips and the Okun relations of the Area as measurement equations, which has 
been estimated by maximum likelihood using the Kalman filter.1 Inflation corresponds 
to the first differences of the log of the GDP deflator, the price index used in the gap 
estimation. The desired levels are assumed to be a null unemployment gap and a value 
of 0.5 percentage points of quarterly inflation, compatible with the usual assumption of 
2 percent of annual inflation - typically used since Taylor (1993). 
Figure 3.1.A shows the macroeconomic performance of the Euro Area clearly 
improving since the second half of the 80s, with both inflation and gap variances 
smaller than before, recording quite low levels and systematically decreasing further 
throughout 1996-2001.  
 
 
                                                          
1 The Phillips equation relates quarterly inflation changes to three lags of quarterly inflation changes, the 
current unemployment gap and the deviation of inflation in the Area from imported inflation in the 
previous quarter. The Okun equation relates the output gap to current period unemployment gap, 
according to a quadratic function. The NAIRU follows a random walk with a stochastic drift and trend 
output is modelled as a random walk with a constant drift. The presented charts employ the 
unemployment gap series given by the Kalman smoother, which uses the information of the full sample - 
see chapter 2 for details. 
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Figure 3.1 A - Macroeconomic Volatility, Euro Area 1972-2001 
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Figure 3.1 B - Ratios of Variability to the Absolute Value of the Average of 
Inflation And of the Unemployment Gap, Euro Area 1972-2001 
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Figure 3.1.B presents adjusted variability values - computed as the ratio of the 
variability measures of figure 3.1.A to the absolute value of the averages of the 
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corresponding variable - which allows a more robust reading. The picture is slightly 
different in what regards the gap variability, but fully confirms that the 1986-2001 
period has been outstanding in terms of inflation performance. Adjusted inflation 
variability fell systematically during the whole period, but its fall has been especially 
large from the first to the second half of the 80s. It has recorded impressively small 
values since then, and has been further lowered until 2001:II. 
 We interpret these pictures within the framework set by Taylor (1979), who 
showed that macroeconomic models featuring a transitory trade-off between the levels 
of inflation and unemployment imply a permanent trade-off between the variability of 
inflation and unemployment around their desired levels. This second moments' trade-off 
means that when the economy suffers a supply shock, that changes inflation and the gap 
in opposite directions, the policymaker cannot bring both variables on track 
simultaneously with equal vigour. As further developed by Taylor (1993, 1994) and 
Fuhrer (1994, 1997a), any given monetary policy regime faces an efficiency policy 
frontier that represents the most favourable combinations of inflation and gap 
variability.2 The optimal policy frontier - sometimes called Taylor curve - is convex to 
the origin, its position is a function of the policy regime and of the variability of the 
shocks hitting the economy, and its curvature is a function of the structural behaviour of 
the economy, namely the Phillips elasticity. An efficient policy explores the best 
achievable combinations of macro stabilisation, and thus places the economy precisely 
on the Taylor curve, so the distance between actual macro performance and the frontier 
may be interpreted as a measure of the policy inefficiency. The specific point where the 
policymaker places the economy is a function of the relative weight attached to inflation 
and activity gap volatility in his loss function. This analysis is further complicated by 
the fact that the optimal policy frontier may change over time.3 
 The history of the Euro Area economic policy since the mid-80s features, most 
notably, the German monetary policy leadership of the exchange rate mechanism of the 
                                                          
2 See Taylor (1998 a, b, c) and Solow (1998b) for further discussion on the EPF. Studies of the empirical 
evidence on the variability trade-off include Debelle and Fischer (1994), Owyong (1996), Iscan and 
Osberg (1998), and Lee (1999). 
3 Efficiency policy frontiers have been used to compare the best combinations of macro volatility 
achievable by alternative policy reaction functions - see, among many others, Defina et al. (1996), Black 
et al. (1997), and Ditmar et al. (1999). They've been also used to assess the robustness of some specific 
class of rules - see, for instance, Amano et al. (1999). 
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European monetary system, with rare exchange-rate realignments, and, since the mid-
90s, a very high degree of macro and policy convergence ahead of 1999's EMU. These 
facts strongly suggest that an important part of the change in macroeconomic 
performance above described may be attributed to a policy regime change in the Area. 
This chapter empirically investigates what lies behind the documented 
favourable shift in the volatility trade-off of the Euro Area, taking on the central 
hypothesis that a crucial part of the explanation lies in the emergence of a new and well-
defined monetary policy regime in the aggregate Euro Area after 1986. In order to test 
this hypothesis, we estimate the Area policymakers' preferences, with a framework that 
simultaneously identifies the Area macroeconomic structure - which is also a 
determinant of the Taylor trade-off - focusing on the comparison of the period 1972-
1985 with that of 1986-2001. Our framework, moreover, generates consistent estimates 
of the variation in inflation not explained by the model, and of the deviation of actual 
interest rates from their optimal path, which provide some information about two other 
factors affecting the volatility trade-off - supply shocks volatility, and monetary policy 
efficiency.4 
 
Policymakers' Preferences 
A recent literature has been attempting to estimate policymakers' preferences 
structural parameters. Three main streams stand out, the studies by Cecchetti et al 
(Cecchetti, McConnel and Quiros, 1999, Cecchetti and Erhmann, 1999, and Cecchetti, 
Flores-Lagunes and Krause, 2001), those of Favero and Rovelli (1999, 2001), and the 
one by Dennis (2001). While the former studies a broad cross-section of 23 OECD 
countries, the second and the third deal with the US case, focusing on the estimation of 
                                                          
4 We use official aggregate data of the Euro Area, from the Area Wide Model Database (AWMD) or 
computed from the AWMD, as described below. We study the Area as a whole, as our aim is to see if the 
aggregate data reveal any well-identified global economic structure, and policy regime, throughout a 
period in which (except for 10 observations at the end of the sample) nations, not the Area, were the 
formal economic units. We do not analyse nation-level data, so our analysis is set off from the opposite 
perspective of the literature that studies data from EMU members and searches for heterogeneity of 
monetary transmission mechanisms - a literature that has been reporting mixed results and where no clear 
consensus seems to exist. Recent references of this literature are, among many others, Clausen and Hayo 
(2002a, b), Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2002), Mihov (2001), Clements et al. (2001), Sala (2001), Leichter 
and Walsh (1999), Aksoy et al. (2002), and Dornbusch et al. (1998). 
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the role that a monetary policy regime change may have had in the improvement in U.S. 
macro-economic performance around 1980.5 
A common characteristic of all these studies is their use of the small 
macroeconomic model suggested by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) to represent the 
dynamic structural behaviour of the macro-economy. One of the key features of this 
model is that it is compatible with the natural rate hypothesis.6 Moreover, its purely 
backward-looking aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply equations, though at odds 
with the functions derived from explicit micro optimisation - such as the models in 
Walsh (1998) - have proved to be quite successful in capturing the main properties of 
recent US macroeconomic data, especially the high persistence in inflation. 
The distinctive feature of Cecchetti et al. (1999), Cecchetti and Erhmann (1999), 
and Cecchetti et al. (2001) is that their empirical strategies are based on fitting the 
second moments of the data. Their framework seems to be, however, affected by two 
main caveats. First, it does not estimate the policymakers' preference coefficients 
through formal econometric methods. Second, it does not include interest rate 
smoothing. Dennis (2001) showed that allowing for interest rate smoothing in a 
procedure that estimates the policy objective function by matching the model second 
moments with those of the data does not seem to work well. Specifically, he found too 
low estimates of the interest rate smoothing parameter, implying that the estimated 
policy rule fails to fit well the first moments of the nominal short-term interest rate. 7 
Favero and Rovelli (1999, 2001) and Dennis (2001) frameworks are based on 
the estimation of the aggregate-supply/aggregate-demand system together with an 
                                                          
5 Rowe and Yetman (2000) have also empirically estimated the level of inflation targeted by the Bank of 
Canada and whether it alternatively targeted output. However, their empirical strategy seems more limited 
in scope, as it studies one only parameter of policymakers’ preferences. 
6 See Beyer and Farmer (2002) for an explanation of the macroeconomic change observed in the U.S. at 
1980 - inflation, unemployment and nominal interest rate changing from upward drifting to downward 
drifting - developed in an alternative set-up featuring a long-run Phillips relation positively sloped, 
instead of the natural rate hypothesis. Their analysis is based on the co-integration properties of the data-
set {π, u, i} and in its representation and estimation as a vector equilibrium correction model - featuring 
optimising IS and Phillips equations and a policy reaction function. It seems, however, to be subject to the 
criticism that the system equation describing monetary policy (the interest rate rule) is a reduced-form 
equation, in contrast to the other two equations in the system. 
7 See Dennis' (2001) Appendix 2. We do not mean that second moments are not important, but only that 
estimation should focus on another approach. The main criteria to evaluate the quality of an estimation of 
policymakers' preferences is whether the optimal policy rule derived from the estimated preferences' 
coefficients does a good job in matching both the first and the second moments of the data. 
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interest rate equation describing conditions for optimality of policymaker's actions. To 
write those conditions, Favero and Rovelli use optimal control, while Dennis uses 
dynamic programming results, building on the use of inverse-control theory to interpret 
the policy equation of a VAR in Salemi (1995). 
Favero and Rovelli (2001) augment the Rudebusch-Svensson structure with the 
policymaker Euler equation, that is, the first order conditions that solve the inter-
temporal optimisation problem faced by the policy authority. They explicitly consider 
the cross-equation restrictions in the system, and jointly estimate the system with 
quarterly US data by GMM truncating the structural equations at four lags and the Euler 
equation at four leads.8 Their framework generates estimates of the policymaker 
preferences parameters - inflation target, relative weight on inflation-output stability, 
weight on interest rate smoothing - and of the equilibrium real interest rate. They 
measure the supply shocks affecting the Economy by the estimated variance of the 
residual of the aggregate supply equation, and measure the efficiency of policy with the 
volatility of actual interest rates around their estimated optimal path, given by the 
standard deviation of the Euler equation residual. Favero and Rovelli confirm the 
change in US monetary regime at the beginning of the 80s and successfully estimate the 
policy regime parameters, as well as - according to their assumptions - the change in 
policy efficiency, and in supply shocks.  
 Dennis (2001) uses Chow's (1981) lagrangean method of dynamic programming 
to solve the infinite-horizon optimisation problem faced by the policymaker. He then 
takes the resulting optimal state-contingent policy reaction rule as an interest rate 
equation joining the dynamic constraints - aggregate-supply/aggregate-demand - in a 
three-equation system, which is estimated by FIML.9 The main advantage of Dennis' 
approach is the elimination of the need to truncate the policy horizon, thus letting the 
policymakers consider the entire forecast horizon when setting policy rates.10 Dennis 
framework builds on the use of inverse-control theory by Salemi (1995) to uncover the 
revealed preferences of the Federal Reserve across a number of sub-periods of a sample 
                                                          
8 In Favero and Rovelli (1999) the structure of the economy is firstly estimated and then the 
policymaker's preferences are estimated given the aggregate-supply/demand coefficients estimates. 
9 Ozlale (2000) reports results from a similar exercise, but instead of using full information maximum 
likelihood, he uses the kalman filter to compute the likelihood function. 
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beginning in 1947 and ending in 1992. Inverse-control means, here, finding the 
coefficients of the central bank's loss function, that produce the optimal feed-back 
equation that best fits the data. Dennis confirms the essential results in the literature on 
policy regime changes in US recent history, and estimates the main policy regime 
parameters. There is, however, a discrepancy between Dennis' and Favero and Rovelli's 
estimated weights of interest rate smoothing, which deserves further discussion in 
section 3.4.3 below. 
 
The Euro Area 1972-2001 
In order to study the causes of the apparent improvement in the volatility trade-
off of the Euro Area at the mid-80s, we use a refined and extended version of the 
Favero and Rovelli (2001) framework, and compare the results with the alternative one 
by Dennis (2001). These frameworks seem suitable, given the role that the emergence 
of a new monetary regime by 1986 seems to have played in the process. 
Even though its observed shift in volatility parallels that of the US, the Euro 
Area case has important particularities that render our work potentially more complex. 
First, there was no formal unique European monetary policy regime until the EMU, in 
1999, and, until then, the national monetary authorities operated within heterogeneous 
monetary policy institutional frameworks – see Cukierman (1992, chapter 19). Second, 
the Area time series are weighted averages of the 11 member-states forming the EMU, 
as published in the Area Wide Model Database (AWMD) by the ECB, and not original 
raw data. They may mask significant heterogeneity across the Area economies, in what 
regards cyclical positions, structure of the economy, shocks, efficiency of policies and 
policymakers preferences - see the references in footnote 4 above. Third, the output and 
unemployment gap series in the AWMD are subject to estimation contention - see 
chapter 2. 
 In spite of these difficulties, both the data and the history of events in the 
European monetary integration throughout 1979-1999 motivate our hypothesis that a 
new and well-identified policy regime exists de facto since the mid-80s. This is a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 Dennis sets the temporal discount factor equal to 0.99, while Favero and Rovelli use 0.975. Both report 
the well-known difficulty in estimating this coefficient - see, inter alia, Ireland (1997). 
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regime associated to the leadership of the EMS Exchange Rate Mechanism by German 
monetary policy - which, itself, had initiated a new regime, stabilising the inflation 
objective at 2 percent per year, after gradually decreasing the target since the beginning 
of the 80s. 
First, contrary to what had happened since the creation of the EMS in 1979, 
after April 1986 there were almost no realignments of exchange-rate parities within the 
system. Notably, no realignments at all existed in the 5 years between January of 1987 
and the crisis of the summer of 1992, with the Basle-Nyborg agreement of September 
1987, and the way it has been implemented, effectively strengthening the EMS. This 
exchange rate stability explains the finding that monetary policy autonomy has 
decreased, within the system, after 1986-87 - see, for instance, Loureiro (1996). Truly, 
some EMS countries had tightened their controls to international flows of capital during 
the turbulent initial period of the System, but these controls were effective only in 
periods immediately preceding realignments. As such, they were practically ineffective 
after 1986 - see, for instance, the differential between onshore and offshore interest rates 
for the franc and the lira in Gros and Thygesen (1992, page 121). Moreover, the 1987 
European Single Market programme has been a crucial additional force pushing 
member-countries for a structural easing of foreign capital controls (on top of the 
monetary integration and the increasing ineffectiveness of controls due to the mounting 
sophistication of financial operations). In fact, since the middle of the 80s, all member-
states began gradually liberalising their international capital movements with the other 
EEC nations. As a result, the actual level of capital controls imposed by the Community 
largest countries was already relatively unimportant well before the 1990 deadline for 
liberalisation (to which Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece had exceptions) - see 
European Commission (1997, pages 25-46 and Appendix C). 
Second, there was a clear convergence of the EMU member-states inflation 
rates toward the German rate, between 1980 and 1986, and thereafter rates have moved 
broadly in tandem, with a very gradual final completion of the nominal convergence 
process throughout 1987-1999. To see this, figure 3.2 depicts the EMU member-states 
inflation rates during 1974-1999 (except for Portuguese inflation, which has been an 
outlier during the 70s and the 80s), with German inflation in bold - clearly showing a 
nominal convergence with Germany ahead of 1986. Furthermore, there has also been a 
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visible nominal convergence of EMU countries to Germany's equilibrium in the path of 
short-term interest rates. Specifically, the dispersion of the EMU members' short-term 
interest rates relative to the German one trended down between 1983:III (when it 
recorded a root mean square error of 3.5) until 1999:I (when it reached zero). This 
dispersion was already below 2.5 in 1986:I, and moved below the average of the 1974-
1998 period (1.7) ever since 1988:II. 
 
Figure 3.2 - Consumer Price Index Inflation, Founding-States of EMU (Excluding 
Portugal)   1974:I-1999:IV 
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While authors writing before the 1992-93 exchange rate crisis had already 
written about a New EMS - see Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990) and Gros and Thygesen 
(1992) - others writing in the aftermath of the crisis were less optimistic - see Loureiro 
(1996). Our argument is that the subsequent history of events and macroeconomic 
performance allows the restatement of the hypothesis, as exchange markets crisis turned 
out to have no significant structural consequences. 
Our hypothesis of a new monetary regime, of a somewhat informal nature, after 
1986, and its role of gradual anticipation of 1999's EMU, is compatible with arguments 
put forth previously, albeit in a different context, by McCallum (1997). The crucial 
point is that, in many episodes of monetary history, institutional changes lag behind 
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actual policy changes, which in turn reflect, with some lag, evolving social beliefs and 
attitudes. Muscatelli and Trecroci (2000) surveyed evidence favouring this hypothesis 
and Muscatelli et al. (2000) offered empirical evidence in favour of this class of 
arguments, related to the recent upsurge of inflation targeting regimes. 
Our hypothesis is also compatible with evidence from forward-looking policy 
rules, and their interpretation, in Doménech et al. (2001a). First, they show that such 
rules can explain the behaviour of the quarterly aggregate EMU short-term interest rate 
after the mid-80s, but not before. Second, they show that the fall in the volatility of 
inflation in the Area, between 1986 and 1994, is associated to the convergence of the 
Area coefficient of response of interest rates to inflation, to the Bundesbank rule's 
coefficient. This led Doménech et al. (2001b) to study their small macroeconomic 
model for the Area - composed of a forward-looking policy rule and hybrid backward-
forward-looking IS and Phillips equations - with data beginning in 1986:I. 
In a framework closer to ours, the recent evidence in De Grauwe and Piskorski 
(2001) seems also to reinforce our hypothesis. They simulate policy and 
macroeconomic outcomes for the Euro Area member-states, in two alternative systems - 
one of targeting weighted national data, and another of targeting aggregate Area data. 
Their simulations, based on a model estimated with 1984-1998 data and policymakers 
preferences calibrated to some alternative sets of preferences, suggest that no significant 
changes in loss and volatility arise from aggregate data targeting - even though their 
estimation period begins eight quarters before ours.11 
 We do not claim, however, that the policy regime that we may identify for the 
aggregate Euro Area between 1986 and 2001 is a good approximation to the current and 
future policy regime of the Area. In search for the reasons behind the volatility trade-off 
improvement by the mid-80s, we intend to document the Area policy regime existing 
before the creation of the EMU, rather than document the EMU policy regime, which 
will most probably be structurally different from the past. 
                                                          
11 Peersman and Smets (1999) estimate optimal Taylor rules for the aggregate of Germany, France, 
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, using data ending in 1997:IV but tracking back to 1975:I, which 
seems less supported by the data and history of the Euro Area. 
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Research - both theoretical and empirical - of the object of policymakers' 
preferences is, undoubtedly, far from exhausted. The value we try to add, in this 
chapter, to ongoing research, can be summarised in four features. 
First, we seek to identify the role played by the emergence of a new monetary 
regime of the aggregate Euro Area in the improvement of the Area volatility trade-off 
after 1985. In order to do so, we use frameworks recently applied to the US case, which 
generate formal estimates of the deep preference parameters of monetary policymakers - 
the central bank loss function - together with the dynamic structure of the macro-
economy - which also determines the second-moments trade-off. Moreover, the 
methods offer some indication about the change in the volatility of supply shocks and in 
the degree of optimality of monetary policy - which influence, respectively, the slope of 
the Taylor trade-off curve, and the position of the economy relative to that efficiency 
frontier. By using frameworks recently applied to the US case, we render comparisons 
of results possible. 
Second, we try to improve on the empirical strategy of Favero and Rovelli 
(2001), and Dennis (2001), in what regards the gap series used in the estimation. 
Following a standard practice in the literature, they use measures of the gap available 
from official sources at the time of their research - the typical alternative being some 
ad-hoc filtering of the raw latest available data. Recently, it has been shown that this 
practice inhibits a correct estimation of policy reaction functions - see Croushore and 
Stark (1999, section VI), Orphanides (2000, 2001a, 2001b) and Nelson and Nikolov 
(2001, 2002).12 The first have reconstructed US real-time data from vintages, or 
snapshots, of data available at quarterly intervals in real-time - an approach also used by 
Egginton et al. (2002) to build a real-time macro data set for the UK. The second and 
third have read the policymakers' real-time perceptions about the state of the economy 
out of Staff forecasts presented to the policy committee, the discussions reported in the 
minutes of the committee meetings, and other policymakers documented statements. 
Here, we can not develop any of these approaches, as we study an Area with no 
aggregate real-time statistical data and a notional central bank, for almost the whole 
                                                          
12 The published version of Croushore and Stark (1999) - Croushore and Stark (2001) - does not include 
Section VI, relative to Taylor rules. More recently, Croushore and Stark (2002) present evidence of other 
type of macroeconomic research that is also not robust to different data-sets, and Stark and Croushore 
(2001) show how the data vintage may matter for forecasting exercises. 
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sample period. Instead, we use a quasi-real-time estimate of the gap: a series computed 
at each quarter with final revised data, but using information of up until that quarter 
only, as described in next section. We argue that this seems to be the best that can be 
achieved to approximate data available to policymakers in real-time, in the case of the 
Euro Area before 1999. 
Third, we offer comparable evidence obtained from the two alternative empirical 
frameworks previously used to study the US case by different researchers. Comparison 
of the results obtained by Favero and Rovelli (2001) to Dennis' (2001), on the US case, 
is not straightforward, because of three main reasons. First, they calibrate the discount 
factor to slightly different values (0.975 and 0.99, respectively). Second, they perform 
estimation with somehow different samples - 1961:I-1979:II versus 1980:III-1998:III in 
Favero and Rovelli, and 1966:I-1979:III versus 1982:I-2000:II in Dennis. Third, they 
use potential output series from different sources - the Bureau of Economic Analysis of 
the U.S Department of Commerce, and the Congregational Budget Office, respectively. 
Differences of this type are not present in this chapter, so that comparing the two 
approaches' results is now possible, for our case. This has two advantages. On one hand, 
it allows for a more robust answer to the questions motivating our research, while, on 
the other, allows for drawing some results of a more methodological nature that can 
prove useful in interpreting the results - including those for the US. 
Fourth, we extend the basic framework used for the US case, by formally testing 
the hypothesis that the policymakers' preferences in the Euro Area may have been 
asymmetric across recessions and expansions. The testing framework brings together 
two strands of the literature that have been dissociated - the estimation of policymakers' 
preferences and the study of asymmetric policy preferences. Specifically, we show that 
the Favero and Rovelli (2001) type of approach can be extended to estimate possibly 
asymmetric policymaker loss functions, for a given specific target of inflation. 
Moreover, in addition to the standard hypothesis of asymmetric reaction of policy to 
inflation and gaps across expansions and recessions, we test the hypothesis of 
asymmetry in interest rate smoothing as a function of the cyclical state of the economy. 
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The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. Section 3.2 presents our structural 
model, describes the data and offers structural stability tests and other useful 
preliminary results. Section 3.3 explains the estimation framework based on optimal 
control, and describes the results. Section 3.4 explains the alternative framework based 
on dynamic programming, summarises the estimation results, and compares them to 
those of the previous section. Section 3.5 presents and applies our method for testing for 
asymmetry in the central bank loss function across recessions and expansions. Section 
3.6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2. A Model for Monetary Policy Analysis of the Euro Area 
3.2.1. Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand 
We model the structure of the Euro Area macro-economy with a simple 
backward-looking aggregate-supply/aggregate-demand system similar to the one 
applied by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), and Rudebusch (2001a) to US data.  
The model, in its original form for quarterly data, is given by:13 
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where x represents the gap, π  is inflation, and i stands for nominal short-term 
interest rate. The first equation is an IS relation - representing aggregate demand -, 
linking the output gap to its lags, to the average of the real interest rate during the 
previous four quarters, and to a stochastic demand shock. The second equation is a 
Phillips relation - representing aggregate supply -, linking the inflation rate to its lags, to 
the lagged output gap and to a stochastic supply shock. 14 
Their motivation for using this model was threefold.15 First, tractability and 
transparency of results; Second, good fit to recent US data; Third, proximity to many 
                                                          
13 Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), page 207. 
14 See Fair (2001c) for one of the most extensive criticisms of this model, on the grounds that it is not 
enough empirically based.  
15 Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) pages 205-207. 
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policymakers' views about the dynamics of the economy, and to the spirit of many 
policy-oriented macro-econometric models, including some models used by central 
banks. The essence of this view is that the short-term interest rate is the policy 
instrument, output gaps are the main real indicator, monetary policy acts with a 
transmission lag, and aggregate supply is represented by a short-run Phillips curve with 
adaptive expectations and conforming to the natural rate hypothesis. 
Our own reasons for using this model are essentially three, besides their first and 
third motivations. 
First, it has been widely used in recent empirical studies of monetary policy 
rules or regimes. This includes, for the US case (besides the above cited), Orphanides 
(1998), Ball (1999), Favero and Rovelli (1999, 2001), Ozlale (2000), Dennis (2001), 
and Meyer et al (2001), and, for European countries, Peersman and Smets (1998, 1999), 
Taylor (1999c), Clausen and Hayo (2002 a, b), and Aksoy et al. (2002). The intensive 
use of the model does not mean that the problem of finding a simple macro-econometric 
model that effectively represents actual developed economies is solved - see the 
discussions in Cukierman (2001) and Fair (2001c). Rather, it is due to its reasonable 
theoretical and empirical properties - from which Goodhart (2000) stresses the realistic 
inclusion of monetary transmission lags. In addition, using it may facilitate useful 
comparison to results obtained elsewhere in the literature. 
Second, even though most of the studies using the model relate to the US, it 
could be argued that the structural behaviour of the Euro Area may be broadly similar to 
that of the US economy, as both are large and relatively closed economies - see 
Rudebusch and Svensson (2002). Particularly supportive of this argument is Agresti and 
Mojon's (2001) finding that the business cycle of the aggregate Euro Area is highly 
comparable to the US business cycle in a number of respects. And, similarly, Angeloni 
et al.'s (2002) findings that the Euro-wide responses of output and inflation to monetary 
policy actions are quite close to those generally reported for the US. In fact, both 
Peersman and Smets (1998, 1999) and Taylor (1999c) had estimated this small model 
with aggregate data from a core of EMU countries, obtaining statistical fits comparable 
to the ones for the US. Aksoy et al. (2002) estimate the model with data of the 11 EMU 
states, augmenting the baseline model with an effect from the trade weighted average of 
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the output gap of the rest of the EMU members, to each member-state gap in its IS 
equation. 
Third, this model is particularly appropriate in our case, because the 
unemployment gap series that we use has been computed within a system that features a 
Phillips equation similar to the one in this model - see chapter 2. 
 
Data and model identification 
Model (3.1) has been identified for US data. We now identify the specific 
formulation of this model that best fits our Euro Area aggregate data. The data are 
quarterly aggregate time-series for the Euro Area beginning in 1972:II and ending in 
2001:II. 
The inflation rate is the annualised GDP inflation, computed as 4 times the first 
differences of the log of quarterly GDP deflator. Our proxy for exogenous supply 
shocks is the deviation of imported inflation from domestic inflation, computed as 4 
times the first difference of the log of the quarterly imports deflator of the Area minus 
the annualised domestic inflation rate. The nominal short-term interest rate is the 
quarterly average of the 3-month interest rate EURIBOR. For 1970-1998, the source is 
the Area Wide Model Database published in Fagan et al (2001), whilst for subsequent 
periods compatible updates are taken from several issues of the ECB's Monthly 
Bulletin. 
The unemployment gap is measured in percentage points and computed as the 
NAIRU minus actual unemployment rate at each quarter, so that positive values 
correspond to expansions. It is an update of the series computed in chapter 2, from an 
unobserved components model featuring the Phillips (with adaptive expectations) and 
Okun relations as main measurement equations, estimated by maximum likelihood 
using the Kalman filter. The update, due to the 4 additional observations for 2000:III-
2001:II, did not change the model identification nor the estimates of its main 
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parameters, so that the behaviour of the unsmoothed unobserved components remains 
fairly unchanged.16 
Our gap series has thus been obtained in a system with a Phillips equation 
similar to the one in this chapter, and is not a full-sample estimate.17 Rather, it is the 
optimal estimate of the gap at each time period, given the identified model and the 
available information until that period - as it is given by the kalman filter updating 
equations, not by the end of sample smoother.18 Hence, we depart from the standard 
practice in the literature - Favero and Rovelli (2001), Dennis (2001) - of using some 
estimate of the gap obtained from an official source and available at the time of 
research. These departures may significantly enhance the consistency of the empirical 
exercise. First, the consistency in the supply-side modelling may reduce the probability 
of spurious regression problems. Second, the use of a quasi-real-time estimate of the 
gap approximates the policymakers' real-time perceptions about the state of the 
economy that are behind their actual policy decisions and, thus, allows for a better 
estimation of their preferences.19 
Orphanides (2000, 2001 a, 2001 b, 2002) has shown that using real-time data is 
crucial for the ex-post evaluation of US monetary policy. As Orphanides (2001 b, page 
7) writes,  
                                                          
16 Differently, the smoothed unemployment gap would change significantly at the sample's last periods 
even though the parameters' estimates do not change, because of the statistical revision effect - see the 
discussions in chapter 2. 
17 Ball and Tchaidze (2002) analyse the Federal Reserve policy performance in 1987-1995, and 1996-
2000, estimating Taylor rules with an unemployment gap computed as actual unemployment minus an 
average of real-time time-varying NAIRUs, estimated by several researchers using unobserved 
components models with the Phillips equations as main measurement equation. 
18 Muscatelli et al (2000) adopt a similar approach in their estimation of forward-looking Taylor rules, 
concerning the gap and inflation expectation series they use. Actually, both are estimated using a 
structural time-series approach and the kalman filter, implying that each period observations use data 
relative to the past and present only, and not full sample information, which is closer to the information 
available to policymakers when deciding interest rates. 
19 Assuming that the policymaker uses our trend-cycle decomposition model and limits its information to 
the series in the model, there are essentially two differences between our quasi-real time estimates and 
strict real-time estimates. First, real-time estimates are published with a lag and are provisional, that is, 
they are subject to subsequent revisions - which Dynan and Elmendorf (2001), for instance, have shown 
to generate quite significant changes in the US output data, especially around troughs. Second, real-time 
estimates may be affected by changes in the model identification and/or parameter estimates. Hence, the 
estimate for any quarter may be revised whenever new data is available and the model is re-estimated. As 
discussed in the text, the only way of unravelling the true policymakers' real-time perceptions would be to 
analyse the information in data actually used in policy committee meetings, which is not possible in our 
research. 
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"(…) this practice [of relying on ex-post constructed data as proxies for 
the information available to policymakers] can lead to misleading 
descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behaviour suggested by 
information available to policymakers in real time. (…) the main 
difficulty arises from the fact that monetary policy decisions are based 
and reflect policymaker perceptions of the state of the economy at the 
time policy is made." 
The estimated policy reaction functions in Orphanides (2001 b, 2002) suggest 
that US monetary policy during the 70s great inflation was not significantly different 
from the 80-90s long boom policy, in what regards the response of interest rates to 
inflation forecasts. Rather, the 70s Great Inflation seems to have been the result of a too 
activist response of policy to real-time potential output measures that were known to be 
over optimist only much later.20  
For the UK case, Nelson and Nikolov (2001) develop an approach similar to 
Orphanides' to infer real-time policymakers' perceptions of the state of the economy. 
They show that the UK's Great Inflation has been caused, in part, by an overvaluation of 
potential output in real-time during the 70s - like in the US case, because policymakers 
failed to correctly evaluate in real-time the negative trend productivity shocks of the late 
60s and early 70s.21 Then, in Nelson and Nikolov (2002), they show that the full 
explanation combines the real-time gap measurement error with policymakers behaving 
with monetary policy neglect - the latter explaining a larger part of the rise in inflation 
during the 70s.22 
Orphanides uses as real-time data the forecasts included in the Greenbook by the 
Fed Board Staff, for each Fed Open Market Committee meeting, prepared during the 
middle month of each quarter. He complements this information with the estimates of 
potential output prepared by the President's Council of Economic Advisors, which he 
                                                          
20 Orphanides (2001 b) pages 7-8, 12-13, 17-22. Orphanides (2001 b, footnote 13, page 14) suggests that 
this misperception of the change in the path of trend productivity may have been a widespread 
phenomenon and thus explain the generalised increase in inflation in most developed countries in the 70s 
and its decline during the 80s. 
21 Note that the UK's Great Inflation is longer than the US, having been identified as early as in 1965 (the 
year of the first documented reference to "stagflation") and having a last episode still as recently as in 
1990 - see Nelson and Nikolov (2002). 
22 Their concept of monetary policy neglect means, in short, that because of a widespread believe that 
inflation was a cost-push phenomenon and that monetary policy would be ineffective in controlling it, 
policy featured a too low response of interest rates to inflation and a too large response to (misperceived) 
gaps. Moreover, monetary policy tended to target an average real interest rate below the natural interest 
rate - which Nelson and Nikolov modelled as an intercept misalignment of the UK's policy rule during 
most of the 70s. 
 120
argues were treated as data by the Fed Board Staff until 1980.23 In Orphanides (2002), 
he shows that a one-sided moving average of real-time unemployment data would 
generate compatible unemployment gap real-time estimates. Perez (2001) confirmed 
Orphanides' result, estimating rules with data from the Greenbook combined with the 
real-time data set constructed by Croushore and Stark (1999). Remarkably, this finding 
contradicts those in Clarida et al (2000) and Taylor (1999 a), who, differently, use 
ex-post data. However, Mehra (2001) finds that during the 70s the US Fed does seem to 
have violated the Taylor principle, with estimation using solely the real-time data set of 
Croushore and Stark (1999). In this chapter, we can not adopt approaches similar to 
those of Orphanides, Perez, Croushore-Stark, Mehra, Nelson and Nikolov, and Egginton 
et al, so we adopt a time-series approach, motivated by our use of the kalman filter to 
estimate the gap.24 
Figure 3.3 shows the significant differences between the ex-post (smoothed) gap 
and our quasi-real time (unsmoothed) series. That difference is the quasi-real time gap 
measurement error, or uncertainty, faced by policymakers. The volatility and 
persistence properties of our quasi-real time uncertainty series are in line with the range 
of values in Orphanides et al. (2000) and Rudebusch (2001a, 2002b) for their real-time 
measurement errors. Specifically, a standard error of 0.41 percentage points (versus 0.5 
to 1 percentage point in Orphanides and Rudebusch), and a first-order auto-regressive 
root estimated at 0.94 (versus 0.75 to 0.95). Our quasi-real time measurement error is 
also compatible with the uncertainty around the NAIRU estimates obtained by Monte 
Carlo integration in chapter 2 - average root of mean square error of 0.6 percentage 
points. Hence, we believe that our measure approaches fairly well the real-time measure 
that, unfortunately, we can not know. 
 
 
                                                          
23 See Taylor (2000) for a criticism of this procedure. Note that no reconstruction of real-time data can be 
immune to criticism. 
24 Coenen et al. (2001) study the profile of revision of the main macroeconomic variables in the Euro 
Area during 1999 and 2000, using the numbers published in the ECB Monthly Bulletin. As each bulletin 
edition uses information available up to some days before a Governing Council meeting, they consider 
the first publication of a variable number for a specific month/quarter as its first provisional estimate and, 
thus, its real-time estimate available to policymakers. Their method is feasible, and should be highly 
helpful in future research on EMU policymaking with real-time data. 
 121
Figure 3.3  - Unsmoothed versus Smoothed Unemployment Gap 
1972:1-2001:2 
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Preliminary individual least squares regressions and full information maximum 
likelihood estimation of the system suggest - on the basis of individual significance 
statistics - that the specification that best adjusts the Rudebusch-Svensson model to our 
quarterly Euro Area data is the following:25 
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Our model differs from the original Rudebusch-Svensson formulation in several 
details. First, in the Phillips equation, the unemployment gap explains inflation 
contemporaneously, not lagged. Second, in that equation, we consider a supply shock 
measured by the deviation of imported inflation from domestic inflation, in the previous 
period. This exogenous shock is included for compatibility with the Phillips equation 
used in chapter 2 to estimate the time-varying NAIRU, and means that our version of 
the Rudebusch-Svensson model is not one of a completely closed economy, differently 
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25 Differently, Taylor (1999 c) and Peersman and Smets (1999) estimate the specification identified by 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) for the US case, using weighted data of selected European countries. 
from the versions typically used for US studies. Third, in the IS equation, we find that it 
takes 3 quarters for the real interest rate changes to begin impacting on the gap, and that 
no statistical gains are obtained by considering a moving average of real interest rates. 
Fourth, in that equation, we find that the gap, lagged by three periods, is statistically 
significant, meaning that our gap measure has more persistence than the measures of the 
US gap used by Rudebusch and Svensson. 
The real interest rate effect, in the IS equation, is clearly statistically significant, 
so we have no need to extend it with financial variables, contrary to what Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2000) find in their developed countries sample.26 
Interestingly, our identification implies a pattern of transmission of monetary 
actions to the gap that is similar to that in Peersman and Smets (2001b), in spite of the 
marked differences in empirical method and data.27 It is also compatible with Angeloni 
et al.'s (2002) extensive reading of the evidence on the Euro Area transmission of 
monetary policy. Specifically, interest rate changes affect output temporarily, with 
effects peaking at more or less one year, while inflation hardly moves during the first 
year and, then, gradually falls over the subsequent few years.28 
 
Structural Stability Tests 
One potential problem with this model is that, in theory, it is subject to the Lucas 
(1976) critique. In fact, if the true dynamic behaviour of inflation and the gap includes 
forward-looking elements - as dynamic general equilibrium analysis and the New 
                                                          
26 More recently, Goodhart and Hofmann (2002) estimate backward-looking IS equations for the G7 
countries including several detrended financial variables, in addition to the real interest rate, namely real 
exchange rates, real house prices and real equity prices. They find all these statistically significant and 
argue that the optimal monetary policy rule given by a model without property and equity prices in its IS 
function yelds significantly higher loss than would be obtained from an IS equation including those 
financial variables, if the true model does include them. 
27 Peersman and Smets (2001b) estimate identified VARs with quarterly series of the AWMD, from 1980 
to 1998. Their endogenous variables are the levels of real GDP, consumer price index, 3 month nominal 
interest rates, M3 and of the real effective exchange rate (all in logs except for interest rates). The 
exogenous variables they consider are a world commodity price index, US real GDP and the US short-
term interest rate. Note that actual real output is used instead of an output gap measure, and that it is the 
log of the price level that is used rather than its changes. 
28 See McAdam and Morgan (2001) and van Els et al. (2001), inter alia, for overviews and experiments 
with the transmission of monetary policy actions in the Euro Area within large-scale macro-econometric 
models. 
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Keynesian theory prescribes -, the reduced form coefficients of this backward-looking 
model are not stable when the monetary policy rule changes. 
Simulations in Lindé (2000) suggest that the Lucas critique may be 
quantitatively important for the Rudebusch-Svensson model, both statistically and 
economically. He generated artificial data from a version of Cooley and Hansen (1995) 
real business cycle model, augmented by four alternative nominal money growth policy 
rules, and found that changing the rule at the middle of the data-set caused the model 
coefficients to change with higher probability than usual significance levels.29 
In complete contrast, Rudebusch (2002a) simulations suggest that the empirical 
relevance of the Lucas critique is not significant. He generated data from several New 
Keynesian models, with varying degrees of forward-looking behaviour and discrete 
shifts between alternative policy rules calibrated to mimic estimates typical of the US 
post-war literature, finding that the model reduced form coefficients would only appear 
unstable in rather extreme and unrealistic parameterisations. Estrella and Fuhrer (1999) 
had previously offered estimation results pointing to the same conclusion. With US 
quarterly data for 1966-1997, they estimated the Rudebusch-Svensson model, a 
forward-looking New Keynesian model with Roberts' (1995) Phillips equation and 
McCallum and Nelson's (1999b) IS equation, and, finally, a similar forward-looking 
model with persistent errors - closing all the models with a similar Taylor rule equation. 
Then, they computed likelihood ratio tests for structural instability of unknown timing 
of the system, failing to reject stability of the backward-looking model, while rejecting 
it in both versions of the forward-looking models. 
As Estrella and Fuhrer (1999) note, since the Lucas critique is an empirical 
matter, every model should be tested for stability before being used for policy analysis. 
Following this advice, we put our model to test for structural stability over the entire 
                                                          
29 This does not imply that purely forward-looking, optimising, IS-Phillips models should be preferred in 
actual empirical studies. In fact, Lindé (2001b) sheds some light on this issue, by estimating the three 
possible alternative versions of the IS-Phillips model - entirely backward-looking, entirely forward-
looking and hybrid backward-forward-looking - using data simulated from a calibrated dynamic general 
equilibrium model with flexible prices and completely forward-looking properties. His main findings are 
twofold. First, GMM estimation of the system can actually detect that forward-looking behaviour is more 
important than backward-looking behaviour (weighting 0.7 in both IS and Phillips equations), in contrast 
to the empirical results from US data, which attribute more weight to backward-looking behaviour. 
Second, structural instability due to policy regime changes is not easier to detect in the forward-looking 
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sample 1972:I-2001:II. We skip stability tests for each equation individually and 
analyse the structural stability of our model when estimated by full information 
maximum likelihood. One reason is that a system approach to stability analysis 
improves the econometric ability of detecting breaks. A second reason is that we'll be 
using the system and not individual equations in our estimation of policymakers' 
preferences.30 
We analyse structural stability with the Andrews and Fair (1988, equation 3.6, 
page 623) Wald statistic for testing pure structural change - that is, a significant change 
in all the coefficients in the model.31 Because we do not have any clear a-priori about 
the timing of possible structural breaks, the analysis is placed within the Andrews 
(1993) framework for testing parameter instability with unknown change point. 
Specifically, the relevant statistic is Andrews' (1993, equations 4.1 and 4.2, page 835)  
)(sup π
π T
W
Π∈
 
where  is a set with closure in (0,1). Following Andrews' suggestion, which is well 
suited for our sample size and number of coefficients, we set the trimming at 15 percent, 
thus defining 
Π
)85.0,15.0(=Π , which amounts to give up 16 observations at each end 
of the sample. Actually, the 16 observations trim is the minimum possible, because we 
are estimating 12 parameters and the model is estimated conditional on 4 lagged 
observations of inflation (and 3 of the gap). Accordingly, we compute the sequence of 
the Wald statistic as function of all possible break-dates within this interval and 
compare the sup W statistic with the critical value given in Andrews (1993, table I, page 
840). We have checked that the regressions are globally statistically significant for both 
sub-samples near the trimming points, in order to make sure that relevant regressions 
were being compared. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
model than in the backward-looking model. Lindé concludes that both results are evidence against the use 
of purely forward-looking models of equilibrium (flexible prices and no real frictions). 
30 Stability analysis in US applications of the model have typically been conducted with single equation 
least squares estimation - see Rudebusch's (2001a) and Rudebusch and Svensson's (1999, 2002). 
31 On this statistic, see also Hamilton (1994, pages 424-426) and Greene (2001, pages 292-293). As is 
well-known, in spite of the asymptotic equivalence between this statistic and the alternatives (likelihood-
ratio and lagrange multiplier), in finite samples the Wald statistic is typically larger, which means that it 
is the most severe test statistic of this class, that is, tends to reject the null more often. 
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Figure 3.4.A displays (in log scale) the Andrews and Fair (1988) Wald statistic 
sequence for testing a pure break in the model, together with the adequate Andrews 
(1993) critical value (for a model with 12 coefficients, 15 percent trimming, and 5 
percent of significance). The figure shows that the supW statistic has a value around 
898 at 1997:II, which is remarkably above the 30.16 Andrews (1993) critical value. 
Thus, there is strong empirical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no structural 
change in our IS/Phillips model for the period 1972-2001. 
This result is in sharp contrast with the failure to reject stability typically 
obtained in the US case - see Rudebusch (2001a), Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) and, 
with mixed forward-backward-looking equations, Rudebusch (2002b). However, these 
studies perform tests covering breakpoints only until the end of 1992, at most, so they 
could be missing more recent structural breaks. For instance, with our data, the test 
statistic only begins exceeding the critical value in 1993:III. 
In order to assess whether the structural break harms our hypothesis of a new 
monetary regime from 1986 on, we proceed to the estimation of the break-date. 
Following Hansen (2001), we estimate the timing of the structural break by least 
squares, because of the limitations of the Wald statistic for that estimation - see Hansen 
(2001, section 3). Specifically, we take as an estimate of the break-date the sample split 
that minimises the sum of square residuals (over the middle 70 percent of the sample), 
that is, the split that minimises the sum of the variance of sub-sample 1 and 2 residuals. 
Figure 3.4.B depicts such variances for the Phillips and the IS equation, when they are 
jointly estimated by FIML. The residual variances are minimised at the same quarter for 
both equations - 1995:II - which is clearly due to the interactions between aggregate 
demand and supply in the model. Figures 3.4.A and 3.4.B indicate that, if we restrict our 
analysis to the 1977-1995 period in search of another significant structural break in the 
model, the best candidate seems to be 1983. Hence, the stability tests results are not 
incompatible with the hypothesis of a stable monetary regime beginning in 1986, but 
suggest that the structural behaviour of the Euro Area economy changed significantly in 
1995.32 
                                                          
32 We have checked whether the results are quantitatively different if we specify the IS function 
considering the average of the real interest rate during the four previous quarters, instead of the real rate 
lagged by three quarters. This formulation - the original Rudebusch-Svensson IS model devised for US 
data - would probably be more robust to some changes in the lag structure of the effects of the real 
 126
Figure 3.4 A - Model Stability Analysis, Andrews' Wald Test for Structural 
Change of Unknown Timing;  
IS, Phillips Jointly Estimated by FIML, 1977:I-1997:II 
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interest rate over spending throughout the sample. The results were, however, fairly similar to those 
above reported in the text and figures: there is evidence of a structural break, which is estimated at 1995:I 
for the IS and 1996:III for the Phillips equation. 
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The structural break in 1995 is perhaps associated to changes in the Area 
economy ahead of the 1999 EMU. It is hardly surprising that these changes are 
statistically significant around three and a half years in advance, in view of the well-
known nominal convergence process and, also, as it seems sensible that such deep 
changes are anticipated and gradual. 
It could be argued that in view of the stability tests results, the estimates should 
be restricted to the period 1986-1995. However, we estimate the new monetary regime 
with 1986-2001 data. We do so for two main reasons. First, because of data scarcity: 34 
quarters of data (the 38 quarters of 1986:I-1995:II, minus 4 quarters needed for the 
model initialisation), covering only one business cycle, would hardly offer comfortable 
degrees of freedom in estimation. Second, because we believe that every regime switch 
is gradual. At times, in our empirical analysis, we check these arguments, comparing the 
results that would come out of estimation with data truncated at 1995:II, with those of 
our baseline period 1986:I-2001:II. As discussed below, estimation is very problematic 
most of those times, apparently because of insufficiency of data, but when possible, 
generates results that are not dramatically different. What our results suggest, instead, is 
that the estimation of the EMU policy regime may combine post 1999 data with data 
beginning already in 1995:III - which may be useful for future research, in view of the 
data scarcity problem. In this regard, the use of monthly data may be especially useful 
in future research focusing on the EMU policy regime, to enhance the degrees of 
freedom in its estimation. Monthly data would also be suitable in view of the twice-a-
month periodicity of the ECB's Governing Council, as it could lead to several interest 
rate changes within some quarters. 
 
Preliminary Monetary Regime Evidence: Taylor Rules 
As a first approximation to our problem, we report in Appendix 1 the results of 
estimation of a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule of the kind suggested by 
Clarida et al. (1998), with the Euro Area data for 1972:I-2001:II.  
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The results in table A3.2 clearly show that there is a structural break in the Area 
forward-looking Taylor rule at 1985:IV. 33 They also show that actual monetary policy 
can be well described by such a Taylor rule during 1986:I-2001:II, but not before.34 The 
results are illustrated in figures A3.1-A3.3.  
The estimated rule for the period since 1986:I has a coefficient of 2.37 on one-
year-ahead expected inflation and a partial adjustment coefficient of 0.77. This rule 
suggests that the 1986:I-2001:II policy regime in the Euro Area has been one of strict 
inflation targeting, as the coefficient on the gap is not statistically significant. However, 
if past unemployment gaps are excluded from the instrument set for GMM estimation, a 
significant coefficient on the current gap would be estimated in the Taylor rule, 
meaning that the unemployment gap, while not being a final goal of policy, does bring 
useful information for policymaking. The estimated rule suggests, also, that the notional 
monetary policy of the Area, during 1986:I-2001:II had an element of interest rate 
smoothing, as the estimated partial adjustment coefficient is high and statistically 
significant. Whether the (typically observed) partial adjustment in interest rates has any 
economic content, or, instead, merely reflects econometric problems such as error-in-
variables or omitted variable problems, is still an open issue - which will also be of 
relevance below in this chapter, when discussing the specification of the central bank 
loss function. 
Figure A.3.4 shows that, if the 1986-2001 policy rule had been followed during 
1972-1985, actual short-term interest rates would have been much higher than they 
actually were, especially in the last seven years of the 70s. 
The Appendix shows that, for the case of the period 1986-2001 in the Euro 
Area, the Taylor rule framework does not estimate precisely the inflation target, and 
illustrates the inability of the framework to estimate the policymakers' structural 
                                                          
33 We include a Andrews and Fair (1988) Wald test for a structural break in the rule. Fair (2000, 2001a) 
criticises the Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) type of empirical strategy for not offering formal tests of the rule 
structural stability, arguing that the changes in coefficients found in the US case after 1982, though 
economically relevant, are not statistically significant. 
34 In addition to the political and macroeconomic arguments, operational factors too imply that it would 
be highly implausible that a clear monetary regime is apparent in the data before the 80s. In fact, by then 
German monetary policy was based in three tools other than short-term interest rates - reserve 
requirements, discount-window quotas and the Lombard rate - see Bernanke and Mihov (1997). Hence, 
empirical studies that assume short-term interest rates as the policy instrument and indicator are not at all 
likely to detect any significant policy regime prior to the 1980s. 
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preference parameters - see also the discussion in chapter 1, section 1.3.3.. In order to 
accomplish that task, we must include the central bank loss function in our model and 
write it in an empirically suited form, which is what we now proceed to do. 
 
3.2.2. Central Bank Loss Function 
Following the standard assumption in the literature, we model central bank 
(policymakers) preferences with an inter-temporal loss function that is quadratic on the 
variability of inflation and the gap around their desired levels (π* and 0), as well as of 
the change in interest rates, with future values discounted at rate δ.35 

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Flexible Inflation Targeting 
The inclusion of the gap variability in L is a broad formulation that is generally 
considered compatible with the statutes of most modern central banks, such as the US 
Fed, which have a priority commitment to price stability but also some second order 
objective about growth and employment.36 Svensson (2001c) argues that even formal 
Inflation Targeting regimes are dual, because once the inflation target is chosen, policy 
minimises the deviations of inflation and output from their targets. 
However, the ECB statutes, similarly to the Bundesbank's, are not entirely 
clear on the significance that real activity stabilisation has in its legal mandate, as they 
merely state that (Chapter II, article 2º) 
                                                          
35 We assume that the relevant arguments in the Euro Area policymaker loss function are variables of the 
aggregate Area, deliberately disregarding the possibility that nation-level economic performance might 
affect the decisions of some or all members of the Governing Council (GC). Meade and Sheets (2002) 
study the decisions of the ECB GC between March 1999 and August 2001 and find evidence not 
incompatible with a regional bias hypothesis. Aksoy et al. (2002) study the effects of different policy 
decisions procedures by the ECB's GC. They simulate four procedures, combining Area-wide versus 
national-level concerns by ECB Board members and Governors of national central banks: a nationalistic 
rule, a consensual procedure, an ECB-rule, and an EMS-rule. Investigating this topic is, however, beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
36 We do not explore Walsh (2001b) suggestion that what monetary authorities - at least the US Fed - 
monitor is the growth in demand relative to growth in potential, which corresponds not to the gap but to 
its changes. 
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“[…] the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. 
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability it shall support the 
general economic policies in the Community […]” 
Moreover, the ECB Governing Council, when announcing its stability-oriented 
monetary policy strategy, clarified that (ECB, 1998, article 2º) 
"As mandated by the Treaty establishing the European Community, the 
maintenance of price stability will be the primary objective of the ESCB. 
Therefore, the ESCB's monetary policy strategy will focus strictly on this 
objective." 
This led some authors – for instance, Goodhart (1998) – to argue that output is 
not supposed to enter the true ECB objective function.  
However, Goodhart recognises that there are two good reasons for the gap to 
enter any central bank's revealed preferences. First, current inflation and gap are the 
critical variables for forecasting future inflation – which is the actually targeted variable 
in contemporary policy regimes, due to the lags in policy implementation and 
transmission. Second, because of the variability trade-off, central banks must react to 
supply shocks with an eye on output, avoiding too fast a reversion of inflation to its 
target, as the lagged effects of a sharp monetary policy can lead to excessive output and 
instrument instability - see Goodhart (2000).37 A third reason for the unemployment (or 
output) gap to enter specifically the ECB's loss function derives from the finding by 
Begg et al. (2002) that cyclical output seems to lead cyclical inflation, in the Euro Area, 
by about 2 to 3 quarters. 
On the contrary, there are relevant reasons that may justify that policymakers, 
in general, concentrate their forecasting and monitoring efforts in inflation. First, there 
certainly are difficulties in the estimation of output or unemployment gaps, implying 
very large uncertainty surrounding contemporary real gap estimates - see chapter 2 and 
the references therein. This is the reason behind McCallum's (2001a) argument that 
monetary policy should not respond strongly to output gaps. Second, empirical evidence 
suggests that official output growth forecasts are significantly less accurate than 
inflation forecasts produced by the same sources - see the recent evidence for 13 
European countries in Oller and Barot (2000). 
                                                          
37 In the policy reaction function's literature there are arguments contrasting with Goodhart's views. For 
instance, Batini and Haldane (1999) offer evidence suggesting that feed-back policy rules based on 
inflation forecasts are output-encompassing. 
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All summed-up, we choose to specify our baseline loss, L, according to a 
flexible inflation targeting regime (Svensson, 1997), because it nests the strict inflation 
targeting case - King's (1997) inflation nutter, minimising inflation volatility and not the 
gap variance, considered unrealistic by Svensson (2001b, c). Hence, we let our 
empirical evidence freely discriminate which of these systems fits better the revealed 
preferences of the Euro Area notional policymaker during 1986-2001.38 
 
Interest Rate Smoothing 
Theoretical central bank loss functions assume that inflation and some activity 
gap are the only final goals of policy - see Cukierman (1992) and Walsh (1998). 
However, optimal interest rates simulated from models with such loss functions are 
substantially more volatile than actual short-term interest rates. Hence, following the 
standard practice in the literature, we consider a loss function in which the policymaker 
also dislikes variations in the policy instrument, the nominal short-term interest rates. 
This accounts for the well documented fact that central banks change interest rates in 
small discrete steps in the same direction over extensive periods, and reverse the path of 
rates only infrequently - see, for instance, Rudebusch (1995), Goodhart (1996, 1998), 
Lowe and Ellis (1998) and Sack and Wieland (2000). And accounts for the evidence 
that, moreover, the persistence in rates surpasses the serial correlation in the typical 
policy goal variables (inflation and gap) - see Sack (2000). Similarly, the policy rules 
literature shows that allowing for partial adjustment in the interest rate is a necessary 
condition for a good fit of forward-looking estimated policy reaction rules - see Clarida 
and Gertler (1997) and Clarida et al. (1998).39 
A large research effort has been devoted to devising the foundations of interest 
rate smoothing, and the literature offers five explanations for partial adjustment of 
interest rates by optimising central banks - see the reviews by Lowe and Ellis (1998), 
Sack and Wieland (2000), Srour (2001), and Cobham (2001). 
                                                          
38 Throughout this chapter we use the expression inflation targeting in a broad sense, meaning that 
monetary policy is clearly committed to a goal of price stability, from which it does not deviate because 
of other possibly existing goals. Neither the Bundesbank nor the ECB, at the time we write, could be 
considered inflation targeters in the strict institutional sense defined, for instance, in Svensson (2001b), 
most especially because of failure to meet the transparency and accountability criteria. 
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First, central banks smooth rates in order to promote financial stability. 
According to this explanation, central banks are concerned not only with 
macroeconomic management (inflation and activity stabilisation), but also with a third 
final policy goal - the stability of the financial system - and must trade-off both - see 
Cukierman (1992)40, Rudebusch (1995), Goodhart (1996), Lowe and Ellis (1998) and 
Mishkin (1999). Frequent, abrupt or erratic changes in interest rates would harm banks 
profits and generate additional volatility in securities markets, both of which are very 
sensitive to interest rates changes. Hence, the probability of a financial crisis is 
minimised, cæteris paribus, by interest rates smoothing. 
Second, smoothing short-term rates is the best way to achieve final goals of 
macro policy, because of the environment of forward-looking agents, as firstly suggested 
by Goodfriend (1991) and developed by Woodford (1999) - see also Levin et al (1999), 
Goodhart (1996, 1998) and Sack and Wieland (2000). If agents are forward-looking in a 
manner that output and prices do not react to changes in day-to-day rates, but only to 
changes in longer term rates (short and medium term rates), then the monetary authority 
should not change short-term rates frequently. A policy moving interest rates gradually 
induces, at each rate change, expectations of additional future interest rate movements, 
and that allows agents to anticipate the path of longer-term rates, thus affecting their 
demand decisions. Then, the authority ends up performing better in terms of stabilising 
output and prices, while maintaining a low level of volatility of the short-term interest 
rate. This is one of the reasons behind Goodhart (1998) argument that central bankers 
should try to minimise the number of reversals of short-term rates. Lowe and Ellis 
(1998) note also that too frequent directional changes in rates would render ineffective 
the announcement impact of monetary policy actions. 
A third reason for instrument changes to be smooth is that policymakers face 
three important uncertainties when conducting policy - data, parameter and model 
uncertainty. From these, data and model specification uncertainties can not be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
39 Taylor (1999a) does not include partial adjustment in his rules because a moving average of recent past 
inflation is part of the explanatory variables. 
40 Chapter 7, pages 117-135. Cukierman also offers an alternative explanation (the optimal seigniorage 
hypothsesis), where interest rates smoothing are seen as a by-product of a policy attempt to optimise 
seigniorage and other taxes in a way that minimises the present value of the social costs of financing 
public expenditures. 
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summarised by a single probability distribution, thus being more complex than 
parameter uncertainty - see Cagliarini and Heath (2000). 
Gradualism may be a reaction of policymakers to data uncertainty, i.e., in the 
perception that policymakers have about the state of the economy in real-time. This 
uncertainty may be due to publication lags, data revisions and statistical uncertainty in 
estimating potential output (natural rate), which is unobservable - see, among many 
others, Orphanides (1998, 2001a), Orphanides et al (2000), Smets (1999), and Dynan 
and Elmendorf (2001).41 However, the extent to which data uncertainty explains 
instrument smoothing is still unclear, as it has not been possible to disentangle the real-
time measurement error of the policymaker - the conscience of which would generate 
intentional interest rate smoothing - from that of the econometrician. Uncertainty about 
the state of the economy is, perhaps, more clearly an explanation for intentional policy 
gradualism if one has in mind that policy should react to the forecasts of output and 
inflation and not merely to the actual cyclical situation of the economy - Goodhart 
(1996, 1998). These forecasts, formulated some quarters ahead, are inevitably smoother 
than actual data turns out to be, as ex-post data includes the effect of shocks that can not 
be forecasted. Hence, as Goodhart (2000) argues, interest rate data is more persistent 
than actual inflation and gap data, because forecasters underestimate the extent of 
upward/downward pressure on inflation at the start of upswings/downswings.42 
In what regards the structure of the economy, many have argued that gradualism 
is an optimal reaction to uncertainty about parameters and the monetary transmission 
mechanism - see, for instance, Estrella and Mishkin (1998) and Batini et al. (1999). In 
fact, Goodhart (1998) considers parameter uncertainty - known also as Brainard, or 
                                                          
41 One alternative to interest-rate smoothing as a response to uncertainty about the state of the Economy, 
based on non-linear revisions of the NAIRU estimate, has been recently suggested by Meyer et al (2001). 
Coenen et al. (2001) suggest a different approach, based on the possible informational role of money. 
They apply their approach within the Coenen and Wieland (2000) model of the Euro Area, augmented 
with a Coenen and Vega (2001) demand for money and an empirically calibrated model of the revision 
process of aggregate Euro Area output. 
42 A tentative corollary to this reasoning is that we could use a loss function with no imposed rates inertia, 
in empirical analysis, if we had access to the real-time series of inflation and gap expectations that 
policymakers used when deciding policy. However, the controversy on the method of reconstruction of 
real-time gaps for the US - see Taylor (2000), Mehra (2001), and Perez (2001) - suggests that we may be 
a long way from achieving any efficient reconstruction of policymakers' true real-time data. Actually, 
English et al. (2002) estimate backward and forward-looking Taylor-type rules with US data available in 
real-time to policymakers (Croushore and Stark, as well as Orphanides' data) and find that the partial 
adjustment coefficient estimate keeps being positive and significant. 
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multiplicative uncertainty - the central explanation for why interest rates are changed in 
small steps, especially when coupled with long and variable lags of policy 
transmission.43 Empirical studies typically do find parameter uncertainty to significantly 
increase policy gradualism. Most studies, however, suggest that this source of 
uncertainty may have only modest empirical effects, when considered by itself - Debelle 
and Cagliarini (2000), Peersman and Smets (1999) and Rudebusch (2001a) - or even 
when combined with data uncertainty - Sack (2000). 
Blinder (1998) emphasises that the policymaker is typically uncertain about the 
general specification of the model describing the economy and the transmission of 
policy, and suggests that simulations of several alternative models should be averaged 
out to - at least roughly - account for that uncertainty. Cagliarini and Heath (2000) 
formalise an approach to optimal control in which the policymaker wishes to compare 
alternatives under all probability distributions in order to make their decisions, and then 
use a sensible rule to choose the specific interest rate value within the selected interval. 
They report simulations with a model close to Rudebusch-Svensson's showing that their 
approach achieves a good replication of the smoothness in actual interest rates.44 Recent 
empirical work in a similar spirit, by Favero and Milani (2001) and Castelnuovo and 
Surico (2001), is suggestive that model uncertainty could indeed be an important reason 
for the actual interest rate inertia observed in the US case. 
A fourth reason for the existence of interest rate smoothing, is Goodhart's (1996, 
1998) argument that central bankers avoid interest rate changes that they might have to 
                                                          
43 Brainard, multiplicative or coefficient (parameter) uncertainty is the uncertainty beyond that inherent to 
the additive errors (shocks) in model equations, which is the sample uncertainty. With shocks uncertainty 
only, certainty-equivalence holds, that is, policy should be conducted based on the best forecast for the 
shocks, thus using the model coefficients point estimates. In contrast, with parameter uncertainty - 
uncertainty about the specific parameter values, assuming, however, that they are draw from a known 
probability distribution - it is known since Brainard (1967) that certainty-equivalence does not hold and 
gradualism becomes optimal. In short, in a context of parameter uncertainty, large reactions of interest 
rates to inflation shocks increase the variance of inflation, so that policymakers must trade-off between 
immediate correction of the inflation deviation from target (bias) and a good performance in controlling 
its (long-run) variability - recall that E(π2) = [E(π)]2 + var(π). Hence, policymakers do not immediately 
offset entirely the shocks, but leave some residual consequences of shocks to be dealt with during next 
periods. 
44 The results of a literature based on the minimax approach to robust control have been the opposite: 
policies that are robust (in that sense) to general specification model uncertainty tend to be more 
aggressive - see, for instance, Sargent (1999b), and Onatski and Stock (2000). However, Blinder's (1998) 
approach seems to be closer to how actual policymakers in the real world deal with model uncertainty, 
than the minimax approach - see Cagliarini and Heath (2000). Tetlow and Muehlen (2002) recently 
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reverse in some near future because that would be perceived by the public as evidence 
of inconsistency, error or irresolution. Mishkin (1999), Caplin and Leahy (1997), and 
Lowe and Ellis (1998) also join this argument. In a world of uncertain forecasts, central 
banks tend not to change interest rates - especially to raise them - until evidence of 
actual, rather than predicted, shifts in the inflationary pressure are in the public domain. 
This explains the evidence in Goodhart (1996) that short-term rates do not lead inflation 
in recent data of a group of developed countries. 
A fifth reason pointed out in the literature is Rudebusch (2001b) argument that, 
in an era of low inflation, small interest rate changes make it less likely that the zero 
bound of nominal interest rates is reached.45 
In spite of the several arguments above, there seems to be no clear consensus in 
the literature, so far, about the meaning of interest rate smoothing. Specifically, it 
remains an open issue to know if the evidence of partial adjustment of interest rates has 
a structural economic meaning or whether it is merely a sign of econometric problems - 
see Goodhart (1996, 1998), Ball (1999), Rudebusch (2001a, 2001b) and Svensson 
(2001b). Some have argued that the serial correlation of short-term rates could be due to 
the omission of a persistent variable that influences policy - Gerlach and Schnabel 
(2000). Others, like Rudebusch (2001a), have argued that it could be the result of 
persistent measurement errors in the state variables - in which case smoothing may be 
an illusion created, for instance, by the use of final data in empirical research, instead of 
the real-time data used by policymakers. For instance, Mehra (2001) finds no significant 
interest rate smoothing in Taylor-type rules estimated with US 1979:III-1987:IV real-
time data.46 And simulations by Lansing (2002), from a small model calibrated with US 
data properties, suggest that failure to account for the measurement error in the Fed's 
real-time perceptions about potential output can explain as much as half of the apparent 
degree of inertia in the US federal funds rate. However, other researchers as Orphanides 
                                                                                                                                                                          
review certainty-equivalence, versus robust and bayesian control, to conclude that these sophisticated 
techniques do not necessarily improve the policymaker's performance. 
45 Rudebusch (2001a) finds evidence that each of the analysed uncertainties - model structure, 
coefficients, and data - can not, by itself, fully explain the reduced and inertial response of interest rates to 
the economy state, but some combinations of those uncertainties could replicate the stodginess observed 
in historical rules. Data uncertainty seems to be a common element to all those combinations. 
46 However, three features of his Taylor-type rule are unorthodox: i) interest rates respond to lagged (not 
expected future) inflation and gaps; ii) rates also react to a real bond rate; iii) all interest rates data are 
averages of the first month of each quarter. 
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(2001a) and Perez (2001), estimate Taylor rules with US data available in real-time at 
Federal Open Market Committee meetings, and still find large and significant partial 
adjustment coefficients. Rudebusch (2001b) noted the possible confusion between 
partial adjustment and non-inertial rules with serially correlated shocks caused by error-
in-variables problems. In order to support his argument, he argued that the empirical 
evidence from the term structure of interest rates is at odds with the assumption that 
central banks smooth interest rates, because financial markets do not seem to have 
information about interest rates in future quarters, under rational expectations. He then 
suggests that, in policy analysis, rules with partial adjustment should be replaced by 
non-inertial rules with serially correlated shocks. These shocks, reflecting missing 
variable or measurement errors, are observationally equivalent to partial adjustment, but 
do imply the lack of predictability of future quarterly rates that is observed in term 
structure regressions.47 
Empirical evidence from recent research has, however, challenged Rudebusch's 
(2001b) arguments. First, English et al. (2002) derive testable implications of 
Rudebusch's serially correlated errors hypothesis, and the standard partial adjustment 
hypothesis, for an equation explaining the change in actual interest rates with the 
change in the interest rate suggested by the policy rule and lagged actual and rule's 
rates. Their estimates and bootstraps simulations, with US data for 1987:I-2000:IV, 
show that while there are omitted serially correlated errors in estimated policy rules, the 
partial adjustment term in those estimated rules is significant and remains so even once 
serially correlated errors are permitted. Second, Favero (2001b) shows that US interest 
rates for a wide range of maturities co-move with rates for similar maturities obtained 
by simulating forward a small macro model composed of Rudebusch-Svensson IS and 
Phillips relations, and a Taylor rule with a partial adjustment coefficient as large as 
0.92. In short, when rational expectations are replaced by model-consistent, limited 
information, expectations, data in a model with interest rate smoothing does not reject 
the term structure hypothesis. Third, Gourinchas and Tornell's (2001) results on the 
forward-premium puzzle (positive predictable excess returns, another paradox of 
                                                          
47 Rudebusch admits that there may be other hypothesis of reconciliation of the policy rule and term 
structure empirical results. For instance, if expectations of interest rates are not predominantly rational, 
then the term structure estimates can not be interpreted to have the implications they have in Rudebusch's 
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modern finance similar in nature to the term-structure puzzle) also defy Rudebusch's 
arguments. In survey data from the G7, 1986-1995, they find that agents systematically 
under-react to innovations in the interest rates, misperceiving shocks as more transitory 
than they are. Their results document significant market anomalies in the short-run, and 
imply that financial markets data should not be used to derive results, as Rudebusch's 
(2001b), that depend upon the strict validity of rational expectations and perfect market 
clearing. 
 
Before ending this section describing our model for monetary policy analysis in 
the Euro Area, some notes on money and exchange rates are in order. 
Following the currently consensual monetary policy analysis framework - see, 
for instance, McCallum (2001b) -, no monetary aggregate is included in our model. 
That stems from the assumption that money is not relevant for policy, neither as an 
instrument nor as an intermediate target. As a result, though, the model estimated 
coefficients should be interpreted with some caution, since no distinction between 
money supply and money demand surfaces in the model and, thus, some coefficients 
may be reflecting mixed effects from demand and policy changes. 
Some observers could find the assumption of excluding money from policy 
incompatible with the fact that the Bundesbank pursued explicit monetary targets since 
1974, and with the fact that the ECB bases its policy on two pillars, the first being 
actually a monetary aggregate growth targeting - see ECB (1998). However, it has been 
demonstrated that the Bundesbank should be considered much more an inflation targeter 
than a money targeter - see Von Hagen (1995) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997). 
Specifically, its money targets have always been defined as function of some inflation 
target and a projection of potential output growth, and since 1986 its inflation target has 
always been defined at 2 percent per year, the level considered compatible with price 
stability. This is compatible with evidence in Muscatelli et al. (2000), who show that 
monetary aggregates are not statistically significant in forward-looking policy reaction 
functions of the Bundesbank, estimated with inflation expectations and output gaps 
                                                                                                                                                                          
paper. Other instance would be an intermediate degree of partial adjustment together with some serially 
correlated shocks.  
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given by structural time-series models estimated with the kalman filter. Von Hagen 
(1999) has argued that the role of money targets in the Bundesbank framework seems to 
have been merely political, in the sense that they were adopted in order to solve co-
ordination problems at the launching and consolidation of a new monetary regime of 
irrevocable commitment to price stability. The ECB, in turn, has presented the rationale 
for its two-pillar strategy as a way to cope with the uncertainty faced by policymakers, 
with each pillar offering information from two alternative theoretical paradigms of 
inflation, both being useful for monetary policy - ECB (2000). Still, it has recognised 
the difficulties of integrating an active role for money into conventional real economic 
models. Mihov (2001) has found no evidence of relevance of the ECB's first pillar in its 
monetary policy and argued that, like the Bundesbank's, its action can be described as 
forecast inflation targeting. Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) classify the ECB's policy 
first pillar a weak monetary targeting, as money growth is not considered an 
intermediate target variable that should systematically be brought in line with the 
reference value, but one between many reference indicators of the risks to price 
stability.48 Begg et al. (2002) show that the ECB interest rate decisions throughout 
1999-2001 are not significantly correlated to the money growth indicator and the 
association between these variables has the wrong sign. Gali (2002b) reviews the 
arguments in favour and against the relevance of the ECB's first pillar, and argues that 
the case for the money growth pillar is weak. Most notably, he notes that the quantity 
theory identity, behind it, is only one among many relations between nominal and real 
variables holding in the long run, and that the empirical evidence on it is not stronger 
than for several other relations. Moreover, he reviews empirical evidence on the role 
that money might have as second pillar indicator for future inflation, concluding that it 
is far from clear. On one hand, Trecroci and Vega (2000) and Gerlach and Svensson 
(2002) find that, in the Euro Area, nominal money growth does not seem to have any 
marginal forecasting power for future inflation, over the output gap and the real money 
                                                          
48 Recent research has shown that in realistic macroeconomic models monetary targeting performs worse 
than inflation targeting. See Svensson (1997, 1999a, and 1999b) for theoretical examples of such 
research, and Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) for an empirical example. One theoretical framework that 
could be closer to the ECB monetary framework has been recently suggested in Christiano and Rostagno 
(2001). Their monetary authority manages short-term interest rates according to the state of the 
macroeconomy - that is, following a Taylor rule - as long as money growth falls within a specified target 
range, but abandons the interest rate rule for a constant money growth rule if the monetary target range is 
violated. 
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gap. On the other hand, Altimari (2001) suggests that money might be useful to 
anticipate medium term and low frequency trends in Euro Area inflation. Recently, 
Svensson (2002) argues that the long run correlation between money and inflation is 
largely irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy, and recalls non-Euro-Area 
evidence that money growth is a poor predictor of inflation at horizons relevant for 
monetary policy - Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Stock and Watson (1999). He calls 
for an urgent reform of the ECB monetary policy strategy, including the demolition of 
the first pillar. 
Another important feature of our model is the absence of an exchange-rate 
variable, and, thus, the preclusion of the exchange rate as an intermediate or final target. 
Exchange-rates may be a significant argument in policy functions of open economies - 
as shown by Black et al. (1997) for Canada, Batini and Haldane (1999) for the UK and 
Conway et al. (1998) for New Zealand. However, they are less likely to matter in a 
policy rule of a large and relatively closed Area like the Euro Area - see Peersman and 
Smets (1999). The evidence in Clarida and Gertler (1997) indicates that even the 
Bundesbank concerns with the DMark exchange-rate, when conducting monetary 
policy, were essentially related to its importance as a determinant of domestic 
inflationary pressures and not as a final target per se. This is supported by evidence in 
Muscatelli et al. (2000), who show that the exchange-rate is not statistically significant 
in forward-looking policy reaction functions of the Bundesbank. The role of the 
exchange-rate seems to be similar for the ECB, in view of its two-pillar monetary 
strategy definition - see ECB (2000b). In fact, these arguments find validation in a 
recent text by ECB officials, Gaspar and Issing (2002). They state that, being the Area a 
large and closed economy, the Euro exchange rate could neither be an intermediate 
target nor a final objective, but merely one of the variables to be considered when 
assessing the economic situation of the Area and looking at the transmission of policy. 
In our model, we consider these roles of the exchange-rate implicitly through the 
exogenous shock variable in the Phillips curve, which is the lagged deviation of 
imported from domestic inflation. Anyhow, as Angeloni et al. (2002) have argued, the 
transmission of monetary policy in such an Area operates mainly through domestic 
channels. Actually, Clausen and Hayo (2002 a) have recently found that the exchange-
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rate channel does not seem to play a critical role in monetary policy transmission in the 
aggregate of the main Euro Area countries. 
 
3.3. Estimation of Policymakers' Preferences using Optimal Control 
and GMM 
3.3.1. Framework 
 The central bank inter-temporal optimisation problem is: 
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We circumscribe our analysis to a discretionary monetary policy regime, 
implying that the monetary authority solves the optimisation problem in each period, 
sequentially choosing the policy decision that minimises loss given the state of the 
economy in that period and its structural dynamic behaviour. In fact, commitment 
would not be a realistic assumption, in spite of its theoretical superiority, not only in 
view of the historical facts of the Area, but also because the absence of a commitment 
technology is still, nowadays, a practical unsolved problem. 
Adopting the method of Optimal Control to solve this problem - see, inter alia, 
Chiang (1992) - we calculate the first-order conditions for minimisation of loss, which 
lead to the following Euler equation: 
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 In order to estimate this equation it is necessary to truncate its lead polynomials 
at some reasonable temporal horizon. Favero and Roveli (2001) use a 4 quarters 
horizon. Dennis (2001) criticises this choice - which implies 0=δ  for all i  - 5≥
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arguing that most of the impact of monetary policy on inflation happens beyond the 
one-year-ahead horizon. However, three arguments stand in favour of the lead 
truncation of the Euler equation at 4 quarters. 
First, the loss function seems to be more related to Goodhart’s (2000) concept of 
forecast horizon - the horizon of the economic prospects motivating current policy 
decisions -, than to his concept of policy horizon - the date at which the objectives of 
policy are to be obtained, considering the policy transmission lags.49 Simulations in 
Batini and Haldane (1999) suggest that the optimal forecasting horizon is between 3 and 
6 quarters, when annualised quarterly inflation is considered.50 Muscatelli et al. (2000) 
show that estimated forward-looking policy reaction functions for the US, Japan, 
Germany, UK, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand, strongly indicate that actual policy 
decisions involve forecast horizons of inflation not beyond 4 quarters ahead. Boivin and 
Giannoni (2002) find that forward-looking policy reaction functions for the US seem to 
be associated with a forecast horizon of no more than 1 quarter for the gap and 3 
quarters for inflation. Doménech et al. (2001a) find that forecast horizons of 1 quarter 
for inflation and the gap, in the US case, and of 2 quarters for inflation and 1 for the 
gap, in the case of EMU aggregate data, generates the best statistical fit for Clarida et al. 
(1998, 2000) rules. Moreover, it is well known that, as a practical matter, forecasting the 
state of the macro-economy over a medium term is highly difficult, so that many 
macroeconomic projections are formulated for only a one-year-ahead horizon. For 
instance, the projections in the IMF World Economic Outlook of October 2001 include 
forecasts for 2001 and 2002. The OECD reports macroeconomic projections for the 3 
semesters subsequent to the information cut-off date, but its Secretariat analyses the 
range of risks involved in the short-term and provides some information on alternative 
                                                          
49 See Smets (2000) for a study of policy horizons of ECB monetary policy. 
50 The optimal forecast horizon is a function of the relative degree of backward and forward looking 
behaviour of the economy model - if agents were purely forward-looking, policy could react merely to 
current inflation, whilst if they are essentially backward-looking policy should have a longer forecasting 
horizon. For instance, Batini and Nelson (2000) did find smaller optimal horizons in a partly forward-
looking model than in a VAR. The results in Batini and Haldane relate to a model in which backward-
looking behaviour in the Phillips relation dominated forward-looking behaviour, but the latter did exist 
and had a weight of 20 percent. In the Rudebusch-Svensson model used here, agents are purely 
backward-looking, so it could be argued that policy should perhaps be slightly more forward-looking than 
Batini and Haldane's prescription. 
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scenarios.51 In the US, the Greenbook of statistical data available to each Federal Open 
Market Committee meeting only reports consistently forecasts of inflation not more 
than four quarters ahead - see Perez (2001). The Bank of England Inflation Report, 
while including forecasts for GDP growth and inflation that extend into a horizon of 8 
quarters, seems to be closer to a policy horizon exercise, because it typically forecasts 
inflation on target at the end of the 2-year horizon. Actually, the optimal feedback 
horizon must be shorter than the policy horizon: if authorities want to achieve the target 
8 quarters ahead, they must surely react to forecasted deviations of the variable from the 
target at some earlier period.52 In addition, the Report includes an explicit measure of 
the dispersion of the forecasts made by the Policy Committee, showing how it increases 
with the lead.53 Hence, it seems that the truncation used by Favero and Rovelli is in line 
with the forecasting needs and abilities of real-world monetary policy authorities and 
therefore can not be significantly at odds with their actual behaviour, even though their 
theoretical loss function may have an infinite horizon. 
Second, as Favero and Rovelli (2001) have argued, a natural cutting point for the 
future horizon of the Euler equation emerges anyway, even if we consider a theoretical 
infinite horizon loss function. In fact, the weight attached to expectations of future gaps 
and inflation decreases as the time-lead increases, meaning that expectations of the state 
of the economy carry less relevant information for the present conduct of policy as they 
relate to periods further away in the future. 
Finally, expanding the horizon in the Euler equation would complicate it and 
bring collinearities to the system, causing great difficulties to estimation. It is worth 
noting that our option is consistent with the standard practice in the estimation of 
                                                          
51 See, for instance, the Summary of projections, page viii, in OECD (2001), presenting forecasts up until 
the second semester of 2002 with information dating up to May 2001. Recently, Oller and Barot (2000) 
find that, contrary to the first year's projections, the second-year ahead forecasts made by OCDE for 13 
European countries during 1971-1997 appear to contain a (positive) bias. The European Commission 
seems to go slightly further into the future than OECD - see, for instance, European Commission (2001), 
the Supplement A "Economic Trends" of European Economy, nº 10-11, October-November 2001, where 
macroeconomic projections for 2002 and 2003 are published. 
52 Here we are using the forecasting and feed-back horizon as equivalent concepts, even though the latter 
has been developed in the slightly different context of simple policy reaction rules. Specifically, for 
Batini and Nelson (2000), the feed-back horizon is the future period for which authorities should form the 
inflation forecast entering a simple inflation forecast-based policy rule. 
53 See for example the so-called "probability fans" of the GDP and RPIX Inflation projections in the 
Inflation Report of August, Bank of England (2001), pages 47 and 49. The dispersion of the forecasts is 
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forward-looking policy reaction functions. Boivin and Giannoni (2002) truncate the 
forecast horizon at 1 quarter for output and 2 quarters for inflation, while Muscatelli et 
al. (2000) and Orphanides (2001 b) truncate the inflation forecast horizon at 4 quarters. 
Once the Euler equation is truncated at 4 quarters ahead, its partial derivatives 
components can be expressed as functions of the IS and Phillips parameters, thus 
building into the Euler equation the cross-equation restrictions. This ensures that the 
loss function is being properly minimised subject to the constraints given by the 
economy structure. 
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Expanding the partial derivatives, (3.5) turns into 
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Then, the IS, Phillips and Euler equations - respectively, (3.7.), (3.8), and (3.9) - 
can be jointly estimated as a system, generating estimates of the structural parameters c0 
through c10, as well as of the policymakers structural preferences parameters µ, λ and 
π*: 
d
ttttttt eicxcxcxccx +−++++= −−−−− )( 3343322110 π  (3.7) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
based on the time series recent historical variance, which it is then skewed to reflect the balance of risks 
attached to the forecasts by the Committee members' judgement. 
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Following Favero and Rovelli, the ratio -(c0/(-c4)) is the estimate of the real 
equilibrium interest rate. The estimates of µ, λ, and π*, describe the monetary policy 
regime, and allow for answering the question motivating this chapter, namely, whether 
the emergence of a well-defined monetary policy regime had a role in the improvement 
in the volatility trade-off in the Euro Area since 1986. The standard error of the Phillips 
equation residual offers some information about the volatility of supply shocks, and the 
standard deviation of the Euler equation residual is some indication about the optimality 
of monetary policy - i.e. the success of policymakers in setting interest rates close to 
their optimal path. Our interpretation of these two standard errors of estimation is more 
cautious than the interpretations in Favero and Rovelli (2001). Firstly, because, as 
discussed in section 3.2.2, the absence of variables such as money from the model may 
change the meaning of some coefficients and residuals. Secondly, and more specifically 
in respect of the Euler equation standard error, because the estimated deviation of actual 
interest rates from their optimal path may reflect specification problems, which can not 
be disentangled from their possible economic content. 
We replace expectations of inflation and the gap by their actual observations 
and, because the expectations errors pile-up in the Euler equation residuals, we proceed 
to estimate the system with GMM, using lagged values of all the variables in the model 
as instruments.54 This is a suitable way of estimating the system, as it is reasonable to 
assume that policymakers are rational - within the model - and, when optimising, use all 
the available information efficiently to forecast inflation and the gap.55 
                                                          
54 Our estimation procedure mimics Favero and Rovelli's (2001), in order to compare results. Specifically, 
we use the (one-step weighting matrix) GMM procedure of Eviews, and we use as instruments all the 
variables in the model lagged up until 4 quarters. The instruments choice also safeguards our analysis 
from the criticism described in Wooldridge (2001, page 90), as it is clear that we did not search over 
different sets of moment conditions until some desired result was achieved. Inflation enters the instrument 
set in changes instead of levels, because of its high persistence throughout most of the sample. 
55 Note that GMM implies assuming that Central Banker’s expectations are rational, but not the public’s. 
Actually, using the Rudebusch-Svensson model to characterise the structure of the economy amounts to 
assume that agent’s expectations are not rational, as it is a backward-looking model. 
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In order to obtain an heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
covariance matrix we use Andrews and Mohanan's (1992) pre-whitening and a Bartlett 
Kernel to weight the auto-covariances, with a bandwith estimated with Andrews' (1991) 
estimator.56 Covariance estimation is especially difficult in cases, like ours, of serially 
correlated moment conditions and small samples (while total observations amount to 
118, we have only 62 observations for the post-1986 regime). This explains our choice 
of the two-step estimator, that is, a one-step weighting matrix version of GMM.57 
 
3.3.2. Results 
Table 3.1 reports results of estimation with the whole sample, 1972:I-2001:II. 
The empirical framework seems to be well designed, as the J test of the over-identifying 
restrictions does not reject the orthogonality conditions (significance of 0.7), indicating 
that the instruments are suited for the system. However, the model does not adjust well 
to the whole sample, as the main structural coefficients are not precisely estimated.58 
This is true for the Phillips elasticity - the sensitivity of inflation to the real gap - and for 
the IS elasticity - sensitivity of the gap to real interest rates -, in spite of their theory-
compatible signs. Moreover, it is also true for the policymakers' preferences. The point 
estimate of the inflation level supposedly targeted by monetary authorities is 4.6 
percent, but its estimate is highly imprecise - a Wald test does not allow rejection of the 
hypothesis that the true target is any value between 0 and 9.2 percent, at 5 percent of 
significance. Both the weights attached to the variability of the gap and to the variability 
of interest rates are not significantly different from zero. The equilibrium real interest 
rate is estimated at 2.3 percent, but this point estimate is the result of the ratio of two 
parameters (c0 and c4) both very imprecisely estimated. 
                                                          
56 Pre-whitening is indicated in cases of very strong first-order auto-correlation (unit-root or close to unit-
root processes) plaguing the moments, and is meant to flatten the moments spectrum at the 
neighbourhood of the zero frequency, so that the kernel estimator becomes unbiased - Canova (1999b). 
57 See the discussions in Hansen et al (1996), Anderson and Sorensen (1996), Burnside and Eichenbaum 
(1996), Christiano and Den Haan (1996), Canova (1999b) and Wooldridge (2001), on the finite-sample 
problems of GMM. Hansen et al (1996), argued that in small samples the continuous up-dating estimator 
performs better, but Florens et al. (2001) show Monte Carlo results indicating that the two-step estimator 
generates results closer to maximum likelihood, and parameters estimators that are not strongly biased, in 
the estimation of forward-looking Taylor rules. 
58 As above in section 3.2 addressing the structural stability of the system IS-Phillips we have tried to 
robustify the aggregate demand equation by considering the average of the real interest rate during the 
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Table 3.1 – Model with Baseline Loss Function  
Optimal Control and GMM [Euro Area: 1972:I - 2001:II] 
Estimates T-statistics Significance Prob
IS equation:
C0 0.0399 1.46 0.14 
C1 1.255 13.16 0.00 
C2 -0.186 -1.15 0.25 
C3 -0.159 -1.69 0.09 
C4 -0.017 -1.90 0.06 
Phillips equation:
C5 0.562 10.63 0.00 
C6 0.297 5.16 0.00 
C7 -0.049 -0.74 0.46 
C8 0.175 2.77 0.01 
C9 0.083 1.13 0.26 
C10 0.052 8.58 0.00 
Euler equation:
π* 4.62 1.96 0.05 
λ 0.117 0.38 0.71 
µ 0.0103 1.03 0.31 
r* 2.33 †  
σ(εIS) 0.157  
σ(εPH) 1.097  
σ(εEU) 0.016  
J-test 0 2839 32 08 * 0 70
Fitted series' σ Data's σ
U. Gap 0.685 0.691  
Inflation 3.533 3.573  
Interest Rate 2.982 2.978  
Residuals IS :
Sample mean -0.001 0.97 ** 
Jarque-Bera 26.751 0.00 
Durbin-Watson 1.95  
Q(4) 10.658 0.03 
Q(28) 41.438 0.05 
Residuals Phillips :
Sample mean 0.051 0.62 ** 
Jarque-Bera 3.11 0.21 
Durbin-Watson 1.96  
Q(4) 1.057 0.90 
Q(28) 29.20 0.40 
Residuals Euler :
Sample mean -0.004 0.01 ** 
Jarque-Bera 10.31 0.01 
Durbin-Watson 0.55  
Q(4) 218.55 0.00 
Q(28) 1109.16 0.00 
Estimation: two-step GMM. Instruments: constant, ∆πt-i, Ugapt-i, stirt-i, (Iπ−π)t-i,       i=1,…4; 
Discount factor: δ=0.975; Variance-Covariance matrix HAC consistent: Andrews and Mohanan (1992) 
pre-whitening; Bartlett kernel, bandwith Andrews (1991); Signific. probabilities are for one-sided tests. 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on at least one coefficient with too large standard error; *: J×nobs; 
**: H0: Mean=0; Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
previous year - as in the original Rudebusch-Svensson model. The results were extremely similar to those 
reported in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.2 shows results of the estimation of the system for 1972:I-1985:IV and 
for the 1986:I-2001:II period - the sample division identified above in the Introduction. 
The J test for the over-identifying restrictions does not allow rejection of the 
moments used in estimation for any sub-sample, but its results are much more 
comfortable for the period 1986-2001, suggesting that this period is more suitable for 
estimation, which is compatible with our policy regime hypothesis. 
The main elasticity-coefficients of the IS and Phillips equations have correct 
signs and are well estimated in both samples, but their estimates change markedly. The 
persistence of inflation does not change and remains compatible with a unit root 
process. The persistence of the gap is in line with the expected behaviour for the series 
in the second sub-sample, but not in the first sub-sample, where the coefficients 
associated to its lags sum-up to an unreasonable value of -0.22. 
The estimates of the inflation target and the real equilibrium interest rate 
document a sharp change in macroeconomic conditions and monetary regime in 1985. 
The inflation target is estimated with good precision, at 9.4 percent in 1972-1985 and 
2.9 percent in 1986-2001, and the equilibrium real interest rate is also precisely 
estimated, as 0.9 percent in the first sub-sample and 4.4 percent in the second. However, 
the results for the two other main coefficients describing policymakers' preferences are 
not so good. The estimate of λ has an unreasonable negative sign, and is only significant 
at 9 percent, in the second sub-sample. The estimate of µ, although changing from 
negative to positive across the sub-samples, remains significant only at 9 percent in the 
1986:I-2001:II period. 
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Table 3.2 – Model with Baseline Loss Function  
Optimal Control and GMM [Euro Area, 1972:I - 1985:IV   vs   1986:I - 2001:II] 
1973:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II
Estimates T-stats Prob. Estimates T-stats Prob.
IS equation:
C0 0.025 2.04 0.04 0.093 3.36 0.00 
C1 0.055 21.27 0.00 1.254 17.18 0.00 
C2 -0.024 -0.26 0.79 -0.256 -3.27 0.00 
C3 -0.297 -5.34 0.00 -0.016 -0.40 0.69 
C4 -0.029 -6.76 0.00 -0.021 -3.73 0.00 
Phillips eq:
C5 0.580 11.64 0.00 0.575 15.64 0.00 
C6 0.311 4.88 0.00 0.167 3.43 0.00 
C7 -0.033 -1.15 0.25 0.043 0.81 0.42 
C8 0.121 2.40 0.02 0.217 8.33 0.00 
C9 0.089 2.93 0.00 0.135 2.51 0.01 
C10 0.049 4.72 0.00 0.049 8.20 0.00 
Euler eq:
π* 9.40 33.40 0.00 2.93 10.54 0.00 
λ -0.31 -3.07 0.00 -0.18 -1.71 0.09 
µ -0.003 -1.11 0.27 0.008 1.69 0.09 
r* 0.88 4.37   
σ(εIS) 0.175 0.128   
σ(εPH) 1.370 0.809   
σ(εEU) 0.0103 0.0093   
J-test 0 662 33 76 * 0 62 0 398 24 66 * 0 94
Fitted series σ Data σ Data σ
U. Gap 0.824 0.847 0.512 0.512  
Inflation 2.057 2.148 1.255 1.476  
Interest Rate 2.332 2.329 2.659 2.654  
Residuals IS :
Mean 0.006 0.80 ** 0.003  0.86 **
Jarque-Bera 24.704 0.00 1.13  0.57 
D-W 1.97 1.92   
Q(4) 2.154 0.71 5.014  0.29 
Q(28) 46.751 0.02 47.169  0.01 
Resid. Phillips
Mean 0.068 0.72 ** 0.031  0.77 **
Jarque-Bera 0.965 0.62 1.22  0.54 
D-W 1.91 2.17   
Q(4) 0.499 0.97 3.126  0.54 
Q(28) 48.76 0.01 24.195  0.67 
Resid. Euler :
Mean 0.003 0.77 ** -0.001  0.35 **
Jarque-Bera 1.180 0.54 1.702  0.43 
D-W 0.41 0.73   
Q(4) 81.029 0.00 84.129  0.00 
Q(28) 208.71 0.00 264.55  0.00 
Estimation: two-step GMM. Instruments: constant, ∆πt-i, Ugapt-i, stirt-i, (Iπ−π)t-i,       i=1,…4; 
Discount factor: δ=0.975; Variance-Covariance matrix HAC: Andrews and Mohanan (1992) pre-
whitening; Bartlett kernel, bandwith estimated with Andrews (1991) method; 
Prob.: one-sided significance probability; *: J×NOBS; **: H0: Mean=0; 
Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
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The problems in table 3.2 with the estimates of µ and λ, clearly require further 
inquiry in order to characterise the Euro Area policy regime since 1986. We now 
explore the hypothesis that the regime has been one of strict inflation targeting with 
interest rate smoothing (SITIRS). This step implies estimating a system composed of 
the above defined IS and Phillips equations - (3.7) and (3.8) -, together with a new 
formulation for the Euler equation - replacing (3.9) - that does not include any term 
associated to the unemployment gap: 
[ ] [ ]
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Table 3.3 reports the estimation of this model for the whole sample. They are 
not qualitatively different - nor quantitatively, in most cases - from those of the baseline 
loss function of flexible inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing. 59 
Table 3.4 reports estimates of the strict inflation targeting with interest rate 
smoothing regime for 1972:I-1985:IV, versus 1986:I-2001:II. The J test for the 
over-identifying restrictions suggests, even more clearly than in the baseline loss, that 
the moments are well suited for estimation of the system in 1986:I-2001:II, but 
somewhat less in 1972:I-1985:IV. The estimates of the Phillips and IS coefficients are 
reasonable and quite precise, and the dynamics of the gap does not show the anomaly 
apparent in table 3.2 for the first sub-sample. 
The results are compatible with the hypothesis that the Euro Area monetary 
regime changed significantly in 1985, and imply that, during 1986-2001, the Euro Area 
has had a policy regime of strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing. In 
contrast, it is difficult to characterise the regime of 1972-1985. Our estimates indicate 
that during 1986-2001 the notional Euro Area monetary authority targeted inflation at 
around 2.73 percent and managed interest rates with a positive and very significant 
degree of smoothing. The change in monetary regime has been drastic, from an implicit 
inflation target of 9.2 percent, and an interest rate smoothing component of L that is not 
well identified, in the previous period.  
                                                          
59 As in the model with the baseline loss, we have tried to robustify the aggregate demand equation by 
considering the average of the real interest rate during the previous year. Again, the results were very 
similar to those reported in table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 – Model with Strict Inflation Targeting with Interest Rate Smoothing 
(SITIRS) Loss Function  
Optimal Control and GMM [Euro Area: 1972:I - 2001:II] 
Estimates T-statistics Significance Prob
IS equation:
C0 0.0445 1.73 0.08 
C1 1.219 13.99 0.00 
C2 -0.125 -0.81 0.42 
C3 -0.187 -2.01 0.05 
C4 -0.019 -2.21 0.03 
Phillips equation:
C5 0.553 10.61 0.00 
C6 0.325 6.04 0.00 
C7 -0.030 -0.47 0.64 
C8 0.138 2.35 0.02 
C9 0.102 1.41 0.16 
C10 0.049 8.20 0.00 
Euler equation:
π* 5.69 4.83 0.05 
µ 0.0104 0.96 0.34 
r* 2.38 †  
σ(εIS) 0.158  
σ(εPH) 1.100  
σ(εEU) 0.019  
J-test 0 2913 32 92 * 0 66
Fitted series' σ Data's σ
U. Gap 0.676 0.691  
Inflation 3.539 3.573  
Interest Rate 2.984 2.978  
Residuals IS :
Sample mean -0.001 0.94 ** 
Jarque-Bera 25.945 0.00 
Durbin-Watson 1.86  
Q(4) 10.784 0.03 
Q(28) 41.924 0.04 
Resid. Phillips :
Sample mean 0.049 0.82 ** 
Jarque-Bera 3.38 0.19 
Durbin-Watson 1.95  
Q(4) 1.449 0.84 
Q(28) 30.60 0.34 
Resid. Euler :
Sample mean -0.001 0.65 ** 
Jarque-Bera 8.04 0.02 
Durbin-Watson 0.44  
Q(4) 257.45 0.00 
Q(28) 1489.36 0.00 
Estimation: two-step GMM. Instruments: constant, ∆πt-i, Ugapt-i, stirt-i, (Iπ−π)t-i,       i=1,…4; 
Discount factor: δ=0.975; Variance-Covariance matrix HAC: Andrews and Mohanan (1992) pre-
whitening; Bartlett kernel, bandwith estimated with Andrews (1991) method;  
Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests; † Imprecisely estimated because based on coefficients 
from which at least one has too large standard error; *: J×nobs; **: H0: Mean=0. 
Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
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Table 3.4 – Model with Strict Inflation Targeting with Interest Rate Smoothing 
(SITIRS) Loss Function  
Optimal Control and GMM [Euro Area: 1972:I - 1985:IV   vs   1986:I - 2001:II] 
1973:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II
Estimates T-stats Prob. Estimates T-stats Prob.
IS equation:
C0 0.040 3.57 0.00 0.092 3.38 0.00 
C1 1.168 26.10 0.00 1.270 17.40 0.00 
C2 0.050 0.64 0.52 -0.253 -3.02 0.00 
C3 -0.389 -8.09 0.00 -0.032 -0.77 0.44 
C4 -0.030 -9.40 0.00 -0.021 -3.56 0.00 
Phillips eq:
C5 0.566 13.40 0.00 0.593 16.96 0.00 
C6 0.352 6.95 0.00 0.158 3.51 0.00 
C7 -0.038 -1.09 0.28 0.033 0.68 0.50 
C8 0.104 2.02 0.05 0.222 8.43 0.00 
C9 0.122 3.42 0.00 0.121 2.42 0.02 
C10 0.040 5.57 0.00 0.050 8.81 0.00 
Euler eq:
π* 9.22 28.57 0.00 2.73 10.16 0.00 
µ -0.002 -0.93 0.35 0.014 2.69 0.01 
r* 1.34 4.51   
σ(εIS) 0.177 0.128   
σ(εPH) 1.379 0.811   
σ(εEU) 0.0207 0.0111   
J-test 0 948 48 34 * 0 12 0 398 24 68 * 0 95
Fitted series Data σ Data σ
U. Gap 0.821 0.847 0.499 0.512  
Inflation 2.063 2.148 1.258 1.476  
Interest Rate 2.324 2.329 2.659 2.654  
Residuals IS :
Mean -0.004 0.32 ** 0.000  0.99 **
Jarque-Bera 33.164 0.00 1.27  0.53 
D-W 1.92 1.95   
Q(4) 2.333 0.67 5.100  0.28 
Q(28) 48.85 0.01 46.966  0.01 
Resid.Phillips
Mean 0.043 0.19 ** 0.016  0.88 **
Jarque-Bera 0.668 0.72 1.109  0.57 
D-W 1.87 2.21   
Q(4) 0.912 0.92 3.466  0.48 
Q(28) 53.69 0.00 24.433  0.66 
Resid. Euler :
Mean 0.003 0.31 ** -0.001  0.32 **
Jarque-Bera 2.055 0.36 1.921  0.38 
D-W 0.16 1.15   
Q(4) 135.35 0.00 42.218  0.00 
Q(28) 306.48 0.00 177.36  0.00 
Estimation: two-step GMM. Instruments: constant, ∆πt-i, Ugapt-i, stirt-i, (Iπ−π)t-i,       i=1,…4; 
Discount factor: δ=0.975; Variance-Covariance matrix HAC: Andrews and Mohanan (1992) pre-
whitening; Bartlett kernel, bandwith estimated with Andrews (1991) method; 
Prob.: One-sided significance probability. *: J×NOBS; **: H0: Mean=0; 
Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
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The change in the Area macroeconomic conditions is also clear in our estimates, 
most notably, in the increase of the equilibrium real interest rate from 1.34 to 4.51 
percent. 
Table 3.4 includes some indication that the improvement in the volatility trade-
off of the Area since 1986 may not have been entirely due to the policy regime change, 
and that milder supply shocks and an increase in the optimality of interest rates may 
have also contributed to the volatility reduction. In fact, the standard deviation of the 
residual of the Phillips equation falls from 1.38 in the first period to 0.81 in the second, 
i.e. about 41 percent, and the standard deviation of the residual of the Euler equation 
falls from 0.021 to 0.011, about 47 percent. The interpretation of the latter is even more 
tentative than that of the former, though. Actually, in addition to the specification issues 
above mentioned, the failure to identify a well-defined regime in the first sub-period 
defies the interpretation of the Euler equation as an optimising relation during that 
period, implying that standard errors of estimation of the Euler equations may not be 
comparable across sub-samples. 
Table 3.5 offers some sensitivity analysis concerning the date of emergence of 
the monetary policy regime of strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing. It 
suggests that the regime switch has been somehow abrupt, and that the critical years 
have been 1985 and 1986 - in agreement with our hypothesis built above in section 1 on 
the basis of the history of events and macroeconomic performance of the Area. In fact, 
while the estimate of the inflation target is relatively stable somewhat below 3 percent 
since early 1985, during that year the point estimate and the statistical significance of 
the weight of interest rate smoothing in the loss function increase gradually. In addition, 
the suitability of the moment conditions, as evaluated by the J statistic, also improves 
markedly since the second quarter of 1985. The results obtained for 1986:I-2001:II 
would be confirmed if the sample-period was assumed to begin at 1986:III, and would 
be broadly matched if samples beginning until 1987:I were used. After that, the table 
may be reflecting the small sample numerical problems to which GMM estimation of 
such a system is highly sensitive. Actually, the aptness of the sample moment 
conditions falls sharply, as indicated by the J test significance probability, and the 
ability of estimation to identify the interest rate smoothing weight deteriorates 
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considerably - even though the estimates of the inflation target and of the equilibrium 
real interest rate remain broadly stable. 
 
Table 3.5 – Sensitivity Analysis: Date of Emergence of Policy Regime of Strict 
Inflation Targeting with Interest Rate Smoothing (SITIRS) 
Optimal Control and GMM  [Euro Area: 1984:I - 2001:II, (…), 1987:IV-2001:II] 
π* µ r* J-statistic Sample Period 
Estimate Prob. Estimate Prob. Estimate J×nobs Prob. 
1984:I - 2001:II 3.066 0.00 0.008 0.52 4.46 39.03 0.42 
1984:II - 2001:II 3.067 0.00 0.006 0.68 4.29 34.51 0.63 
1984:III - 2001:II 3.218 0.00 0.005 0.57 3.20 34.99 0.61 
1984:IV - 2001:II 3.145 0.00 0.003 0.66 3.79 35.33 0.59 
1985:I - 2001:II 2.961 0.00 0.005 0.40 4.09 35.44 0.59 
1985:II - 2001:II 2.857 0.00 0.004 0.37 3.91 33.40 0.68 
1985:III - 2001:II 2.792 0.00 0.003 0.20 3.93 33.19 0.69 
1985:IV - 2001:II 2.816 0.00 0.008 0.10 3.92 27.69 0.89 
1986:I - 2001:II 2.726 0.00 0.014 0.01 4.51 24.68 0.95 
1986:II - 2001:II 2.528 0.00 0.010 0.05 3.83 33.65 0.67 
1986:III - 2001:II 2.719 0.00 0.011 0.01 4.66 24.52 0.96 
1986:IV - 2001:II 2.390 0.00 0.012 0.09 3.68 37.16 0.51 
1987:I - 2001:II 2.597 0.00 0.011 0.07 4.13 37.89 0.48 
1987:II - 2001:II 2.666 0.00 0.009 0.11 3.94 37.09 0.51 
1987:III - 2001:II 2.648 0.00 0.007 0.19 4.27 35.59 0.58 
1987:IV - 2001:II 2.721 0.00 0.005 0.22 4.02 37.91 0.47 
Estimation: two-step GMM. Instruments: constant, ∆πt-i, Ugapt-i, stirt-i, (Iπ−π)t-i,       i=1,…4; 
Discount factor: δ=0.975; Variance-Covariance matrix HAC: Andrews and Mohanan (1992) pre-
whitening; Bartlett kernel, bandwith estimated with Andrews (1991) method; 
Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests. 
 
Figure 3.5 displays the fit of the Euler interest rate equation to the short-term 
interest rate between 1986:I and 2001:II, both for the flexible inflation targeting with 
interest rate smoothing regime and for the regime of strict inflation targeting with 
interest rate smoothing. It shows that the model fits satisfactorily the interest rates first 
moments, and that the fit improves significantly when the gap is dropped from the loss 
function - the mean square error falls from 1.01 to 0.42. Accordingly, the regime of 
strict inflation targeting matches better the data second moments - standard deviation of 
3.11, versus 2.66 in the data and 3.41 in the flexible inflation targeting regime. 
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Figure 3.5 - Actual versus Fitted Interest Rate  
Optimal Control and GMM, 1986:I-2001:II, 
Flexible Inflation Targeting with Interest Rate Smoothing (FITIRS), Strict 
Inflation Targeting with Interest Rate Smoothing (SITIRS) 
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Note: Fitted interest rates obtained by dynamically solving the IS-Phillips-Euler system, using the 
coefficient estimates obtained for the sample period 1986:I-2001:II. 
 
In summary, the answers we obtain with this method for the questions 
motivating this research are as follows. First, the emergence of a well-defined aggregate 
monetary policy regime targeting a low rate of inflation has been part of the causes for 
the apparent reduction of macroeconomic volatility in the Euro Area after 1986. 
Specifically, the regime is estimated as one of strict inflation targeting with interest rate 
smoothing, with the target level for inflation at around 2.7 percent. Second, there are 
some indications that supply shocks may have been milder since 1986 - as the standard 
deviation of the Phillips equation residual decreased by 41 percent - which could add to 
the explanation of the Taylor trade-off improvement. Third, there are some signals that 
the ability of the policymaker to run interest rates closer to their optimal path may have 
improved. In fact, the standard deviation of the Euler equation residual fell by 47 
percent, which could mean that part of the reduction in macroeconomic volatility could 
have resulted from a better exploitation of the volatility possibilities frontier. 
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The results of the structural stability tests in the previous section had suggested 
that there is evidence of a structural break in our small macroeconomic model for the 
Area in 1995:II. We have tried to check whether this structural break could be affecting 
the results, attempting to estimate the model for 1986:I-1995:II. However, in order to 
estimate the system by GMM with such a limited amount of degrees of freedom, we 
have had to restrict significantly the number of instruments and, as a result, the 
estimation results (not reported) turned out to be far less precise than those for 1986:I-
2001:II, inhibiting clear conclusions. Hence, it is not possible to estimate a policy 
regime for the 1986:I--1995:II period, with this framework. 
Comparing our Euro Area results to those reported by Favero and Rovelli (2001) 
for the US, we see that both economies experienced significant monetary regime 
changes during the 80s, in both cases toward regimes targeting low inflation rates 
(estimated at 2.63 for the US and 2.73 for the Euro Area). According to our hypothesis 
and estimates, the Euro Area regime switch happened some years after the US switch, 
but seems more drastic than that of the US: the inflation target fell more and the real 
equilibrium interest rate increased more than in the US. The estimates suggest that the 
Euro Area policymaker has put more weight on interest rate smoothing in his objective 
function than the US Fed has did (µUS=0.0085, versus µEUR=0.014). Finally, while the 
US policy regime seems to be one of flexible inflation targeting with interest rate 
smoothing - as λ is statistically significant in Favero and Rovelli (2001) - our evidence 
suggests that the Euro Area notional monetary authority has been much more an 
inflation nutter.60 
 
                                                          
60 Although statistically significant, the weight of the gap in the estimated Fed preferences in Favero and 
Rovelli is numerically very low. This may be considered as compatible with the prescription offered by 
Soderlind et al. (2002), that one of the conditions that a new keynesian model should fulfil in order to 
mimic the broad behaviour of US macroeconomic series is a small (virtually zero) preference for output 
stabilisation. Our own estimates for the Euro Area clearly comply with this condition, which is certainly 
important for its good performance in matching the low inflation volatility and the high persistence and 
volatility of our gap measure. 
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3.4. Estimation of Policymakers' Preferences using Dynamic 
Programming and FIML 
3.4.1. Framework 
There is currently a sizeable literature of monetary policy analysis using 
dynamic programming theory to solve the infinite-horizon policymaker optimization 
problem, given a small model describing the structural dynamics of the aggregate 
economy.61 In this literature, the loss function coefficients are typically calibrated, 
rather than estimated, and the economy structure is very often described with the 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model.62 
Some authors have calibrated alternative loss functions and studied the 
stabilizing performance of the implied optimal linear policy rules, as is the case of 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, 2002) for the US. Others have studied the outcome of 
alternative policy rules under uncertainty, such being the case of Peersman and Smets 
(1999) with weighted-average data of a core of five EMU member-states. Others - 
Aksoy et al. (2002) - have used this framework to study how different decision 
procedures by the ECB would affect the economic outcomes and welfare in the EMU 
member-states. More recently, some authors have identified ranges of specific 
parameter values of theoretically derived models that could best mimic the broad 
stylized facts in the US data - Soderlind et al. (2002), with a new keynesian model. 
Dennis (2001) has also used dynamic programming, but, in contrast to the 
referred literature, he has simultaneously estimated - by full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) - the economy structure and the loss function coefficients describing 
the monetary policy regime, for several US historical samples. His framework builds on 
a prior exercise of estimation of the Federal Reserve revealed preferences, using 
inverse-control theory, by Salemi (1995). The main differences are in the specified loss 
function, and in Salemi's use of an unrestricted VAR to model the macro-economy 
                                                          
61 See Litterman (1983) for an early example of a use of dynamic programming, together with a time-
series representation of the dynamic behaviour of the economy. His model did not include, however, any 
final goal variables - inflation and output -, as it was meant to study the trade-off between interest rate and 
M1 volatility, in order to assess whether an optimal interest rate rule could be superior to the operational 
framework of the US 1979-82 monetarist experiment. 
62 Examples of studies not using the Rudebusch-Svensson structural model are Fair's (2000, 2001a, 
2001b) evaluations of alternative rules, with simulation methods, in his US and multi-country models. 
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dynamics - which implies that he conducted estimation with a two-step procedure 
because of the large number of parameters to estimate.63  
Dennis' approach is an effective alternative to the Favero and Rovelli (2001) 
framework, with possible advantages at two levels. First, the use of dynamic 
programming instead of optimal control eliminates the need for truncating the 
optimality conditions, rather considering the infinite horizon optimisation problem 
solved by the policymaker. Second, the use of FIML overcomes some weaknesses of 
GMM - namely related to serial correlation and non-stationarity of the moment 
conditions, and to the small dimension of the sample - which can interact to difficult the 
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix and, thus, the ability of GMM to generate 
efficient estimates. Certainly, FIML has its own weaknesses, most especially the need to 
assume normality of the system's innovations, small sample departure from asymptotic 
results, and higher sensitivity to mispecification problems. 
Aware of both its advantages and disadvantages, we now proceed to estimate the 
Euro Area monetary policy regime of our sample following Dennis' method, for 
comparison with last section. The method can be described as follows. 
Recall the dynamic optimization problem faced by the Monetary Authority: 
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63 There are at least five additional important differences. First, Salemi uses monthly data, not based in 
national accounting statistics. Second, besides output, prices and interest rates, he also includes a measure 
of the money stock and a stock market index in his VAR. Third, he estimated the VAR with all series 
differenced, deseasonalized and linearly detrended. Fourth, he ran the inverse-control procedures and 
estimation for two alternative policy control variables - interest rate changes and, alternatively, growth 
rate of the money stock variable. Finally, Salemi's central bank loss function possibly includes all 
variables in the VAR, some of which specified in unusual ways - growth rates of output, prices, money, 
and stock index, and first differences of a short-term interest rate. 
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The dynamic constraints can be written in state-space form as follows: 
1ttt1t0 CBuAXXA ++ Ε+++=  (3.12) 
where u stands for the control variable - the interest rate, i - and X is the vector 
of state variables. Denoting (Imπt-1-πt-1) by Iπt-1, the state-space form (3.12) can be 
further detailed as: 
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64 Two minor variations from the model used in our Euler equation-GMM estimation are the inclusion of 
a constant in the Phillips equation (c5) and the imposition of dynamic homogeneity over that equation - 
i.e. restricting the sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation to 1. Both variations are made for ensuring 
comparability to Dennis' results for the US, and do not change qualitatively any results. 
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As the objective function is quadratic and the constraints are linear and 
stochastic, the problem fits into the stochastic optimal linear regulator framework - see, 
inter alia, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), and Hansen and Sargent (2001). We use the 
solution suggested by Chow (1981, 1983, 1997), which consists of introducing a vector 
of Lagrange multipliers, λ, and setting to zero its derivatives in order to the control and 
states variables, thus obtaining a set of first-order conditions.65 In these, expectations at 
time 0 are replaced by expectations at time t, highlighting that we are solving for the 
optimal closed-loop system, as we assume discretionary policy.66 
In order to solve these conditions for the control variable (u) and the multiplier 
(λ), Chow suggests approximating λ(X) by a linear function 
hHX)X( +=λ  (3.13) 
                                                          
65 In this brief description of the solution method we follow closely Chow (1997), pages 22-24. 
66 Notice the timing assumption of this model. At each period (t), the monetary authority observes the 
current state of the economy, that is, inflation and the gap up until period (t), together with the interest 
rates that it has set in the past. Then, he decides the interest rate for period (t). Then, period (t) demand 
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and the derivatives of the objective function with respect to the control and state 
variables by linear functions as well 
11211 kuKXK)u,X(Lx
++=∂
∂  (3.14) 
22221 kuKXK)u,X(Lu
++=∂
∂  (3.15) 
These three linear approximations, together with the linear constraint (3.12) and 
the first-order conditions with respect to the state and the control, are the basis for the 
solution. 
From the first-order conditions relative to the control variable, and the linear 
approximations (3.13) and (3.15), we obtain the optimal state-contingent linear policy 
rule 
gGXtu +=  (3.16) 
where 
)'21(
1)'22( HABKHBBKG δδ +−+−=  (3.17) 
[ )('21)'22( hHCBkHBBKg ++−+−= δδ ] (3.18) 
Analogously, using the linear approximations (3.13) and (3.14) for adequate 
substitution in the first-order conditions relative to the state-vector, we obtain 
)('1211 BGAHAGKKH +++= δ  (3.19) 
)('1)'12( hHCAkgHBAKh ++++= δδ  (3.20) 
Combining equation (3.17) and (3.19), gives the matrix Riccati equation 
)'21(
1)'22)('12('11 HABKHBBKHBAKHAAKH δδδδ +−++−+=  (3.21) 
The Riccati equation can be solved iteratively for H. Given H, equation (3.17) 
can be used to compute G, equation (3.18) to calculate g, and equation (3.20) to obtain 
h. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and supply shocks occur, generating, together with the interest rate decided for (t), the new outcome of 
the state-vector, at (t+1). 
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In our specific problem, k1 and k2 are equal to zero. We define the matrix K11 as 
K11 = 
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Which implies that K12 is set to zero.67 We further define K21 and K22 as follows: 
K21 = [ ]0000000000 µ−  
K22 = µ 
The linear approximation to the dynamic system constraining the maximization 
of L is simply the system (3.12) above, solved for the state vector at t+1 and excluding 
the innovations' vector, as follows: 
CABiAAXAX 10t
1
0t
1
01t
−−−
+ ++=  (3.22) 
 
The estimation proceeds as follows. In each iteration, for certain given values of 
the model parameters – c0, c1,(…), c10, λ, µ - we solve the Riccati equation (3.21) 
iteratively for H. Then, H is used to compute the coefficients of the optimal state-
contingent policy rule, G, the constant of the optimal linear policy rule (g), and the 
constant of the solution to the Lagrangean (h). 
The resulting optimal state-contingent policy rule is of the form 
11029182716534231210 −+−+−+−+−++−+−+−++= tIgtigtigtxgtxgtxgtgtgtgtggti πππππ
 
                                                          
67 Generally, there are alternative ways to write the linear approximation to the dynamic optimisation 
problem solution. We have tried a formulation in which K12 is not set to zero. Specifically, we have 
written K11[10,10]=0, K11[10,8]=µ, and K12[10]= -µ (with K22 and K21 unchanged). Estimation results 
were not significantly different, showing that numerical equivalence also exists. 
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and joins the IS and Phillips in a system of three equations.68 We include an 
innovation in the interest rate equation, which, technically, solves the singularity in the 
variance-covariance matrix of the system that otherwise would exist. 
The three equations system can be written as: 
tKtIFtZFtZFtZFtZFtZF Ξ++−+−+−+−+−= 15443322110 π  (3.23) 
where F0, F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5 are (3х3) matrices of coefficients adequately 
defined, and 
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The vector of residuals of the system, tΞ , is assumed to follow a multivariate 
normal distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Ω , with no 
additional restrictions. Under this assumption, we compute the log-likelihood function 
of the data from 1 to T, conditional on the four first observations, using the square of the 
regression residuals as estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.69 The log-likelihood 
function is maximized with respect to the model parameters - IS, Phillips and loss 
function coefficients - by standard numerical methods.70 
As in last section, we estimate the real equilibrium interest rate as the ratio of the 
estimates [c0/(-c4)]. In what regards the monetary policy regime, this set-up estimates λ 
and µ, but does not offer a direct estimate of the inflation target, so we compute it as the 
sample average of the nominal interest rate minus the estimate of the real equilibrium 
interest rate. As in section 3.3, we adopt the standard error of the Phillips equation 
residual as some indication of the volatility of supply shocks. Analogously to the 
standard deviation of the Euler equation residuals in section 3.3, we interpret the 
                                                          
68 In addition to the current information used in the Taylor (1993) rule, the optimal rule includes past 
deviations of inflation and the gap from their targets, as well as past values of the control variable. This 
additional past information allows policy to react more completely to economic conditions - see Bullard 
and Schaling (2001) for an example, showing how lagged state variables are crucial to account for 
changes in trend productivity. 
69 See, for instance, Chow (1983), page 170. 
70 We are indebted to Richard Dennis for sharing his GAUSS code, which is the basis for our own codes 
of this section. Estimation uses the procedure Optmum to minimise the symmetric of LogLik, with the 
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standard error of the optimal linear policy rule residual as some indication about the 
optimality of monetary policy - i.e., the ability of policymakers to run actual interest 
rates close to their optimal path. As before, this interpretation is exploratory, as the 
control theory attributes this error to specification imperfections.71 
 
3.4.2. Results 
Table 3.6 reports the results of estimation of the system for the whole sample. 
That table confirms that it is not possible to estimate reasonably and precisely 
the central bank loss function coefficients for the whole 1972-2001 period. Moreover, 
as the IS intercept is not statistically different from zero, the real equilibrium interest 
rate is not well estimated, which, in turn, precludes the estimation of a precise inflation 
target. 
The optimal policy rule is close to a simple auto-regression of the interest rate, 
with a root of 0.97, showing almost no reaction of interest rates to inflation and a very 
moderate reaction to the gap. This rule achieves a good fit to the data second moments, 
especially those of inflation and interest rate, but not that good to the level of the 
interest rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
BFGS algorithm and the Stepbt step method. Standard errors of the estimates are computed using the 
inverse of the Hessian matrix as estimator for the parameters variance-covariance matrix. 
71 Building on inverse-control theory, Salemi (1995) and Dennis (2001) interpret this innovation as 
resulting from the fact that the econometrician does not observe the whole information used by the central 
bank to conduct policy. 
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Table 3.6 – Model with Baseline Loss Function 
Dynamic Programming and FIML [Euro Area: 1972:I - 2001:II] 
Estimates T-statistics Significance Prob.
IS equation:  
C0 0.006 0.33 0.37 
C1 1.156 14.34 0.00 
C2 -0.043 -0.35 0.36 
C3 -0.181 -2.35 0.01 
C4 -0.0062 -1.54 0.06 
Phillips equation:  
C5 -0.052 -0.51 0.31 
C6 0.524 6.76 0.00 
C7 0.272 3.10 0.00 
C8 -0.096 -1.10 0.14 
C9 0.250 1.53 0.06 
C10 0.038 3.62 0.00 
Policy regime:  
λ 200.715 0.71 0.24 
µ 31.503 0.86 0.20 
π* 7.76 †   
r* 0.90 †   
σ (εIS) 0.149   
σ (εPH) 1.090   
σ(εOPR) 0.656   
Optimal Policy Rule Sums †† Long-run 
Gπt 0.019 0.039 1.300 
Gπt-1 0.010   
Gπt-2 0.005   
Gπt-3 0.005   
Gxt 0.305 0.165 5.500 
Gxt-1 -0.079   
Gxt-2 -0.061   
Git-1 0.972 0.970 - 
Git-2 -0.002   
GIπt-1 0.001 0.001 0.033 
Fitted series' σ Data σ:
U. Gap 0.674 0.691  
Inflation 3.578 3.573  
Interest Rate 2.976 2.978  
Estimation: FIML 
Discount factor: δ=0.975; Standard-errors: square root of diagonal elements of inverse of the Information 
Matrix (Hessian); Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests; 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on at least one coefficient with too large standard error; 
†† Sum of optimal policy rule coefficients of inflation, gap, interest rate and imp. inflation, respectively; 
π*= Inflation target, estimated as ( i - r*), where i  is the sample average of nominal interest rate; 
Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
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The results of estimation of the system in the two sub-samples, 1972-1985 and 
1986-2001, are reported in table 3.7. 
There are some signs of a change of monetary policy regime from the first to the 
second sub-sample. First, for 1986-2001, the system estimates with precision a real 
equilibrium interest rate (4.78 percentage points) and, thus, the inflation target (2.41 
percentage points). Second, the optimal linear feed-back rule changes markedly across 
the two sub-samples.72 The coefficient of reaction of current interest rates to its recent 
past decreases from 0.94 to 0.85. The cumulative short-term reaction of interest rates to 
gaps increases from 0.09 to 0.17 and, notably, the reaction of interest rates to current 
and recent inflation increases from 0.07 to 0.34. The change in the long-run responses 
of policy to inflation and the gap highlights more clearly the change in the conduct of 
policy across the sub-samples.73 While in 1972-1985 the long-run reaction of policy to 
the gap is higher than the reaction to inflation (1.56 versus 1.18), in the 1986-2001 
period optimal policy is far more oriented towards price stability, as interest rates react 
to inflation more than they react to gaps - 2.28 versus 1.17. 
As expected, our results show that the optimal linear policy reaction function 
would be activist with respect to inflation in both sub-samples, as the estimate of the 
long-run response of interest rates to inflation is larger than 1 in 1972-1985 as well as in 
1986-2001.74 
The system mimics the data second moments better in the second period 
(especially for the gap and interest rates), and also fits the data first moments far better 
after 1985 - notably, the standard error of the interest rate equation residuals falls from 
0.82 to 0.46. In spite of all these signs of a regime change at 1985, in table 3.7 we fail to 
estimate with reasonable precision the policymaker loss function coefficients, not only 
for 1972-1985 but also for 1986-2001. 
                                                          
72 Formal tests of the significance of such changes are not offered, as the coefficients of the optimal 
policy rule are not directly estimated, but instead are computed with dynamic programming results from 
the estimates of the model structural coefficients (IS, Phillips, and central bank's loss function). 
73 Recall that in our policy reaction function the long-run response of interest rates to, for instance, 
inflation, is given by )2i91i81/()3423121( −−−−−+−+−+ tgtgtgtgtgtg ππππ . 
74 A long-run response of nominal interest rate to inflation below 1 is destabilising in modern small 
models such as ours, Clarida et al. (2000), and the FRB/US model described in Reifschneider et al. 
(1999), but not necessarily in larger and richer models - see Fair (2000, 2001a, 2001b). See also 
Woodford (2001a, page 233) for a more complete description and discussion of the determinacy 
condition, known as 'Taylor principle'. 
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Table 3.7 – Model with Baseline Loss Function 
Dynamic Programming and FIML [Euro Area: 1972:I - 1985:IV, 1986:I - 2001:II] 
1973:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II
Estimates T-Stats Prob. Estimates T-Stats Prob.
IS equation:
C0 0.004 0.15 0.44 0.100 2.29 0.01 
C1 1.053 9.56 0.00 1.244 11.15 0.00 
C2 0.138 0.81 0.21 -0.321 -1.82 0.03 
C3 -0.300 -2.97 0.00 0.077 0.69 0.24 
C4 -0.018 -2.07 0.02 -0.021 -2.24 0.01 
Phillips equation:
C5 -0.126 -0.65 0.26 0.084 0.72 0.24 
C6 0.440 3.70 0.00 0.617 5.45 0.00 
C7 0.334 2.61 0.00 0.104 0.86 0.19 
C8 -0.047 -0.36 0.35 0.001 0.01 0.50 
C9 0.348 1.39 0.08 0.237 1.86 0.03 
C10 0.031 1.79 0.04 0.060 3.46 0.00 
Policy regime:
λ 138.043 0.49 0.31 -4.297 -1.07 0.14 
µ 68.250 0.69 0.25 0.423 0.50 0.31 
π* 10.22  †   2.41   
r* 0.20  †   4.78   
σ (εIS) 0.163   0.128   
σ (εPH) 1.368   0.808   
σ(εOPR) 0.818   0.463   
Optimal Policy Rule Sums †† Long-run Sums †† Long-run
Gπt 0.030 0.067 1.175 0.172 0.340 2.282 
Gπt-1 0.019   0.068   
Gπt-2 0.010   0.052   
Gπt-3 0.008   0.048   
Gxt 0.200 0.089 1.561 0.212 0.174 1.168 
Gxt-1 -0.042   -0.053   
Gxt-2 -0.069   0.015   
Git-1 0.947 0.943 - 0.855 0.851 - 
Git-2 -0.004   -0.004   
GIπt-1 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.010 0.010 0.067 
Fitted series' σ Data σ: Data σ:
U. Gap 0.526 0.847  0.503 0.512  
Inflation 1.997 2.148  1.246 1.476  
Interest Rate 3.097 2.329  2.681 2.654  
Estimation: FIML; Discount factor: δ=0.975; Standard-errors: square root of diagonal elements of inverse 
of the Information Matrix (Hessian); Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests; 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on at least one coefficient with too large standard error; 
†† Sum of optimal policy rule coefficients of inflation, gap, interest rate and imp. inflation, respectively; 
π*= Inflation target, estimated as ( i - r*), where i  is the sample average of nominal interest rate; 
Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
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Motivated by the results in table 3.7, in the appendix, and in section 3.3, we now 
estimate regimes of strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing for the periods 
considered. Estimates for the whole sample are given in table 3.8. The main results are 
similar to those obtained with the baseline loss function. We fail to estimate precisely 
the real equilibrium interest rate, the inflation target, and the loss function coefficients. 
Table 3.9 reports the estimates of strict inflation targeting regimes with interest 
rate smoothing for the two relevant sub-samples. As with the flexible inflation targeting 
loss function, the monetary regime break at 1985 is highly apparent: for 1972:I-
1985:IV, most estimates of regime coefficients are not statistically significant, while for 
1986:I-2001:II the opposite happens. The system estimates, with high precision, a real 
equilibrium rate of 4.6 percentage points and an inflation target of 2.6 percentage points 
during 1986:I-2001:II. 
The optimal policy reaction function changes markedly across the sub-samples, 
with the reaction to past interest rates decreasing from 0.94 to 0.90 and the short-run 
reaction to inflation and output increasing to about 0.22 cumulative points for each.75 
Compared to the homologous rule estimated with the baseline loss function, the 1986:I-
2001:II optimal rule now features larger responses of interest rates to the gap both in the 
short-run - 0.23 versus 0.17 - and in the long-run - 2.34 versus 1.17. This long-run 
reaction surpasses the long-run response of interest rates to inflation - which keeps 
being estimated at 2.21. Hence, although the gap has not been an independent target in 
the loss function, it still has been important for policy making - most probably as a 
leading indicator of inflation. 
The interest rate fitted by this loss model is observationally equivalent to that 
fitted by the baseline loss model, rendering a graphical comparison useless - the root of 
the mean square deviation between them is 0.07 percentage points. In contrast, given a 
loss function of strict inflation targeting, the regimes estimated for the two sub-samples 
differ significantly. In order to illustrate this, figure 3.6 shows that the optimal state-
contingent policy rule implied by the estimates from the second sub-sample, performs 
worse in adjusting interest rates of the first sub-sample period. The standard error is 
1.34 in 1972-1985, quite above the 0.464 computed for 1986-2001. 
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Table 3.8 – Model with Strict Inflation Targeting Loss Function 
Dynamic Programming and FIML [Euro Area: 1972:I - 2001:II] 
Estimates T-statistics Significance Prob.
IS equation:  
C0 0.014 0.82 0.20 
C1 1.158 14.45 0.00 
C2 -0.053 -0.42 0.34 
C3 -0.158 -2.10 0.02 
C4 -0.009 -2.16 0.02 
Phillips equation:  
C5 -0.034 -0.34 0.37 
C6 0.511 6.67 0.00 
C7 0.266 3.04 0.00 
C8 -0.084 -0.96 0.17 
C9 0.395 3.41 0.00 
C10 0.037 3.54 0.00 
Policy regime:  
µ 32.119 1.40 0.08 
π* 8.79  †   
r* 1.63  †   
σ (εIS) 0.151   
σ (εPH) 1.085   
σ(εOPR) 0.666   
Optimal Policy Rule Sums †† Long-run 
Gπt 0.025 0.053 1.472 
Gπt-1 0.013   
Gπt-2 0.007   
Gπt-3 0.008   
Gxt 0.135 0.084 2.333 
Gxt-1 -0.029   
Gxt-2 -0.022   
Git-1 0.965 0.964 - 
Git-2 -0.001   
GIπt-1 0.001 0.001 0.028 
Fitted series' σ Data σ:
U. Gap 0.686 0.691  
Inflation 3.613 3.573  
Interest Rate 2.982 2.978  
Estimation: FIML; Discount factor: δ=0.975; 
Standard-errors: square root of diagonal elements of inverse of the Information Matrix (Hessian); 
Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests; 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on at least one coefficient with too large standard error; 
†† Sum of optimal policy rule coefficients of inflation, gap, interest rate and imp. inflation, respectively; 
π*= Inflation target, estimated as ( i - r*), where i  is the sample average of nominal interest rate; 
Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
75 In both sub-samples, the in-quarter response of the instrument to the gap is about three times the size of 
its response to inflation, which is in line with Peersman and Smets (1999) and Aksoy et al. (2002). 
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Table 3.9 – Model with Strict Inflation Targeting Loss Function 
Dynamic Programming and FIML [Euro Area: 1972:I - 1985:IV, 1986:I - 2001:II] 
1973:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II
Estimates T-Stats Prob. Estimates T-Stats Prob.
IS equation:
C0 0.006 0.23 0.41 0.103 2.27 0.01 
C1 1.053 9.62 0.00 1.229 11.07 0.00 
C2 0.133 0.78 0.22 -0.312 -1.78 0.04 
C3 -0.289 -2.90 0.00 0.069 0.61 0.27 
C4 -0.020 -2.43 0.01 -0.022 -2.37 0.01 
Phillips equation:
C5 -0.116 -0.61 0.27 0.044 0.40 0.34 
C6 0.425 3.66 0.00 0.600 5.56 0.00 
C7 0.328 2.58 0.00 0.113 0.92 0.18 
C8 -0.034 -0.26 0.40 0.008 0.06 0.52 
C9 0.462 2.57 0.00 0.141 1.70 0.04 
C10 0.028 1.69 0.05 0.052 3.65 0.00 
Policy regime:
µ 56.98 0.84 0.20 1.999 1.68 0.05 
π* 10.14  †   2.55   
r* 0.28  †   4.63   
σ (εIS) 0.164   0.128   
σ (εPH) 1.367   0.808   
σ(εOPR) 0.827   0.464   
Optimal Policy Rule Sums †† Long-run Sums †† Long-run
Gπt 0.031 0.067 1.196 0.107 0.217 2.214 
Gπt-1 0.019   0.046   
Gπt-2 0.009   0.035   
Gπt-3 0.008   0.029   
Gxt 0.106 0.055 0.982 0.279 0.229 2.337 
Gxt-1 -0.017   -0.069   
Gxt-2 -0.034   0.019   
Git-1 0.946 0.944 - 0.908 0.902 - 
Git-2 -0.002   -0.006   
GIπt-1 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.005 0.005 0.051 
Fitted series' σ Data σ: Data σ:
U. Gap 0.529 0.847  0.495 0.512  
Inflation 2.031 2.148  1.245 1.476  
Interest Rate 3.083 2.329  2.688 2.654  
Estimation: FIML; Discount factor: δ=0.975;  
Standard-errors: square root of diagonal elements of inverse of the Information Matrix (Hessian); 
Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests; 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on at least one coefficient with too large standard error; 
†† Sum of optimal policy rule coefficients of inflation, gap, interest rate and imp. inflation, respectively; 
π*= Inflation target, estimated as ( i - r*), where i  is the sample average of nominal interest rate; 
Fitted series: observed series minus residuals of estimation of each series' equation. 
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Figure 3.6 – Actual versus Fitted Interest Rate, 1972:I-2001:II, Loss Function: 
SITIRS, Dynamic Programming and FIML  
Model Estimated Throughout 1986:I-2001:II 
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Note: Fitted interest rates computed as observed interest rates minus residuals of estimated optimal 
policy rule for sample period 1986:I-2001:II. 
 
Most importantly, the panel relative to 1986:I-2001:II in table 3.9 shows the 
most precise estimation of the loss function weights that we achieve within the 
framework of this section. Specifically, the coefficient associated to interest rate 
smoothing during 1986:I-2001:II is estimated at 2, and is significant at 5 percent, which 
can be considered a reasonably precise estimate. Also, the point estimate of 2 is not as 
unreasonable as many of the others in tables 3.6 through 3.9, and seems more plausible 
than the estimates for the US case described in Dennis (2001). In addition, and 
interestingly enough, our estimate is compatible with the interval of values for the 
interest rate smoothing weight that Soderlind et al. (2002) have identified as necessary 
for their small New-Keynesian model to mimic the persistence and volatility in US 
inflation, gap and short-term interest rates (1 2≤≤ µ ).76 
                                                          
76 Our estimate is smaller than the value that Fair (2000, 2001a) uses for stochastic simulations with his 
US model (2.0, which corresponds to 4.0, because inflation and the gap weight 0.5 each), as well as than 
the calibration in Fair's (2001b) simulations (9.0, which is actually 18.0). However, Fair's weight is 
attached to the deviations of interest rate changes to their baseline path and not to interest rate changes 
themselves, so that their values are not actually comparable to our weight µ. 
 171
It is often considered hard to accept, by conventional wisdom, that the 
instrument smoothing is so important, compared to inflation stabilization - see, for 
instance, Rudebusch (2001a). However, as Soderlind et al. (2002) note, there seems to 
be a paradox between the generalized acceptance of high coefficients on lagged interest 
rate in Taylor-type rules, and the notion that high weights of interest rate smoothing in 
L are hard to accept. Moreover, if, as argued in section 3.2.2, policy inertia results 
merely from the excessive smoothness of inflation forecasts, compared to its ex-post 
volatility, then it reflects serially correlated forecast (and possibly measurement) errors 
of inflation (and possibly gaps). In that case, the weight attached to interest rate 
smoothing is directly related to the inflation (and possibly gap) goals, making its large 
estimated magnitude less hard to accept. 
In table 3.9 there is a marked decrease of the estimated Phillips elasticity across 
the sub-samples - from 0.462 to 0.141 - which, taken at face value, would mean that this 
method identifies a much more horizontal Taylor curve in the second period. This result 
is, however, at odds with the fact that the time-varying NAIRU used to compute the 
unemployment gap employed in this chapter's estimation has been estimated, in chapter 
2, from an unobserved components model with a constant Phillips elasticity. Moreover, 
it contradicts the results obtained with optimal control and GMM, described in table 3.4, 
which exhibit a constant estimate of the Phillips elasticity, in harmony with chapter 2, 
of around 0.12. Furthermore, the result is unreasonable, as the estimate for the first sub-
period is too large, and there is no reason to expect a decrease in the Phillips elasticity, 
after 1985, to one third of its hypothetical value of the first sample period. We suspect 
that the anomaly in the estimate relative to 1972:I-1985:IV is associated to the fact that 
FIML may generate very wrong results whenever a model is not well specified, as it 
tries to adjust the coefficients of the equation with the largest residuals in order to 
minimize them. Hence, we choose to disregard the 1972:I-1985:IV sub-sample results. 
In short, the answers we obtain, with this method, for the relevant questions in 
this research, are as follows. First, the emergence of a well-defined aggregate monetary 
policy regime targeting a low rate of inflation, is part of the explanation of the reduction 
in macroeconomic volatility of the Euro Area since 1986. The regime is estimated to be 
one of strict inflation targeting, with a target rate of inflation around 2.6 percent, with a 
significant degree of interest rate smoothing. Second, there are signals that the supply 
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shocks impacting on the Area have been milder after 1986, as the standard error of the 
Phillips residual decreased by 41 percent, which could have caused, also, an inward 
shift of the Taylor efficiency frontier. Finally, there are some signals that the ability of 
policymakers to maintain interest rates closer to their optimal path has improved after 
1986, as the standard error of the residual of the optimal linear policy rule decreased by 
an impressive 45 percent across the sub-samples. As in section 3.3, these signals can 
only be considered tentative, however: first, control theory ascribes an econometric 
meaning to the deviation of the control variable from its optimal path; second, the 
residuals have different meanings across sub-samples, as there is no clear policy regime 
in the first one. 
The results obtained by Dennis (2001), for the US case, confirm the policy 
regime switch in that country at (the beginning of) the 80s, likewise we identify for the 
Euro Area at 1986. Moreover, Dennis' estimate of the output gap weight in the Fed's 
loss function after 1982 is highly imprecise and, hence, not statistically significant, 
suggesting a regime of strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing. This is 
similar to the regime that we estimate for the Euro Area after 1986, and is compatible 
with Soderlind et al. (2002) condition that a very small preference for output 
stabilization is needed for a new keynesian model to match inflation's low volatility and 
output's high volatility and persistence. Interestingly, according to Dennis' estimates, in 
the Volcker-Greenspan policy regime the level of inflation targeted by the US Fed is 
estimated at 1.4 percent, which is fairly below our estimate for the notional Euro Area 
central bank. 
We end this section examining the sensitivity of the results to the structural 
break detected above for the Area IS-Phillips model around 1995:II. Specifically, we 
have estimated the strict inflation targeting regime (with interest rate smoothing) with 
data throughout 1986:I-1995:II. The weight of interest rate smoothing is estimated at 
1.74, instead of 1.99, and with higher imprecision - significance level of 12 percent. The 
overall fit of the model is slightly worse than in table 3.9, which is especially true for 
the model ability to mimic the interest rates second moments - with fitted rates 
exhibiting somewhat an excessive volatile. Hence, no significant differences in policy 
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regime seem to exist, whilst the data scarcity problem seems to affect more severely the 
estimation of the system.77 
 
3.4.3. Optimal Control and GMM versus Dynamic Programming and FIML 
The FIML estimation based on a dynamic programming solution of the 
policymaker problem, and the GMM estimation with an optimal control solution, yeld 
the same answers to the questions motivating this research. 
Both set-ups suggest that the sample period should be partitioned, and react well 
to the partition at 1985:IV. Both suggest that it is only possible to identify an 
equilibrium real interest rate in the second sub-sample, and broadly agree in their 
estimate (4.5 - 4.6). Both frameworks precisely estimate very similar inflation targets 
for the 1986:I-2001:II period (2.7 - 2.6), and fail in doing so for 1972:I-1985:IV. Both 
clearly indicate that the Euro Area policy regime of 1986:I-2001:II, has been one of 
strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing. Both calculate a decrease in the 
standard error of the residuals of their optimizing equations slightly above 45 percent, 
after 1986 - which is remarkable, given the differences between the Euler equation and 
the optimal linear policy rule. And both agree in their estimation of the fall in the 
standard error of the Phillips curve residuals, after 1986 - precisely 41 percent for both. 
As reviewed above, there is less agreement between the estimates obtained from 
these two approaches for the US case. First, the inflation targets estimated for the most 
recent regime are 2.63 percent in Favero and Rovelli (2001) and 1.38 percent in Dennis 
(2001). Second, and most particularly, while Favero and Rovelli find a statistically 
significant weight of the output gap in the Fed's loss function, Dennis finds a point 
estimate of that weight that is much larger but he can not rule out the hypothesis that the 
true coefficient is zero. In view of the similarity of our broad results across both 
methods - except for the divergence discussed below - we conclude that the differences 
                                                          
77 We have also checked the sensitivity of our results to the timing assumption in the model. Specifically, 
we have estimated the model assuming that the central bank watches inflation and the gap up until period 
(t-1), when deciding his policy for period (t). This gives an optimal state contingent linear policy rule 
with inflation and the gap lagged one period in comparison to the specification in the text - resembling the 
Taylor rule used in Cogley and Sargent (2001). Our estimation results show an increase in the lag of 
optimal interest rates to actual rates, but the essence of the econometric results is unchanged. 
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between Favero and Rovelli results and Dennis' can originate from the disparities in 
their empirical procedures discussed in section 3.1 above. 
Coming back to the Euro Area case, the Euler equation estimated by GMM fits 
the first and second moments of interest rate somewhat worse than the optimal state-
contingent linear policy rule estimated with FIML. The root of the mean square error 
(RMSE) of fitted rates is 0.62 for the Euler equation, and is 0.46 in the optimal-policy-
rule estimated by FIML. The standard deviation of the series of fitted interest rates is 
3.11 in GMM and 2.63 in FIML, against a sample standard deviation of 2.65. 
 
Figure 3.7 – Actual versus Fitted Interest Rate, 1986:I-2001:II, Loss Function: 
SITIRS, Dynamic Programming and FIML, and Optimal Control and GMM 
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Notes: GMM fitted interest rates obtained by dynamically solving the IS-Phillips-Euler system, using 
the coefficient estimates obtained for the sample period 1986:I-2001:II; 
FIML fitted interest rates computed as observed interest rates minus residuals of estimated 
optimal policy rule for the sample period 1986:I-2001:II. 
 
Figure 3.7 shows that the interest rates fitted by the Euler equation (GMM) and 
by the optimal policy reaction rule (FIML) are not dramatically different. By 
construction, they are not, however, strictly comparable: the series of GMM fitted 
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interest rates is obtained by dynamically solving the estimated IS-Phillips-Euler system, 
assuming perfect knowledge of the inflation rate at 3 and 4 quarters ahead.78 
One important difference that is apparent in the figure is that the rates fitted with 
the FIML and dynamic programming approach tend to lag actual and GMM fitted rates. 
The contemporaneous correlation between the interest rates fitted by the two methods is 
0.966, whereas it increases to 0.978 when the GMM interest rates are lagged once. This 
reflects the dominance of the auto-regression element in the optimal policy rule, which 
is associated to the high estimate of the interest rate smoothing weight obtained with the 
dynamic programming approach: 1.999, versus 0.014 in Euler-GMM. 
We come now to the heart of the difference between the results in sections 3.3 
and 3.4: the estimate of µ. The difference already exists - and is even quantitatively 
more important - between results for the US in Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis 
(2001). When comparing his results to those of Favero and Rovelli, Dennis suggested 
that the difference appears to stem from two facts. First, GMM models the interest rate 
changes - in the Euler equation - while the interest rate equation in FIML is estimated in 
levels. Second, GMM implies a truncation of the policy horizon - in practice, it assumes 
that 0=δ , for all quarters  - while FIML considers the infinite horizon 
optimization problem when estimating the policymakers' optimal reaction function. This 
could be important, for Dennis, as it takes long and variable lags for monetary policy to 
impact on the real economy. Soderlind et al. (2002) also points out this second reason as 
the main explanation for the divergences in results. 
5≥i
There are also econometric differences possibly affecting the results. From 
certain points of view, the FIML approach is more restrictive and sensitive than GMM, 
as it requires the assumption of normality of the residuals of the structural system, while 
GMM depends only on a set of orthogonality conditions and not on probabilistic 
assumptions - see Wooldridge (2001). Also, FIML may be more sensitive in that it 
adjusts the coefficient estimates to improve the fit of the equation with worse mean 
square errors of the system. On the other hand, GMM is more sensitive to non-
                                                          
78 If the fitted interest rate from the GMM approach was computed as that of the FIML framework - 
observed series minus interest rate equation estimation residuals - we would obtain a fitted series 
observationally equivalent to the actual series. This is caused by the small magnitude of the Euler 
equation residuals, when estimated - as in this research - using actual future values of inflation in place of 
its expected values. 
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stationarity of the moment conditions - Hamilton (1994, page 424) -, than FIML is to 
non-stationary time-series in the system. Also, GMM could suffer more from small-
sample problems, which especially difficult the estimation of the variance-covariance 
matrix when the moments are serially correlated as in our case.79 It is not clear, at this 
stage, the net effect of all these econometric particularities. 
Favero and Milani (2001), and Castelnuovo and Surico (2001), have offered 
evidence somewhat suggestive that the interest-rate-smoothing puzzle could be solved 
by some consideration of the model uncertainty faced by policymakers, using Granger's 
(2000) thick modeling approach.80 
Another hypothesis is that the puzzle could be caused by the fact that the 
Euler/GMM framework uses actual future values of inflation, in place of expectations, 
while the dynamic-programming/FIML approach uses only actual current and lagged 
state variable values. If policy inertia is caused by expectations errors - the excessive 
smoothness of inflation forecasts being passed on to the policy rates path - it could 
happen that the Euler/GMM framework generates lower interest rates smoothing 
weights estimates. If this hypothesis is true, then the estimates of the degree of optimal 
policy inertia from both methods would only converge if inflation expectations were 
replaced, in the Euler equation, by expectations available to policymakers in real-time. 
We have no chance, however, of testing such an hypothesis, at least for the time being. 
Finally, we explore another possible explanation. The dynamic 
programming/FIML approach is based on the lagrangean method of solution to the 
optimisation problem, which, as Chow (1997, page 25) notes, always finds an optimal 
control function, even when the system does not reach a steady state. Now, the state 
vector converges to an equilibrium if and only if the matrix governing the dynamics of 
Xt under optimal control has all its characteristic roots smaller than unity in absolute 
value - see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, chapter 4). From equations (3.22) and (3.16) 
above, we have 
                                                          
79 See Hansen et al (1996), Anderson and Sorensen (1996), Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), Christiano 
and Den Haan (1996), Canova (1999b), Florens et al. (2001), and Wooldridge (2001) on the finite-sample 
problems of GMM. 
80 In subsequent research, Castelnuovo and Surico (2002) fix µ = 0.2 - the standard value assumed by 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, 2002) - and estimate the inflation and gap variability weights minimising 
the distance of the interest rate fitted by the optimal state-contingent linear rule to that fitted by the 
unconstrained estimate of the rule. 
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Hence, the optimal dynamic system for Xt will only be stable - Xt will converge 
to a unique stationary distribution - if the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues of 
matrix )~~( GBA +  is strictly smaller than unity. Some of the studies elsewhere in the 
literature check for this condition. For instance, studying data of the 11 EMU member-
states within a dynamic programming framework close to ours, Aksoy et al. (2002) 
report maximum eigenvalues of 0.99 for all countries.  
In studies that use dynamic programming to compute the optimal linear policy 
rule, given estimates of the structural parameters of the model, roots so close to unity do 
not create problems. However, when dynamic programming is used together with non-
linear estimation, such proximity to non-stationarity may create numerical problems. 
Table 3.10 shows that the maximum value in modulus of the characteristic roots of 
the optimal dynamic matrix for the state vector is almost always numerically 
undistinguished from one, in this study. The eigenvalue that is further away from unity 
is the one of the strict inflation targeting regime estimated for 1986:I-2001:II, in which 
case the maximum root of the system is 0.983. Interestingly, this is, among our 
estimates, the case where the loss weights are most precisely estimated and, indeed, 
have more reasonable point estimates.  
 
Table 3.10 – Maximum Absolute Value Of Eigenvalues Of Matrix (A+BG) 
 1973:I - 2001:II 1973:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II 
Loss:


 ∆ ttt ixL ,,π  0.996 0.992 1.007 


 ∆ tt iL ,π  0.995 0.991 0.983 
Values reported are the maximum of the characteristic roots, in modulus, of matrix )~~( GBA + , which is 
the optimal dynamics of the state vector given by the solution to the dynamic optimization problem 
 
As before, we finalize this section by checking whether the results would be 
different if the estimation period is restricted to 1986:I-1995:II, to assess if the well 
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identified monetary regime beginning in 1986 has significantly changed in 1995. We 
find that the greater absolute value of the eigenvalues of the optimal state-vector 
dynamics is 0.985, for that period, which is very much close to the maximum absolute 
value of the characteristic roots for 1986:I-2001:II.81 
In the end, we consider the interest rate smoothing question an unsolved 
puzzle. We have offered arguments that seem to suggest that neither GMM results with 
optimal control, nor FIML results with dynamic programming, should be considered 
superior, with our present knowledge of the problem. Yet, we have shown that there are 
reasons to cast some doubts on the numerical results of FIML estimation based on the 
lagrangean method of solution to the dynamic programming problem. Fortunately, the 
results from both methods are qualitatively identical, so our conclusions in this research 
seem to be reasonably robust. 
 
3.5. Testing for Asymmetry in the Loss Function - Euro Area 1986-
2001 
3.5.1. Definition of Asymmetric Policy Preferences 
So far, we have modelled policymakers' preferences symmetrically with respect 
to the cyclical and inflationary state of the economy. Formally, and following the 
literature, we have considered quadratic loss functions, which attach equal weight to 
positive and negative deviations of the goal variables from their targets. In such 
functions, the loss increases linearly with the distance of the goal variables from the 
target, meaning that it is more important to return to the target the further away from it 
the variable is. Both these characteristics of quadratic loss functions are considered 
                                                          
81 Moreover, we have checked (i) whether results would change when data is limited to more recent 
observations, and (ii) whether they would change if the interest rate smoothing parameter was the only to 
be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
As to (i), we have estimated this model for periods 1988:I-2001:II, 1989:I-2001:II and 1990:I-2001:II. 
The smallest estimate we obtained for the interest-rate smoothing weight has been 1.31, with 1 percent 
significance, for 1988-2001. The maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues of the state optimal 
dynamics is 0.967, the lowest characteristic root we obtained across all the sub-samples. 
In what regards (ii), we have estimated the model inputting the estimates for the IS and Phillips 
parameters obtained by estimation of that system, leaving only the interest rate smoothing parameter to be 
estimated by maximum likelihood. Its estimate changed slightly to 1.873, but its t-statistic increased to 
3.03 (significance ≅ 0.01). The optimal feed-back rule did not change significantly. This model records 
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attractive and intuitive - see, for instance, Svensson (2001c). In addition, quadratic 
functions are tractable, while large analytical complexities could arise from polynomial 
loss functions of higher order. 
However, there is a growing recent literature focusing on departures of central 
bank loss functions from the quadratic form. 
Cukierman (2000, 2001) challenges the assumption that, given an inflation level, 
positive real gaps are as disliked as negative gaps of the same dimension, and that, 
given a real gap level, positive and negative deviations of inflation from target cause the 
same loss.82 He focuses on inflationary bias asymmetry, designing a loss function in 
which central bankers strictly target inflation in expansions, but react to the output gap 
at recessions. That specification is meant to analytically describe his observation that 
the political establishment is sensitive to the social costs of recessions, and that in 
democratic societies, even independent, but accountable, central banks, are not totally 
insensitive to the wishes of the political establishment. This argument had also been 
suggested by Goodhart (1998), who further argued that this asymmetry could derive 
from the fact that policymakers are typically uncertain about the current and future state 
of the economy, thus having a natural tendency to delay restrictive policy actions for 
longer than expansionary measures. Blinder (1998, p.19-20) has been profusely cited as 
an insider confirmation of his hypothesis 
“In most situations the CB will take far more political heat when it 
tightens pre-emptively to avoid higher inflation than when it easys 
pre-emptively to avoid higher unemployment”. 
This asymmetry hypothesis offers a new explanation for the inflation bias 
observed throughout much of the XXth Century: in the presence of uncertainty, a central 
bank with such a loss function makes the probability of erring on the side of tightness 
smaller than that of erring on the side of ease. This explanation, moreover, has the 
appealing feature of not implying the assumption that policymakers target output above 
its natural level - central to the Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon 
(1983), dynamic inconsistency paradigm. In fact, recent statements by central bank 
                                                                                                                                                                          
also a similar ability to mimic the first and second moments of data. The maximum absolute value of 
eigenvalues of the matrix of optimal dynamics of the state-vector is, in this case, 0.9814. 
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insiders - Vickers (1998) and Blinder (1998) - as well as remarks from academics - 
McCallum (1995, 1997) - had been noting, that it is unlikely that contemporaneous 
central banks systematically target output levels above expected natural output.  
Inflationary bias asymmetry was not the exclusive centre of Goodhart's (1998) 
attention, though, as he argued that there are reasons to believe that central bankers have 
an inner-conflict that may result in two opposing types of asymmetry. On one hand, 
they are not immune to social pressures and feel great dissatisfaction when the economy 
is in a recession, so they would tend to strengthen their actions when output is below 
potential than when it is above. But, on the other hand, they want to credibly pursue 
their main objective of price stability and thus tend to have a stronger attitude against 
inflation pulling above the target than against inflation below the target - which would 
generate a deflationary bias. These two aims are conflicting, as inflation is typically a 
pro-cyclical variable,83 and Goodhart (1998, page 18) raised the hypothesis that they 
could perhaps balance out. Nobay and Peel (1998) studied theoretically a model of a 
central bank with asymmetric preferences, allowing, a-priori, for both inflationary and 
deflationary asymmetry. 
Deflationary bias asymmetry, like inflationary asymmetry, is caused by the 
combination of asymmetric preferences and the uncertainty typically faced by 
policymakers. If a central bank needs to build a new credibility as inflation fighter, in 
order to consolidate a regime of low and stable inflation, his reaction to uncertainty is to 
prefer to fail on the low-inflation than on the high-inflation side of the target. This 
deflationary bias has actually been the subject of some references during the 1990s, in 
light of the context of disinflation and commitment to low inflation in developed 
countries since the mid-80s - see Fischer (1994). Hence, this asymmetry hypothesis may 
be more relevant to explain recent episodes than the inflationary bias asymmetry - for 
instance, the nominal convergence process ahead of the EMU, and the definition of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
82 This reasoning of Cukierman (2000, 2001) seems to be hard to observe in practice, because inflation 
and output are significantly correlated - which could be an additional reason to use quadratic loss 
functions. 
83 The implementation of inflation targeting regimes in some countries during the 90s was meant to deal 
with this inner conflict of central bankers, especially important in systems where governments have had 
fully discretionary power over monetary policy. For a recent evaluating review of the first decade of 
inflation targeting see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). 
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ECB inflation target have been considered by some observers as asymmetric in the 
deflationary sense.84 
There are also some references in the literature to a somehow different type of 
asymmetry - the hypothesis that monetary authorities increase rates in different pattern 
from that of decreases in interest rates. Goodhart (1996, 1998) noted that because 
interest rate increases are treated as bad news, monetary authorities could be led to 
increase rates less regularly, and in larger jumps, than they decrease them. Cukierman 
(1992, page 121) wrote 
“(…) it is pretty clear that banks dislike large unexpected swings 
in interest rates, particularly if they are upward." 
However, most direct comparisons between the pattern of interest rate increases 
and decreases in the literature have not found significant evidence of differences - see 
Rudebusch (1995) and Goodhart (1996). 
The empirical literature of monetary policy asymmetry has, so far, tested for 
policymakers' asymmetry within the framework of monetary policy reaction functions 
of the Taylor (1993) rule type. This is the case of, inter alia, Blinder (1997), Clarida and 
Gertler (1997), Clarida et al (1998, 1999), Dolado et al. (2000, 2002), Bec et al. (2001), 
Orphanides and Wieland (2000), and Martin and Milas (2001). This approach is not 
satisfactory, not only because of the empirical difficulties in identification and 
estimation of forward-looking Taylor rules, but also because these rules are not direct 
evidence on the deep policymakers' preference parameters, as reviewed in chapter 1 of 
this dissertation. In turn, the studies developed within frameworks alternative to that of 
Taylor-type rules, either have not offered formal evidence on the policymakers' loss 
function coefficients - Mishkin and Posen (1997), Gerlach (2000) - or have done so in 
frameworks restricted by somewhat stringent assumptions - Ruge-Murcia (2001 a, b). 
Next, we present a new framework to test for asymmetries in a central bank loss 
function, and use it to enhance our knowledge about the monetary policy regime of the 
Euro Area since 1986:I – the period when a well-defined monetary policy regime seems 
                                                          
84 As Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001, pages 26-30) recently reviewed, there is not yet any consensus 
on what may be the optimal long-run inflation target level, but all Inflation Targeters have been choosing 
long-run inflation goals slightly above zero (typically some interval between 1 and 2, or 3, percent). This 
has arguably been their pragmatic solution to the conflict between the need for credibility and the desire 
of minimising the probability of deflation. 
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to have emerged in the Area. Our testing framework brings together two strands of the 
literature that have been dissociated so far - the estimation of policymakers' preferences 
and the study of asymmetric policy preferences. Specifically, we show that the approach 
based on optimal control and GMM estimation used in section 3.3 of this chapter can be 
extended to allow for formally testing the hypothesis that policymakers' loss function 
coefficients may be asymmetric across recessions and expansions, for a given specific 
target of inflation. Our framework nests the standard case of a quadratic loss function - 
that is, symmetry of preferences - and does not impose ex-ante inflationary or 
deflationary asymmetry. Moreover, in addition to the standard hypothesis of 
asymmetric reaction of policy to inflation and gaps across expansions and recessions, 
we test the hypothesis of asymmetry in interest rate smoothing as a function of the 
cyclical state of the economy.  
 
3.5.2. Tests of Asymmetric Policy Preferences 
Preliminary remarks 
In section 3.3, with the central bank loss function constrained to a quadratic 
functional form, we have estimated the inflation target at 2.73 percentage points (with 
optimal control and GMM) and have found that the unemployment gap is not 
statistically significant in the Euro Area policymakers’ objective function during 
1986:I-2001:II. We now offer an alternative interpretation of those findings, by 
considering the official inflation target implicitly assumed throughout the period and 
allowing for asymmetry in policymakers' preferences across recessions and expansions. 
The implicit official inflation target of the German central bank has been 2 
percent per year, since 1986. This has been the level of inflation that the Bundesbank 
has considered compatible with price stability, since that year, and the basic statutory 
objective of the Bundesbank is price stability. The ECB inflation target interval is also 
not incompatible with a point target of 2 percent, even though some authors - as Galí 
(2002b) - note that the reference value for money growth implies a target range between 
1 and 2 percent, and others - Svensson (2002) - criticise the asymmetry in the target. 
Here, we find reasonable to adopt 2 percent as the official inflation target in the Euro 
Area during 1986:I-2001:II. 
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The inflation target estimated with a quadratic loss function, 2.73 percentage 
points, and the official target of 2 percent, can be reconciled by allowing for asymmetry 
in the loss function across recessions and expansions. Econometrically, there is a 
problem of under-identification in models trying to estimate simultaneously the 
inflation target and an unconstrained loss function functional form. If a quadratic loss is 
assumed, we can estimate the inflation target, whereas if an inflation target is imposed, 
estimation calculates a functional form for the loss function. These two exercises yeld 
results that are observationally equivalent in the limit case of a completely 
unconstrained loss functional form. We now assess whether the marked difference 
between the official inflation target and 2.73 percent can be addressed with a loss 
function that is asymmetric with respect to business cycles, thus offering a new view of 
section 3.3 results. 
A simple inspection of the data allows some preliminary informal conclusions. 
The sample average of the unemployment gap is -0.16 (percentage points) and that of 
the inflation rate is 3.05 (percent per year). Our estimate of the inflation target is not 
statistically different from the sample average (significance probability of 31 percent in 
a Wald test), but is significantly above the official 2 percent target (Wald test 
significance probability of 0.007). Hence, real activity has been close to potential, on 
average, while inflation has been, on average, 1 percentage point per year above the 
official target – i.e., there has been somewhat an inflationary bias in the Area during 
1986:I-2001:II. 
One alternative interpretation would be considering that the 2 percent target 
might not have been a binding target, but merely a reference number with a political 
role, perhaps similar to the one played by money target values in Germany according to 
Von Hagen (1999). If so, our best guess for the true inflation target would be the 
estimate of 2.73 percent associated to a symmetric loss function (with the associated 
interval of statistical uncertainty). Because of the under-identification problem 
described above, we can not econometrically address this question. 
Another alternative interpretation would be pointing out that the excess of 
average inflation over the official target might have been the result of a gradual 
disinflationary process beginning in 1986, with the definition of the new 2 percent 
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target, and only ending later in the sample. This interpretation is, however, at odds with 
the precise estimation of an inflation target for the 1986:I-2001:II period, which should 
not have been possible with such a disinflationary scenario. Moreover, modelling loss 
asymmetry across expansions and recessions should control for such a scenario of 
systematic fall in inflation. 
Our choice of a regime of strict inflation targeting is also further scrutinized in 
this section. Specifically, our framework allows testing whether the rejection of the 
statistical significance of the unemployment gap term in the loss function is robust to 
the possibility of an asymmetric response of policy to the cyclical state of the economy. 
The relevant hypothesis here seems to be whether the coefficient associated to the gap 
element is statistically significant (and correctly signed) in recessions. 
 
Framework and Results 
We assess asymmetry of the loss function extending the optimal control 
framework and GMM framework of Favero and Rovelli (2001) using dummy variables 
to distinguish between quarters in which the economy is in a recession - negative 
unemployment gap - from quarters in which it is in an expansion - positive 
unemployment gap. Specifically, we specify a threshold quadratic loss function: a 
quadratic function with weights, attached to each objective variable, that can assume 
two different values, one at expansions and other at recessions.85 
                                                          
85 We do not use the linex form used by Nobay and Peel (1998) and Ruge-Murcia (2001 a, 2001 b), as its 
behaviour does not diverge significantly from that of the threshold quadratic, for reasonable loss weights 
and the values of gaps and inflation that exist in the data. In the presence of a significant asymmetry, the 
linex functional form behaves exponentially to one side of 0 and linearly to the other side of 0, while the 
threshold quadratic behaves always non-linearly, with different increasing rates to the left and right-hand-
side of 0. For reasonable coefficients, these functions cross each other at some point to the left and some 
point to the right of 0. Further away from those intersection points, the linex increases at increasingly 
higher rates than the quadratic threshold, in its exponential branch, and at increasingly lower rates than 
the asymmetric quadratic, in its linear branch. However, these unbounded divergences are only significant 
(for reasonable coefficients) at points that are mostly out of the range of unemployment gaps and inflation 
deviations (from target) present in our sample. 
 185
The loss function of the strict inflation-targeting regime is now defined as 
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The dummies are defined with respect to the cyclical state of the economy, but 
they relate very similarly to the deviation of inflation from target, because of the 
contemporaneous positive and significant association between the gap and inflation – 
the statistically significant Phillips elasticity.86 We chose to normalise the weight 
associated by policymakers to deviations of inflation from the target during expansions 
to one minus the weight associated during recessions, in order to restrict the number of 
parameters to estimate and, thus, facilitate the convergence of the estimation criteria. 
As in section 3.3 above, we truncate the optimal control problem 4 quarters 
ahead, and, considering the cross-equation restrictions, obtain the following first order 
conditions for either state of the economy: 
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These are then merged into one single Euler equation, using the dummy 
variables referred to above, generating a Euler equation that allows for asymmetries in 
both the inflation gap and the interest rate smoothing elements, while nesting the 
symmetry case.87 Symmetry exists when µEXP and µREC are not significantly different 
from each other and when φREC is not statistically different from (1-φREC), and, thus, 
                                                          
86 We have run the tests with dummies distinguishing between inflation above and below the target, and 
the results were fairly similar. 
87 Note that this strategy changes the normalisation adopted for the inflation-gap term in the loss function 
from 1 to 0.5. This changes the numerical estimates of the other coefficients but does not change the 
statistical behaviour of the model - normalisation at 1 is as arbitrary as at 0.5. 
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these are the two null hypothesis of interest to test. Rejection of any of the null 
hypothesis is statistically incompatible with symmetry and is compatible with 
asymmetry of the loss function in that particular argument. 
The resulting Euler equation is estimated jointly with the Phillips and IS 
equations, using GMM as in section 3.3, setting the inflation target at the official 2 
percent level. We test our hypothesis using Wald tests on the relevant coefficients. 
Table 3.11 summarises the results of these tests, for 1986:I-2001:II, within the 
strict inflation targeting regime. 
 
Table 3.11 – Tests of Asymmetry of Loss Function - Strict Inflation Targeting with 
Interest Rate Smoothing,  π=2% 
Optimal Control and GMM [Euro Area: 1986:I - 2001:II] 
MODEL:  Strict Inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing 
 
π target Coeff. Estimate T-stat. Signific. 
Probability 
Wald Test 
CREC=CEXP 
Statistical 
Inference 
 
H0:   µEXP=µREC 
The interest rate smoothing part of L is not asymmetric with respect to the cyclical state of the 
Economy, given that the inflation-gap element of L is symmetric 
Official:  2% µREC 
µEXP 
0.013 
0.005 
2.75 
1.73 
0.01 
0.09 
1.89 
(0.17) 
Not 
Rejected 
 
H0:   φEXP=φREC 
The inflation-gap part of L is not asymmetric with respect to the cyclical state of the Economy, 
given that the interest rate smoothing element of L is symmetric 
Official:  2% φREC 
φEXP 
0.783 
0.217 
10.00 
2.78 
0.00 
0.01 
13.06 
(0.00) 
Rejected 
 
H0:   φEXP=φREC  ∧  µEXP=µREC 
The inflation-gap part of L and the Interest rate smoothing element of L are symmetric with 
respect to the cyclical state of the Economy 
φREC 
φEXP 
0.778 
0.222 
8.84 
2.53 
0.00 
0.01 
9.96 
(0.00) 
Rejected Official:  2% 
µREC 
µEXP 
0.0098 
0.0006 
2.62 
0.11 
0.01 
0.92 
1.76 
(0.18) 
Not 
Rejected 
Estimation: two-step GMM. Instruments: constant, ∆πt-i, Ugapt-i, stirt-i, (Iπ−π)t-i,       i=1,…4; 
Discount factor: δ=0.975;Variance-Covariance matrix HAC: Andrews and Mohanan (1992) pre-
whitening; Bartlett kernel, bandwith estimated with Andrews (1991) method; 
In models where the inflation-gap part of L is not allowed to be asymmetric, its weight in L, φ, is 0.5. 
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The table shows that, given an inflation target of 2 percent, there is no statistical 
evidence of threshold asymmetry in the coefficient associated to interest rate smoothing 
in the loss function, that is, the policymaker did not change policy rates differently in 
recessions and expansions. In contrast, there is significant evidence of asymmetry in the 
inflation-gap element of the loss function when the official 2-percent target is used: the 
Wald test for the null of equality of the inflation-gap coefficients between recessions 
and expansions has significance of 0.0015. Those coefficients estimates are 0.78 for 
recessions and 0.22 for expansions, meaning that the monetary authority disliked 
inflation deviations from the 2 percent target during recessions more than three times it 
disliked the deviations that existed during expansions, in average. 
We now inspect whether, given the 2 percent official inflation target and loss 
coefficients possibly changing across cyclical states, the unemployment gap may weight 
significantly in policymaker's preferences. Specifically, in this new formulation of the 
problem, the unemployment gap may be significant in only one of the two cyclical 
states of the economy, or may have significantly different coefficients in recessions and 
expansions. 
The flexible inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing policy regime with 
possible threshold asymmetries has a loss function defined by 
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The Euler equations, one for each cyclical state of the economy, obtained by 
truncating the optimal control problem 4 quarters ahead and considering the cross-
equation restrictions arising from the structure of the economy, are as follows: 
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As before, these are then merged into one single equation, using the dummy 
variables referred to above. We thus have an Euler equation that allows for asymmetries 
in the inflation gap, the unemployment gap, and the interest rate smoothing elements, 
and nests the symmetry case. Symmetry exists when µEXP and µREC, and λEXP and λREC 
are not significantly different from each other and when φREC is not statistically different 
from (1-φREC), so that these are the three null hypothesis of interest to test. We estimate 
this Euler equation jointly with the Phillips and IS equations, using GMM as above, 
setting the inflation target at the official 2 percent level, and then test the hypothesis 
using Wald tests on the relevant coefficients. 
Table 3.12 summarises the results. There is no statistical evidence of asymmetry 
in the policymakers' preferences with respect to interest rate smoothing, as in the strict 
inflation targeting regime. In contrast, there is evidence of asymmetry both in the 
(π−π*) and in the unemployment gap element of the loss function, when they are 
considered independently. The results indicate that, if the inflation target has actually 
been the official 2 percent target, the way the notional monetary authority of the Euro 
Area managed interest rates, during 1986:I-2001:II, reveals that it disliked recessions 
but actually liked positive gaps. For instance, taking the coefficients in the panel testing 
only λEXP=λREC, it placed a weight of 0.111 on each percentage point of negative gap, 
and a weight of –0.361 on each percentage point of positive gap. In what regards 
deviations of inflation from 2 percent, policymakers disliked the deviations during 
recessions more than 9 times they disliked inflation deviations from target during 
expansions (weights of, respectively, 0.905 and 0.095, in the panel testing only for 
φEXP=φREC). 
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Table 3.12 – Tests of Asymmetry of Loss Function - Flexible Inflation Targeting 
with Interest Rate Smoothing,  π=2% 
Optimal Control and GMM [Euro Area: 1986:I - 2001:II] 
MODEL:  Flexible Inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing 
 
π target Coeff. Estimate T-stat. Signific. 
Probability 
Wald Test 
CREC=CEXP 
Statistical 
Inference 
 
H0: µEXP=µREC 
The interest rate smoothing part of L is not asymmetric with respect to the cyclical state of the 
Economy, given that the inflation-gap and unemployment-gap elements are symmetric 
 
Official:  2% µREC 
µEXP 
0.014 
0.003 
2.90 
0.51 
0.00 
0.61 
1.74 
(0.19) 
Not 
Rejected 
 
H0:   λEXP=λREC 
The unemployment-gap part of L is not asymmetric with respect to the cyclical state of the 
Economy, given that the inflation-gap and the interest rate smoothing elements are symmetric 
 
Official:  2% λREC 
λEXP 
0.111 
-0.361 
1.90 
-2.20 
0.06 
0.03 
4.82 
(0.03) 
Rejected 
 
H0:   φEXP=φREC 
The inflation-gap part of L is not asymmetric with respect to the cyclical state of the Economy, 
given that the interest rate smoothing and the unemployment gap elements of L are symmetric 
 
Official:  2% φREC 
φEXP 
0.905 
0.095 
8.78 
0.92 
0.00 
0.36 
15.44 
(0.00) 
Rejected 
 
H0:   λEXP=λREC  ∧  µEXP=µREC 
The unemployment-gap and the interest rate smoothing element of L are not asymmetric with 
respect to the cyclical state of the Economy, given that the inflation-gap part of L is symmetric 
 
λREC 
λEXP 
0.085 
-0.314 
1.41 
-2.07 
0.16 
0.04 
3.88 
(0.05) 
Rejected Official:  2% 
µREC 
µEXP 
0.007 
0.006 
1.79 
2.11 
0.08 
0.04 
0.08 
(0.78) 
Not 
Rejected 
 
H0:   φEXP=φREC  ∧  µEXP=µREC 
The inflation-gap and the interest rate smoothing element of L are not asymmetric with respect 
to the cyclical state of the Economy, given that the unemployment-gap part of L is symmetric 
 
φREC 
φEXP 
0.918 
0.082 
9.38 
0.84 
0.00 
0.40 
18.22 
(0.00) 
Rejected Official:  2% 
µREC 
µEXP 
0.016 
0.006 
2.45 
1.40 
0.02 
0.16 
1.70 
(0.19) 
Not 
Rejected 
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H0:   φEXP=φREC  ∧  λEXP=λREC 
The inflation-gap and the unemployment-gap elements of L are not asymmetric with respect to 
the cyclical state of the Economy, given that the interest rate smoothing part L is symmetric * 
 
φREC 
φEXP 
0.333 
0.666 
1.33 
2.67 
0.19 
0.01 
0.45 
(0.51) 
Not 
Rejected 
Official:  2% 
λREC 
λEXP 
0.108 
-0.660 
1.27 
-1.37 
0.21 
0.17 
2.60 
(0.11) 
Not 
Rejected 
 
H0:   φEXP=φREC  ∧  λEXP=λREC  ∧  µEXP=µREC 
The inflation-gap, the unemployment-gap, and the interest rate smoothing element of L are not 
asymmetric with respect to the cyclical state of the Economy * 
 
φREC 
φEXP 
0.266 
0.734 
1.16 
3.20 
0.25 
0.00 
1.04 
(0.31) 
Not 
Rejected 
λREC 
λEXP 
0.089 
-0.743 
0.95 
-1.61 
0.34 
0.11 
3.29 
(0.07) 
Not 
Rejected 
Official:  2% 
µREC 
µEXP 
0.001 
0.004 
0.11 
1.07 
0.91 
0.29 
0.22 
(0.64) 
Not 
Rejected 
Estimation: two-step GMM. Instruments: constant, ∆πt-i, Ugapt-i, stirt-i, (Iπ−π)t-i,       i=1,…4; 
Discount factor: δ=0.975; Variance-Covariance matrix HAC: Andrews and Mohanan (1992) pre-
whitening; Bartlett kernel, bandwith estimated with Andrews (1991) method; 
In models where the inflation-gap part of L is not allowed to be asymmetric, its weight in L, φ, is 0.5; 
* Sample: 1986:2-2001:2; GMM estimator highly volatile to small changes in estimated sample. 
 
When we test for asymmetry simultaneously in the inflation-gap and 
unemployment-gap elements of L, there is no evidence of asymmetry. This result is 
perhaps associated to complex inter-actions between the inflation and unemployment 
gap asymmetries. GMM estimation of these models is, actually, very problematic: 
reasonable convergence fails for the entire 1986:I-2001:II period, and the estimates 
reported are for 1986:II-2001:II. Furthermore, the estimates are highly volatile to small 
changes in the sample. Taken together, these facts mean that the results from this model 
are not reliable. The explanation for this may be associated to the contemporaneous 
Phillips relation, which is creating an econometric problem of identification of the 
source of asymmetry. 
The individual significance statistics of the loss function coefficients in the 
second and third panels of table 3.12 (allowing for, in turn, λEXP ≠ λREC and φEXP ≠ φREC), 
suggest that the model with asymmetry in the unemployment gap weight seems to be 
preferable. In fact, it does not seem sensible to have inflation eliminated from the 
central bank loss in expansions. Moreover, the flexible inflation targeting model with 
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different coefficients on the unemployment gap weight, across recessions and 
expansions, fits actual interest rates far better than a model of flexible inflation targeting 
and asymmetry in the component of inflation deviations from 2 percent. Specifically, 
the mean square error is 0.68 in the former and 1.28 in the latter. 
In summary, we draw four main conclusions from the analysis in this section. 
First, if we assume 2 percent to be the official inflation target, and allow for different 
policymakers' preferences between recessions and expansions, there is statistical 
evidence of inflationary asymmetry in the loss function of the notional monetary 
authority of the Euro Area during 1986:I-2001:II. Second, under those assumptions, the 
regime best characterising the policy regime in the Area, during 1986:I-2001:II, is one 
of flexible inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing and asymmetry in the 
unemployment gap weight in the loss function, in which authorities only disliked 
recessions and actually liked expansions. Third, we can not determine whether the 
notional monetary authority of the Euro Area, in 1986-2001, had symmetric preferences 
and followed a monetary policy of targeting inflation at 2.7 percent, or whether it 
disliked recessions but not expansions, and targeted inflation at the official 2 percent 
level. The only way to solve this observational equivalence would be to exogenously 
obtain precise and credible information on the true inflation target, or on its statistical 
distribution, pursued by the monetary authority. Fourth, at a more methodological level, 
we suggest an extension to the optimal control framework with GMM estimation, and 
show that it is useful to assess the possibility of asymmetries in central bank loss 
functions. This avenue of research should be fruitful, in the future, once credible 
information about the true inflation target is available. 
 
Further explorations 
In view of the structural break detected at 1995:II in section 3.2 above, we now 
look at the period 1995:II-2001:II, to examine whether the well-defined monetary 
policy regime beginning in 1986:I experienced any marked shift by mid-90s. 
We have computed the mean square error (MSE) of all possible models of 
symmetric and asymmetric loss functions, for the reasonable inflation targets, and have 
come out with the result that is shown in figure 3.8. The figure indicates that during 
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1995:II-2001:II, the symmetric loss model with a 2 percent inflation target adjusts better 
to the interest rates data than the model with a 2.73 percent target (MSEs of, 
respectively, 0.20 and 0.34). 
 
Figure 3.8 - Actual versus Fitted Interest Rate, 1995:I-2001:II, Loss Function: 
Quadratic, SITIRS, Optimal Control and GMM 
Model Coefficients Estimated Throughout 1986:I-2001:II 
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Note: Fitted interest rates obtained by dynamically solving the IS-Phillips-Euler system, using the 
coefficient estimates obtained for the sample period 1986:I-2001:II with, π*=2 and, alternatively, 
π*=2.73. 
 
Hence, this evidence indicates that the policy regime that emerged after 1986 
may have experienced a significant change by 1995:II, ahead of the EMU in 1999. 
Specifically, the inflation target may have been reduced from about 2.7 to 2 percent or, 
put alternatively, the EMU policy regime (after 1995) may not be suffering from the 
inflationary bias recorded for the whole 1986:I-2001:II period. This evidence is 
compatible with our structural stability tests in section 3.2, and is also compatible with 
the inflation target defined in the ECB statutes - which, as reviewed above, may more 
likely induce a deflationary bias, than an inflationary one. 
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These conclusions can only be considered tentative, however, as they are subject 
to numerous qualifications. Most importantly, the 1995:II-2001:II is too short a period 
for us to be able to reach conclusive and robust conclusions: the adjusted rates of figure 
3.8 have been simulated with coefficient estimates obtained with the data for the whole 
1986:I-2001:II period, as the post 1995:I quarterly observations do not allow for any 
robust GMM estimation of a new policy regime. Investigating this post-1995:II regime 
is clearly a path for future research. 
 
3.6. Concluding Remarks 
The empirical research in this chapter shows that the emergence of a well-
defined monetary policy regime in the aggregate Euro Area is part of the explanation 
for the apparent improvement in the volatility trade-off between inflation and the gap of 
the Area since 1986. This result is noteworthy, bearing in mind the institutional 
prevalence of national monetary policies until 1999, and confirms with formal evidence 
the well-known stylised fact that monetary policy autonomy of member-states of the 
ERM fell markedly since the mid-80s, with the advent of the German leadership of the 
System. Notably, the two alternative methods employed - optimal control with GMM 
estimation, and dynamic programming with FIML estimation - both indicate that the 
Area monetary policy regime post-86 has been one of strict inflation targeting with a 
significant interest rate smoothing, with the inflation target estimate located somewhat 
above 2.5 percentage points.  
We find signs that the improvement in the Taylor trade-off of the Area since 
1986 may have been caused, in addition, by somewhat milder supply shocks - which 
move the efficiency policy frontier - and by some increase in the ability of policymakers 
to run interest rates closer to their optimal path. These signs are remarkably robust 
across the two optimisation-estimation methods used in the research. Most 
extraordinarily, the two employed methods generate similar estimates for the decrease 
in the standard error of the residuals of their optimizing interest rate equations, from 
1972-1985 to 1986-2001: 47 and 45 percent, respectively for the Euler and the optimal 
linear policy rule equation. 
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Estimated forward-looking Taylor rules are also compatible with the 
unemployment gap not showing up as a significant argument in the loss function, in the 
post-1986 Euro Area regime. The gap is valuable information, however, for monetary 
policymaking, as apparent in the need to include past unemployment gaps in the 
instrument sets for GMM estimation of the Taylor rule. 
The finding that a well-identified monetary policy regime seems to have existed 
in the Area after 1986, implies that Rudebusch and Svensson's (2002) use of (1961-
1996) US data to draw lessons for Euro-system monetary versus inflation targeting may 
have been unwarranted, as post-86 aggregate Area data could have been used. 
With our new optimal control and GMM based approach to modelling loss 
function asymmetries across expansions and recessions, we present our policymakers' 
preferences estimates in an alternative form. Specifically, we show that the data alone 
can not discriminate between the Euro Area notional policymaker having targeted 
inflation at 2.7 percent, with a quadratic loss excluding the unemployment gap, and, 
alternatively, having flexibly targeted inflation at 2 percent and disliking negative but 
liking positive unemployment gaps. We discuss informational conditions necessary for 
solving this observational equivalence. 
We confirm that interest rate smoothing is an open problematic issue, not only 
with regard to theoretical explanations but also concerning empirical estimation. The 
two methods used in this chapter yeld quite different estimates for the instrument inertia 
in the Euro Area loss function since 1986:I, as happens in previous studies for the US 
case. Our assessment of this issue suggests that the dynamic programming with FIML 
approach may suffer from numerical problems, and that the optimal control with GMM 
estimation method seems to yeld a loss function that is closer to its theoretical 
foundations. 
Finally, there are some indications that the well-defined monetary policy regime 
that emerged in the Euro Area after 1986:I may have changed by 1995:II, ahead of the 
EMU. Specifically, the actual inflation target may have switched from about 2.7 to the 
official 2 percent target, or, put alternatively, the policy regime since 1995 may not be 
suffering from any inflationary bias. However, the data available so far does not allow a 
precise scrutiny of this question. 
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This chapter has suggested several avenues for future empirical research on the 
Euro Area policymakers' preferences, from which we emphasize four. First, when a 
sufficient amount of additional future data is collected, estimation of policymakers 
preferences of the EMU monetary policy regime should be pursued, focusing on post-
1995:II data. Second, when possible, monthly data, instead of quarterly data, should be 
used, not only to enhance the degrees of freedom of estimation, but also in view of the 
periodicity of the ECB's Governing Council meetings. Third, when precise and credible 
information on the official inflation target is available, our framework may be applied to 
investigate possible asymmetries in the ECB loss function. Fourth, when real-time data 
available to ECB policymakers is available, their preferences may be estimated with 
greater precision, and perhaps the interest rate smoothing puzzle may be clarified. 
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Appendix 
Estimation of Forward-Looking Taylor rules for the Euro Area 1972:I-
2001:II88 
 
A.3.1. The Model 
Taylor rule:    (A3.1) 

 

 Ω+

 −

 Ω++= tetxtetrtr /*/4
_
* γππβ
Partial adjustment constraint:    (A3.2) tttt rrr νρρ ++−= −1*)1(
Where  is the level of the short-term interest rate that policymakers would like to set 
at quarter t, 
*
tr
r  is the equilibrium nominal short-term interest rate - that is, the level that 
would prevail if inflation and the gap were to equal their target levels, respectively  
and 0.  stands for the expectation that policymakers make, with 
information available at period t, for the rate of inflation four quarters ahead and, 
similarly,  is the policymakers expectation of the current period gap, made 
with information available at each period. In the partial adjustment equation, 
*π

Ωt/4π


 Ωt/

 +et
e
tx
ρ  
represents the degree of interest rate smoothing, and the residual tν  is meant to model 
irregular components and inefficiency in the conduction of policy. 
Defining 
*βπα −= r , 
and merging equations (A3.1) and (A3.2), we obtain 
ttrt
e
txt
e
ttr νργρπβραρ +−+

 Ω−+

 Ω+−+−= 1/)1(/4)1()1(  (A3.3) 
Now, the expectation of period t gap with information available at period t corresponds 
precisely to our gap series, which has been computed with the kalman filter updating 
equations. Hence, we replace that expectation by , that is, the current period 
observation of our gap. The expectation of inflation four quarters ahead - compatible 
with the 12-month-ahead expectation in Clarida et al. (1998) and with our discussion of 
tx
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the forecast horizon of policymakers in the text - is replaced by the actual observation of 
inflation at t+4. Then, the equation residual, tε , is a linear combination of the error tν  
and the inflation expectation error. The model can, then, be estimated by GMM, using 
the orthogonality conditions implied by the fact that, if policymakers are rational, the 
equation residual is uncorrelated with information available at period t, which includes 
information relating up until period t-1. 
( tx
Hence, the equation to estimate is: 
( ) ) tttt rr εργρπβραρ ++−+−+−= −+ 14 )1()1()1(  (A3.4) 
To obtain the inflation target implicit in the estimated coefficients, we take as estimator 
of the equilibrium nominal short-term interest rate, r , the sample average of the short-
term interest rate. Given the estimates of α  and β , it is straightforward to obtain an 
estimate of *π . 
 
A.3.2. Results 
 
Table A.3.1 – Forward-Looking Taylor Rule, Euro Area, 1972:I - 2001:II 
 
 Estimates T-statistics Significance Prob. 
Coefficients:    
α 3.84 2.52 0.01 
ρ 0.92 48.11 0.00 
β 1.15 4.63 0.00 
γ 3.84 2.81 0.01 
π∗ 4.10 - - 
sample average i 8.54 - - 
R2 0.94   
DW 0.98   
S.E. regression 0.72   
J-test 0.09 10.09 0.61 
RMSE interest rate 3.21   
Fitted series σ  Data σ:  
Interest Rate 2.96 3.87  
Estimation: equation (A3.4), by GMM. 
Instruments: πt-1, πt-2,  πt-3, πt-4, xt-1, xt-2, xt-3, xt-4, it-1, it-2, it-3, it-4, Iπt-1, Iπt-2, Iπt-3, Iπt-4, where Iπ is the 
imports inflation rate minus the domestic inflation rate. 
No prewhitening; HAC variance-covariance - Bartlett kernel, Bandwidth = 4. 
Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
88 See Clarida, Galí and Gerler (1998, 2000). 
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Table A.3.2 – Forward-Looking Taylor Rules, Euro Area, 1972:I - 1985:IV versus 
1986:I-2001:II 
 
 1972:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II 
 Estimates T-stats Sig.Prob. Estimates T-stats Sig.Prob. 
Coefficients:       
α 5.33 1.08 0.28 0.07 0.11 0.91 
ρ 0.93 38.02 0.00 0.77 31.20 0.00 
β 0.67 1.21 0.23 2.37 14.43 0.00 
γ 4.28 1.85 0.07 0.32 0.99 0.33 
π∗ 7.03 † - - 3.00 †   
sample average i 10.04 - - 7.19   
R2 0.87   0.95   
DW 0.99   1.47   
S.E. regression 0.87   0.62   
J-test 0.18 9.28 0.68 0.16 9.41 0.67 
RMSE int. rate 2.72   1.04   
Fitted series σ  Data σ:   Data σ:  
Interest Rate 2.03 2.57  2.83 2.67  
Wald test for structural break: 94.18 0.00 
Estimation: equation (A3.4), by GMM. 
Instruments: πt-1, πt-2,  πt-3, πt-4, xt-1, xt-2, xt-3, xt-4, it-1, it-2, it-3, it-4, Iπt-1, Iπt-2, Iπt-3, Iπt-4, where Iπ is the 
imports inflation rate minus the domestic inflation rate. 
No prewhitening; HAC variance-covariance - Bartlett kernel, Bandwidth = 4. 
Significance probabilities relate to one-sided tests. 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on coefficients from which at least one has too large standard 
error. 
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 Figure A.3.1 - Short-Term Interest Rate 1972:I-2001:II: Actual and Fitted with 
Forward-Looking Taylor Rule 
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Figure A.3.2 - Short-Term Interest Rate 1972:I-1985:IV: Actual and Fitted with 
Forward-Looking Taylor Rule 
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Figure A.3.3 - Short-Term Interest Rate 1986:I-2001:II: Actual and Fitted with 
Forward-Looking Taylor Rule 
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Figure A.3.4 - Short-Term Interest Rate 1972:I-2001:II:  
Actual, Fitted with Forward-Looking Taylor Rule Estimated for 1986:I-2001:II, 
and Fitted with Rule Estimated with 1972:I-1985:IV Data 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusions and Reflections for Future Research 
 
This chapter finishes the thesis, summarising its most central results, and 
suggesting some scopes for further work. 
 
4.1. Summary of Results 
This study contributes to the monetary policy analysis literature offering an 
empirical enquiry of the macroeconomic trade-offs and monetary policy in the Euro 
Area, focusing on aggregate Area data of the last three decades of the XXth Century. 
Chapter 2 has analysed the Phillips trade-off, with a special emphasis on testing for 
possible asymmetry in the Phillips relation, on modelling expectations as near-rational, 
and in the consistent estimation of the Area's time-varying NAIRU. The analysis is 
conducted within a small unobserved components model featuring the Phillips and 
Okun relations as main measurement equations, estimated by maximum likelihood with 
the kalman filter. Chapter 3 has focused on the Taylor trade-off and in its implications 
for the monetary policy regime and the economic structure of the Area throughout the 
sample period. The analysis compares results of two alternative inverse control 
procedures and estimation methods - optimal control with GMM estimation, and 
dynamic programming with FIML estimation. The former method is, then, used to 
discuss possible asymmetries in the central bank loss function. 
 
As regards the Phillips relation, the analysis shows that once purely rational 
expectations are replaced by a more realistic hypothesis - specifically Ball's (2000) 
near-rational, limited-information expectations -, and once time-variation of the NAIRU 
is allowed, then the new keynesian Phillips curve - optimising, forward-looking - works 
well for the Euro Area. In fact, the Phillips elasticity is estimated with the correct sign, 
and is statistically significant - when the theoretical equations in the measurement 
system are modelled with proper functional forms. Moreover, the estimated model-
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consistent NAIRU implies a path for the unemployment gap that mimics the business 
cycle dating generated by the alternative New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) 
approach, based on unit labour costs instead of gaps - as reported in Gali et al. (2001). 
Hence, our analysis suggests that the empirical problems with the new keynesian 
Phillips curve, documented in some literature, are more likely related to the use of 
rational expectations of inflation, and/or of mechanically detrended activity time-series, 
than to the choice of the proxy variable for real marginal costs. Moreover, it shows that 
the limited-information rational expectations are a viable alternative to the pragmatic 
but somewhat unfounded approach of specifying mixed forward and backward-looking 
expectations of inflation, often used in the literature. 
Our asymmetry tests clearly indicate that there is not enough evidence to reject 
the hypothesis that the Phillips relation has been linear in the aggregate Euro Area 
throughout 1970-2000. In contrast, the evidence gathered strongly suggests that there is 
a statistically significant and economically important asymmetry in the Okun Law. 
Notably, our asymmetry tests nest the linear specification, cover four alternative 
functional forms, do not impose convexity nor concavity, and use model-consistent 
NAIRU and potential output series - all desirable features that allow for a good degree 
of confidence in the obtained results. The evidence of convexity in the Area's Okun 
equation is consistent with results for most developed countries elsewhere in the 
literature. In contrast, our evidence of linearity of the Phillips curve challenges several 
recent strands of literature, which have been stressing that there are supposedly 
important theoretical and empirical reasons for the Phillips curve to be asymmetric, 
especially when aggregated data of regions or nations is scrutinised. Remarkably, our 
evidence seems to defy a literature that has been specifying convex Phillips curves, for 
some developed countries, without offering convincing preliminary evidence of the 
allegedly important convexities in the trade-off. Taken together, our Phillips and Okun 
equations' asymmetry tests results indicate that the choice of unemployment versus 
output gap to characterise the trade-off may not be irrelevant for its functional form, and 
that neither linearity nor non-linearity should be taken for granted a-priori across 
samples. 
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In chapter 2, the choice of the specific unobserved components' model to be 
estimated - based on wide-ranging preliminary identification tests - allows some 
conclusions, which are also of interest per se: 
First, in both the (linear) Phillips equation and in the (quadratic) Okun relation, 
the unemployment gap relates only contemporaneously to the explained variables. 
Hence, no speed-limits effects are present in the Phillips trade-off, in contrast to some 
earlier literature on the subject, but in accordance with more recent results elsewhere in 
the literature. 
Second, the trade-off equation is augmented with the deviation of domestic 
inflation from imported inflation in the previous quarter, which seems to summarise 
well the exogenous shocks affecting the inflation of the Area during the sample period. 
Notably, variables such as productivity and exchange-rates were not found to be 
statistically relevant in the Phillips equation. This result contrasts with some literature 
that has been including a large number of such variables possibly affecting inflation 
exogenously, without testing for their individual significance. 
Third, the NAIRU is successfully modelled as a random walk with a drift which 
itself follows a random walk, while the random walk process driving potential real 
output has, in turn, a constant drift. This identification result challenges some recent 
literature that had been imposing similar stochastic processes for the NAIRU and 
potential real output of the Euro Area. With our model for the NAIRU, we find no 
evidence of hysteresis, when it is modelled as a feed-back from lagged gaps to the 
neutral rate of unemployment. 
One exercise in chapter 2 that also allows some worthy of note conclusions, is a 
systematic comparison between the results of estimation of the identified model and 
those of a standard backward-looking Phillips curve. It turns out that most hyper-
parameters' estimates are quite close, as well as the estimates for the unobserved 
components, and the results of the asymmetry tests. The most detectable difference 
happens in the estimate of the Phillips' trade-off elasticity - which decreases from 0.053 
in the adaptive expectations model, to 0.042 in the forward-looking equation with near-
rational expectations of inflation, even though its statistical significance remains stable 
at 5 percent. These point estimates are equivalent to about 0.21 and 0.17, respectively, if 
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an annualised rate of inflation had been used in the estimation, which are not inferior to 
estimates obtained in recent research for the US case. Hence, our results clearly 
challenge the studies that had been claiming that there was no Phillips relation in 
Europe, and has identified conditions for a proper detection of that significant trade-off. 
These include most especially, a proper choice of functional forms for the Phillips and 
Okun equations, a model-consistent time-varying NAIRU, and some deviation of 
expectations from full rationality. 
Finally, the confidence bands for our estimates of the time-varying NAIRU, 
including all the sources of uncertainty - filter and parameter -, are in line with the 
related research on different economic areas in different places in the literature. 
Essentially, they are very wide and advise caution when using such NAIRU estimates 
for the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
In chapter 3, we take on the unemployment gap estimates of chapter 2, and 
document a striking improvement in the Taylor trade-off of the Euro Area, around 1986. 
The simultaneous fall in the volatility of the gap and inflation continues during the 
1990s, although less impressively than at the turn from the first to the second half of the 
80s. This phenomenon mimics the evolution of the macroeconomic volatility in other 
developed areas, such as the US - although, in comparison to that case, with some lag. 
This evaluation of the Taylor trade-off, taken together with the stability of the 
coefficients associated to lagged inflation in the Phillips equation of chapter 2 - when 
estimated as time-varying coefficients, in section 2.5.2 - conveys a clear story regarding 
the time-series properties of the Euro Area inflation rate throughout the period. In short, 
the Euro Area inflation has become less volatile, but has maintained its persistence - a 
story that seems quite close to that of the US, according to some recent research on this 
topic. 
Bearing in mind that the gap series used to assess the Taylor trade-off has been 
estimated, in chapter 2, with a constant Phillips elasticity, we come across a transparent 
interpretation about the joint evolution of both unemployment-inflation trade-offs of the 
Area throughout 1970-2001, from the very beginning of chapter 3. Under the 
assumptions of our estimation of chapter 2 - most especially a time-varying NAIRU - 
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we find out that the Phillips trade-off - between the levels of the gap and inflation - has 
been constant, while the Taylor trade-off - between the variances of the gap and 
inflation - has decreased markedly since around 1986. This finding has been confirmed, 
in chapter 3, as a change in the Phillips elasticity is rejected, in favour of other structural 
changes driving the simultaneous improvement in the gap and inflation volatility. 
 
In search for the causes behind the improvement in the second-moments trade-
off, we reach a crucial conclusion about the monetary history of the Area, in chapter 3. 
We find that one important cause for that improvement is that, after 1986, a well-
identified monetary policy regime targeting a low rate of inflation has emerged in the 
aggregate data of the Area. Specifically, assuming a standard quadratic functional form, 
we successfully estimate a loss function of the Area's notional central bank, with 
aggregate data since 1986:I, and identify the monetary regime as one of strict inflation 
targeting - at slightly above 2.5 percent - with a significant degree of interest rate 
smoothing. Hence, our research offers formal evidence that clarifies the extent of a 
well-known stylised fact of the Area's monetary integration in the years before the 
creation of EMU - that sovereignty of national monetary policy had been given up by 
EMS countries well before formal loss of monetary autonomy in 1999. Moreover, our 
finding implies that the use of US data to draw lessons for Euro-system monetary 
policy, in some recent research, may have been unwarranted, as aggregate Euro Area 
data after 1986 might have been used instead. 
In addition, chapter 3 offers signals that milder supply shocks and higher 
monetary policy efficiency - the ability of policymakers to maintain actual interest rates 
close to their optimal path - also seem to have contributed the fall in the Area 
macroeconomic volatility since 1986, in addition to the policy regime change. In fact, 
the standard error of the residuals of both our inflation equation, and the equation 
describing the optimality conditions for the policy instrument, decreased markedly from 
1972-1985 to 1986-2001. 
In chapter 3, we make use of two alternative inverse control and estimation 
procedures recently used for the US case by autonomous researchers - optimal control 
with GMM, and dynamic programming with FIML estimation - to study the role of the 
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monetary regime in the Taylor trade-off improvement of the Euro Area. This enhances 
the robustness of our conclusions regarding the Euro Area and, in addition, sheds some 
light into the causes of some discrepancies in the results about the US case. 
With respect to robustness of our results, both methods identify a regime of strict 
inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing, and estimate the inflation target slightly 
above 2.5 percent. Also, both estimate identical percent changes in the standard errors 
of their Phillips and optimising interest rate equations, from 1972-1985 to 1986-2001, 
which may be considered, somewhat, signals about the changes in volatility of supply 
shocks and optimality of monetary policy. 
The striking broad accordance that we reach with these methods, on the Euro 
Area case, is not seen in their use by independent researchers on the US case. Hence, we 
suspect that the divergence of results in the U.S. case is due to differences in details of 
the empirical frameworks - namely data sources, discount factor calibration, and sample 
period delimitation. One particular divergence that we do observe in our results with the 
two methods, which also appears in the results of the US literature, is the estimate of the 
weight of interest rate smoothing in the central bank's loss function. Our literature 
review and econometric work confirm that interest rate smoothing remains an open 
problematic issue, both theoretically and empirically. Our assessment of the issue 
suggests that the dynamic programming with FIML approach may suffer from 
numerical problems, and that the optimal control with GMM estimation method seems 
to estimate a loss function that is closer to its theoretical foundations. 
 
Overall, our results show that there is an outstanding resemblance between the 
causes broadly identified as explaining the fall in macroeconomic volatility during the 
80s in the case of the Euro Area and in the case of the US. Essentially, the change of 
monetary policy regime, towards a targeting of a low rate of inflation, is now known to 
have been crucial for that favourable outcome in both areas. The notable singularity of 
the Euro Area, here, is that this development has occurred in the context of a de facto 
loss of national monetary autonomy from most its member-states, in favour of the 
leadership of the EMS policy by Germany - the country with the best record as inflation 
fighter. 
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Having in mind the prevalence of formal monetary and economic autonomy by 
the Euro Area member-states until 1999, it is also noteworthy that our work shows how 
the well-known Rudebusch-Svensson model describes the dynamic structure of the 
Area macro-economy, at least since 1986, once a proper model identification is done. 
The similarity with the modelling of the US economy is remarkable, as is the contrast 
with difficulties in fitting this model to some smaller and more open individual 
economies. A test of stability of this model suggests that the structure of the Area 
macroeconomy may have changed somewhat ahead of the EMU creation, probably at 
1995, which may be valuable information for future research on the EMU macro and 
monetary regime. 
Some exploratory analysis at the end of chapter 3, based on the structural 
stability tests results, offers some indications that the monetary policy regime that 
emerged in the Euro Area after 1986:I may have changed by 1995:II, probably ahead of 
the EMU regime. Specifically, the actual inflation target may have moved closer to the 
official 2 percent target. However, we note that the data available so far does not allow 
a precise scrutiny of this question - we argue that only when more data is available can 
any study of the EMU monetary policy regime be accomplished. 
 
The issues pertaining to the specific vintage of statistical data used in monetary 
policy analysis receive a large attention, both in chapter 2 and chapter 3 of our work. 
In chapter 2, we show how the end-of-sample kalman filter estimates of the 
unemployment gap are sensitive to statistical uncertainty, computing the NAIRU and 
the gap with quasi-real-time data as of 1998:II, for a more fair comparison with the 
estimates in the ECB's AWMD. This statistical uncertainty, associated to the somewhat 
large confidence bands around unobserved components estimates and their typical 
widening by the end of samples, advises caution in the use of output or unemployment 
gap estimates in the conduction of monetary policy. 
A natural corollary of the previous reasoning is that the statistical uncertainty 
also advises caution in the choice of the estimates of the gaps that are to be used in 
monetary policy analysis. Hence, our decisions regarding the unemployment gap data to 
be used in chapter 3. In fact, motivated by chapter 2 results, and by results in the 
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expanding literature on the importance of real-time data for monetary policy analysis, 
we use the unemployment gap obtained in chapter 2 with the kalman filter, and not with 
the smoother. We describe this recursive estimate as a quasi-real-time unemployment 
gap, and argue that it is, for the object of our study, the closest a researcher can get to 
the notional true data available to notional Euro Area policymakers in real-time, before 
1999. Furthermore, as the specification of the Philips equation in both chapters is quite 
similar, this choice of data adds consistency to our empirical exercise. Here, we diverge 
from the approach taken in studies of the US policymakers' preferences - where 
estimates of gaps available from official sources at the timing of the research have been 
used - and the success of our empirical analysis seems to encourage our approach. 
 
The interest devoted in chapter 2 to the possible asymmetry of the Phillips and 
Okun equations is paralleled, in chapter 3, by the study of possible asymmetry in the 
central bank loss function across expansions and recessions. Here, we integrate the 
literature of estimation of policymakers' preferences - specifically, the optimal control 
with GMM framework - with the literature assessing deviations of the loss function 
functional form from the standard quadratic approach. We employ the developed 
method in our case, assuming an official inflation target of 2 percent, and present our 
policymakers' preference estimates in an alternative form. Specifically, we show that the 
data alone can not discriminate between a strict inflation targeting regime with a 2.7 
percent target, with a quadratic loss, and, alternatively, a flexible inflation targeting 
regime with the official 2 percent target, in which policymakers disliked negative, but 
liked positive, unemployment gaps. Finally, we discuss the information requirements 
needed for overcoming this observational equivalence. 
 
4.2. Reflections for Future Research 
Monetary policy analysis is, at the moment, an extremely vivid area of research, 
with a huge ongoing effort, and plenty scope for new enquiries. Knowledge about the 
specific case of the Euro Area is, by itself, far from satisfactory, and clearly calls for 
additional research - especially because of the structural break caused by the EMU. This 
section mentions some possible extensions of the studies conducted in chapters 2 and 3, 
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motivated by some of the obtained results, or by recent developments of the author's 
perception about the topics in those chapters. 
 
First, the unobserved components models in chapter 2 could be enriched with 
additional measurement equations, suggested by economic theory, maybe improving the 
estimation of the NAIRU and potential output - not only their precision but also their 
flexible-price equilibrium attribute. A natural candidate would be a production function, 
and the inclusion of data from production factors - which could enable the estimation of 
the contribution of factors and their productivity to potential activity and cycles. 
Another natural candidate would be an aggregate demand, or IS, function, which would 
bring interest rate data into the model. Including an IS function seems particularly 
important, as it could solve one inconsistency between the results of chapter 2 and 
chapter 3. While in chapter 2 we do not reject the stability of the average growth rate of 
potential real output, in chapter 3 we observe a marked increase in the estimate of the 
equilibrium real interest rate, at the mid-80s - and these variables should be intimately 
associated, according to economic theory. 
In chapter 3, in order to retain comparability with previous studies on the US 
case, we adopted the backward-looking standard version of the Rudebusch-Svensson 
model. One second possible extension of this research would be to consider a structural 
model with optimising, forward-looking, IS and Phillips equations, which have more 
theoretical foundations. One natural way - along the lines of this thesis - of holding the 
empirical success of the model, would be to use near-rational expectations of inflation 
in both functions. This would obviously apply to chapter 2, also, if the system were 
extended with an IS function, as suggested above. 
A third extension of the study relates to the crucial topic of expectations of 
inflation. Our use of Laurence Ball's near-rational expectations of inflation has proved 
quite successful in our empirical work, and that is a crucial development in this thesis. 
However, expectations of inflation remain at the heart of modern monetary theory, and 
there are plenty ongoing developments of models of learning and deviation from full 
rationality. These ongoing contributions deserve a closer look in future research, as they 
may strengthen the theoretical roots of imperfect rationality. 
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This thesis offers an explanation for the reduction in the volatility of the gap and 
inflation, which includes the emergence of a well-defined monetary policy regime 
targeting a low rate of inflation. It follows that this explanation also helps in 
understanding the fall in the level of inflation. The thesis does not, however, explain the 
level of the unobserved component implicit in the estimated unemployment gap - the 
NAIRU. Although the explanation of the path of the Euro Area NAIRU has been 
intentionally excluded from this thesis, as mentioned in chapter I, it could be a fourth 
extension of our work. In fact, there now seems to be room for such a research 
programme, in view of recent explanations of the evolution of the US NAIRU based on 
determinants that can be measured at the macroeconomic level - such as the relation 
between the change in trend productivity and workers' wage aspirations. 
Finally, the fifth extension relates to the study of the EMU's monetary policy 
regime, and to the possibility of using the empirical frameworks employed in chapter 3, 
for that purpose, in future research. Several conditions are necessary to make that study 
possible, and others are advisable to strengthen its results. First, when a sufficient 
amount of additional data is collected, estimation of policymakers' preferences in the 
EMU policy regime could be achieved, with the structural stability tests in chapter 3 
suggesting that data posterior to 1995:II can be used for that purpose. Second, when 
possible, monthly data, instead of quarterly data, should be used, not only to enhance 
the degrees of freedom of estimation, but also in view of the periodicity of the ECB's 
Governing Council meetings. Third, when precise and credible information on the 
official inflation target is available, our optimal control with GMM estimation 
framework for testing for asymmetries in loss functions may be applied to investigate 
possible asymmetries in the ECB loss function. Fourth, when real-time data available to 
ECB policymakers is available, their preferences may be estimated with greater 
precision, and perhaps the interest rate smoothing puzzle can be clarified. 
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